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94th Congress 1 
2d Session J 



A Frame of Reference for Congress 



Congressional Research Service 


Printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Armed Services 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $1.45 


JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi, Chairman 

HENRY M. JACKSON. Washington 
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire 
HARRY F. BYRD, Jr., Virginia 
SAM NUNN, Geoipia 
GARY HART. Colorado 

T. Edward Brvswell, Jr., Chief Counsel and Staff Director 
John T. Ticer, Chief Chrk 

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 



Page 19, figure 4, bottom line before notes: USSR current status is 

Page 22, figure 5, U.S. nuclear artillery and U.S. margin both are 700. 

U.S. margin in helicopter carriers is + 5. 
Page 25, figure 8, U.S. tube artillery is 3,510; Soviet margin is 13,460. 
Page 44, Annex A: 

Army nuclear artillery: U.S. difference 1965 is +1,750; 1975 

is +700; net U.S. change is -1,050. 

Move Soviet Border Guards to left hand margin as main 

Page 58, 6th line from bottom: friendly aims. 


U.S. Senate, 
Committee on Armed Services, 
Wash in (/ton, D.C., January 22, 1976. 
Hon. John* C. Stennis, 
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, 
212 Russell Senate Office Building } 
Washington, B.C. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: At my request, the Congressional Research 
Service of the Library of Congress lias prepared a detailed study 
on "The United States/Soviet Military Balance" as a frame of 
reference for consideration of the Defense Department budget request. 
A copy is enclosed. 

I believe that this study is balanced, detailed, and thought-pro- 
voking. It has been reviewed by over 100 knowledgeable persons in 
the Executive and Legislative Branches. It contains the most com- 
prehensive and current unclassified data on the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the Soviet Union and the United States. It also 
suggests questions (rather than answers) which the Committee and 
the Congress might want to a^k in evaluating our national security 

In order to give this study the wider circulation which it deserves, 
I respectfully request that it be published as a Committee Print. 

John C. Culver. 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2013 


A Frame of Reference for Congress 




Senior Specialist in National Defense 


Research Assistant 


Congressional Research Service 

January 21, 1976 


The Soviet Union, alone among all countries in the world today, 
has sufficient strength to challenge America militarily in many areas 
of mutual interest overseas and bring power to bear on our homeland. 
Other countries, large and small, routinely pose additional threats 
that our leaders may wish to deter or deal with successfully, but the 
balance between U.S. and Soviet armed forces generally offers the 
best yardsticks with which to measure U.S. national defense require- 
ments. Appraisals contained herein therefore afford a unique frame 
of reference for reviewing U.S. military posture in general and the 
defense budget in particular. 

Part I, which introduces evidence, identifies a strong shift in the 
quantitative military balance toward the Soviet Union over the past 
10 years. That conclusion comes as no surprise. It crops up annually 
at budget time, when Pentagon spokesmen call for more dollars with 
which to shore up this country's defense. 

Raw statistics, however, are significant only in context. What each 
side has is less cogent that what U.S. armed forces can do on demand, 
despite Soviet opposition. 

This study, which begins analysis at the point where most others 
stop, consequently compiles and applies a set of force sufficiency 
factors for ascertaining "how much is enough?", a question often 
asked by U.S. leaders, but never objectively answered. 

Part II identifies some imbalances as important, others as im- 
material, then goes on to examine the match between U.S. ends and 
means. One salient finding seems evident: misplaced priorities in 
many cases make poor use of available funds, by stressing inadvisable 
policies and inessential capabilities at the expense of critical sectors. 

Part III, keyed to 45 multipart questions for Congress, suggests 
ways to mate realistic ends with measured means, minimizing risks 
in the process. 

— Step One is to ascertain real requirements, predicated on 
imperative U.S. interests, objectives, and commitments. 

■ — Step Two is to reshape U.S. force structure, defense policies, 
and fund allocations so they correspond. 

— Bolstering budgets is the last, not the first, resort. 

A national defense debate, with serious participation b} r parties of 
all persuasions, would sharpen issues and identify optimum options. 
This study of the U.S. /Soviet military balance (as opposed to the 
total strategic balance, which involves political, economic, social, and 
other aspects of national power) is intended to lay part of the ground- 
work for Congressional contributions, not just this fiscal year, but in 
the future. 




Letter of Transmittal in 

Abstract vn 

Background, purpose, and scope i 


The quantitative balance: 

Strategic nuclear 3 

Tactical nuclear. 5 

Ground forces 5 

Naval forces 6 

Tactical air forces 6 

Strategic mobility forces 6 

NATO 'Warsaw pact 7 

The qualitative balance: 

Manpower 9 

Materiel 10 

NATO/ Warsaw pact 11 

The controlling matrix 12 


Causes of asymmetries: 

Geographic influences 13 

Technological influences 14 

Threat characteristics 14 

Pervasive policy decisions 14 

Quantum instead of incremental improvements 14 

Quality instead of quantity 15 

Firepower instead of manpower 15 

Sustained combat conce pts 15 

Total force concepts 16 

Cyclical cutbacks 16 

All-volunteer force 16 

Money for manpower 17 

Particular policy decisions 17 

Strategic nuclear policies. 17 

Tactical nuclear policies 18 

General purpose force policies 20 

Strategic mobility policies 21 

Assessing asymmetries : 

U . S . quantitative superiority 21 

Superiority disadvantageous 22 

Superiority deceptive 22 

Superiority an ambiguous asset 23 

Superiority an assured asset 23 

United States/Soviet quantitative equality 24 

Soviet quantitative superiority 24 

United States/Soviet correlations militarily immaterial 24 

United States/Soviet correlations militarily important 25 

Appraising U.S. ends and means: 

Present balance 28 

Strategic nuclear problems 28 

NATO-related problems 28 

Naval combat problems 29 

Strategic mobility problems 30 

Proj ected balance 30 

Research and development programs 30 

Procurement/deployment programs 31 

Budgetary emphasis 32 

Predicting Soviet intentions 33 

65-316 — 76 .2 



Identifying options 35 

Ascertaining real requirements: 

Review U.S. interests 35 

Review U.S. objectives 36 

Review U.S. commitments 36 

Review U.S. military roles and missions 37 

Adjusting policy guidelines: 

Review strategic nuclear policies 37 

Review general purpose policies 38 

Adjusting available means: 

Review U.S. force structure 38 

Review U.S. budget procedures 39 



A. Trends in the quantitative balance 43 

B. Force sufficiency factors 47 

C. Current U.S. defense commitments 55 

D. Glossary 57 

E. Abbreviations 69 


1. United States/Soviet numerical balance 4 

2. NATO's numerical balance 7 

3. The technological balance 11 

4. SALT I force levels 19 

5. U.S. quantitative superiority 22 

6. United States /Soviet quantitative equality 24 

7. Soviet quantitative superiority : Correlation between like forces 

militarily immaterial 25 

8. Soviet quantitative superiority: Correlation between like forces mili- 

tarily important 25 

9. U.S. aims to be accomplished 27 

10. Key U.S. shortcomings 27 



A Frame of Reference for Congress 

It is not true that more is alwa} r s better than less, or"that 
the nation could always use more. The United States could 
have ten times as man)- . . . forces as the Soviets and 
still not have enough, or one-tenth as many and have too 

Alain C. Exthoven 
K. Wayne Smith 
How Much is Enough? 


The Soviet Union, alone among all countries in the world today, lias 
sufficient strength to challenge America militarily in man}^ areas of 
mutual interest overseas and bring power to bear on our homeland. 
Other countries, large and small, routinely pose additional threats 
that our leaders may wish to deter or deal with successfully, but the 
balance between U.S. and Soviet armed forces generally offers the 
best yardstick with which to measure U.S. national defense 

Comparing military credits and debits, however, is a complex 
matter. Good big armed forces, for example, are almost always superior 
to good small ones. Quality commonly prevails over quantity only 
up to a point, beyond which numbers clearly take precedence. Still, 
great size can impede rather than improve performance, unless 
calculated to serve essential interests. Technology, in turn, is a poor 
substitute for first-class strategy. Reserve components augment 
active elements. Allies sometimes add to or detract from regional 
capabilities. Present status may be less meaningful than projections. 
A cornucopia of constraints condition capabilities. Consequently, 
some asymmetries between U.S. and Soviet armed forces are im- 
portant, others are immaterial. 

The purpose of this paper therefore is twofold: 

— First, to furnish the Congress with an objective analysis of the 

United States/Soviet militant balance. 1 

— More importantly, to provide a starting point for Congressional 

debate on the subject. 

Coverage comprises three sections: 

— Part I introduces evidence as dispassionately as possible. 

1 The strategic balance between two countries or coalitions involves all elements of national power: political 
stability at home and leverage abroad; national institutions and values; geographic strengths and weak- 
nesses; the economy, especially natural resources, industrial capacity, and finances; the people, including 
their numbers, location, character, morale, and education; the scientific and technological base: and, as the 
integrating factor, leadership. This study is devoted exclusively to the military balance, which is just one 
specialized aspect. 


— Part II examines that evidence in ways that segregate significant 

U.S. shortcomings from those that are superficial. 

— Part III suggests ways to remedy flaws by rematching ends with 


Conclusions concerning Soviet intentions and certain qualitative 
considerations are strictty circumscribed by the absence of classified 
information in this study. Statistical summaries that form the frame- 
work for analysis coincide with official figures in some cases, and 
slightly conflict in others. Such deficiencies are matters of minor 
detail that do not affect emy findings. 

The end product, which supports no special brief, avoids branding 
the evident balance as either "good" or "bad." Instead, it affords the 
Congress a frame of reference for shaping its own consensus, if so 
inclined, in open and executive sessions. 2 

2 See Annex D for a glossary of specialized terms. Annex E summarizes abbreviations. 


The quantitative military balance since 1965 has shifted substanti- 
ally in favor of the Soviet Union (see Figure 1 and Annex A for presenl 
status and trends). Indeed, no less a scholar than Harvard'- Samuel P. 
Huntington identifies "the relative decline in American military 
power'' as the "preeminent feature in [contemporary] international 
politics." : 

This section -imply displays comparative statistics. Their true 
significance is revealed only in context with other relevant factors, 
which are reviewed in subsequent segments. Readers therefore should 
postpone personal conclusions until all pertinent evidence has been 
introduced and examined. 

Strategic nuclear 

This country's numerical superiority in strategic nuclear weapons, 
which was -till evident a decade ago, has dissolved. 

The United States had three times as many intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) as the Soviet Union in 1965 (854 to 224). The 
Soviets had more ballistic missile submarines (SSB, SSBX), but we 
had four time- as many sub-launched missiles (SLBMs, 496 to 120), 
because U.S. boats mounted 16 tubes each and theirs averaged only 
three. Neither side had yet deployed multiple independently targetable 
reentry vehicles (MIRVs), but 176 of our Polaris A-3 SLBMs carried 
three multiple reentry vehicles (MBVs) each bv June 1965, so the 
warhead totals stood at 1,702 U.S. and 390 Soviet. 2 

1 Huntington, Samuel P., After Containment: The Functions of the Military Establishment, The Annal 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. March 1973, p. 5. 

2 MRV data furnished by Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, January 16, 1976. 


Figure 1. — United Stales/ Soviet numerical balance 
[See Annex A for details} 

U.S. Superiority Soviet Superiority 






Air defense 


Fighter/attack aircraft 

Medium bombers 



Aircraft carriers 
Aircraft afloat 

Anti-tank Weapons 
Logistic tail 

Air defense 



Attack Submarines 

Cruise missile ships 

Combat boats 

Aircraft ashore 

Mine countermeasure ships* 



*Xot shown in Annex A. 




Today, the United States lags in every category, except for MIRYert 
launchers and aggregate warheads. Continued U.S. ascendancy in 
quantities of heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles [ALCMs] 3 
compensates in part, but Soviet superiority in sea-launched cruise 
missiles (SLCMs) offsets that advantage to some extent. 4 

The United States/Soviet balance between anti-ballistic missile 
[ABM] forces is close to irrelevant, since neither country ever deplo3 r ed 
extensive installations. Air defense assets, however, are a different 
case. This country, in conjunction with Canada, maintained the 
world's most comprehensive system in the mid-1960s. Ten years 
later, that accumulation has been cut to the bone. Only 12 dedicated 
fighter-interceptor squadrons, half in the Ai#National Guard [ANG], 
will remain after phaseouts are complete. 5 All surface-to-air missile 
[SAM] batteries once assigned to the Army Air Defense Command 

3 Short-Range Attack Missiles (SRAM) now arc deployed by U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC). 
Medium-range ALCMs and SLCMs arc in research and development stages. 

4 Shaddock, which is the only Soviet SLCM with strategic nuclear capabilities, is essentially an anti- 
ship missile. 

• Present plans will eliminate six F-101 squadrons from the ANG by the end of FY 1977, reducing U.S. 
fighter-interceptor strength to 12 active and reserve F-106 squadrons. Schlesinger, James R., Annual De- 
fense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, FY 1977 Authorization 
Requesl and FY 1976-1980 Defense Programs. Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. OIL, February 5, 
1975, p. 11-41. Updated telephonic-ally by Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5) on November 5, 1975. 

(ARADCOM) were inactivated in FY 1974. 6 By way of contrast, the 
Soviet air defense shield currently contains 2,700 interceptor aircraft 
and 12,000 SAMs. 7 That agglomeration, which is larger than ours at 
its apogee, is constantly being improved. 

Tactical nuclear 

U.S. tactical nuclear delivery systems are concentrated in general- 
purpose land- and carrier-based fighter/attack aircraft and tube 
artillery. 8 Conversely, the Soviets feature specialized cruise and 
ballistic missiles, although impressive Backfire bombers are beginning 
to supplement their fleet of obsolescent Badgers, whose penetration 
prospects are poor against well-defended targets in Eurasia. 

Air power gives the United States an evident global edge in forces 
for tactical nuclear purposes. The Soviets, in turn, evince extreme 
quantitative superiority in central Europe, where their surface-to- 
surface missiles outnumber ours by about 10:1 and their 700 nuclear- 
capable aircraft by something like two-to-one. 9 

Ground forces 

The numerical strength of U.S. ground forces, including Marines; 
has never matched Moscow's massive arm}'. Soviet personnel strength 
presently is 2 l / 2 times that of the U.S. establishment, and our divisions 
are outnumbered 9:1 (168 Soviet, 19 U.S. Army/Marine). 10 Some 9,000 
U.S. main battle tanks compare unfavorably with 34,500 in the Krem- 
lin's armored force, 11 which has 40,000 steel-plated personnel carriers, 
double the size of the U.S. contingent. Their stock of anti-tank 
(AT) missiles is almost triple ours. 12 America has only two clear quanti- 
tative advantages: we have many more helicopters, and the U.S. 
Marine Corps dwarfs its Soviet counterpart, which fields a small 
fraction as many men (197,000 to 12,000), has no divisions, and no 
organic air support. 

6 Ibid, p. TI-42; update identical. Seven Nike Hercules batteries (3 in Alaska, 4 in Florida), plus four 
Hawk batteries in Florida, currently are under operational command of Air Defense Command (ADCOM), 
but are available for tactical deployment ov 

7 There are 9,500 SAM launchers in the Soviet inventory. Some have multiple rails. The number is de- 
creasing somewhat , but electronic counter count ermeasures (ECC.M) are improving at current sites, accord- 
ine: to Defense Intelligence Agency on January 15, 1976. 

s The U.S. Army has some nuclear capable missiles and atomic demolitions. Our Navy's Terrier and 
TALOS missiles are nuclear capable in surface-to-surface and surface-to-air modes. The Navy also has 
nuclear depth charges. Nevertheless, our tactical nuclear might is mainly as noted above. 

; - The Soviet Air Force has only about 350 pilots qualified in tactical delivery techniques, according to 
Defense Intelligence Agency on January 15, 1976. Warsaw Pact air forces are unable to assist, since they 
have no nuclear weapons. NATO air forces, in contrast, contribute substantially. 

'" The U.S. Army and Marine Corps increased from 1,153,000 to 1,877,000 active duty personnel between 
1965 and 1963 in response to involvement in the Vietnam War, then cut back to a combined strength of 

About 65 Soviet Category 1 divisions are at 75 percent or greater personnel strength with complete equip- 
ment. The ratio between those forces and active U.S. Army/Marine divisions is roughly 3.5-1. Soviet divi- 
sions at full strength have only about half the manpower of U.S. counterparts, but almost as many tanks: 

States Soviet 

U.S. armored, Soviet tank divisions: 

Men _ 17,500 8,-100 

Tanks.. 324 316 

U.S. mechanized, Soviet motorized rifle divisions: 

Men 16,000 10,500 

Tanks 216 188 

11 U.S. Army Marine and Soviet main battle tanks today are all mediums. The U.S.S.R. also has 2,500 
antiquated heavy tanks that are not counted above. 

!- TOW and Dragon are the primary U.S. AT weapons. Squad-level LAWs (light assault weapons) are 
effective only for last-ditch close combat. 


Naval forces 

Ten years ago, the Soviet Navy had already outstripped the United 
States two-to-one in attack submarines (336 to 169), but its surface 
fleets had just begun to break out of their coastal cocoons and compete 
on higb sea>. Today, they have more major combatants in every 
category except aircraft carriers, and a virtual monopoly on surface- 
to-surface anti-ship cruise missiles, which are mounted on cruisers, 
destroyers, submarines, and small craft. The Soviets have even 
surpassed us in numbers of amphibious ships, ending- once dramatic 
U.S. dominance — not because they built many more," but because we 
have halved our force since 1965. 

Three important U.S. pluses compensate in part for otherwise 
lopsided statistical comparisons in Soviet favor. First, the U.S. Navy 
includes seven nuclear-powered surface combatants. 13 The Soviet 
Navy has none (although its 75 nuclear attack and cruise missile 
submarines outnumber our 63). u Second, U.S. carrier air power is 
unsurpassed. Moscow as yet has no fighter/attack aircraft afloat, 
and still will rely on short-range, vertical/short takeoff and landing 
(VSTOL) versions when ships of the Kiev Class enter active service. 
Last, but surely not least, the U.S. Navy not only has more ASW 
aircraft afloat, but more shore-based as well (450 to 360 in the latter 
category, which commonly is considered a Soviet quantitative 
strength) . 

Tactical air forces 

America's land- and carrier-based combat aircraft, excluding 
forces for strategic air defense, quantitatively outclassed Soviet 
tactical air power in 1965 as they do today. However, that comparison 
is deceptive, since a large segment of our naval air arm is dedicated 
to fleet defense. The Soviet Air Force presently has 25 percent more 
fighter/attack aircraft and medium bombers than the U.S. Air Force 
and Marine Corps combined. Total tactical air transport ratios 
favor the Soviet Union (500 U.S. C-130s, 800 Soviet Cubs). 

Strategic mobility forces 

Strategic airlift and sealift forces are used to shift personnel, 
equipment, and supplies intercontinentally or between widely sepa- 
rated theaters. 

America's sealift assets under Military Sealift Command (MSC) 
and in the U.S. Merchant Marine were more than twice as large as 
those of the Soviet Union in 1965. 15 Since then, situations have 
reversed. The net U.S. loss, from +1,433 vessels to —1,349, exceeds 
the size of our 1965 inventory, which was 2,778 (we presently count 
1,009). 16 

Military Airlift Command (MAC) had amassed a marked numerical 
superiority over Soviet strategic airlift in 1965, and increased the 
disparity during the past decade. Accurate analogies are elusive, how- 
ever, since both countries augment military airlift with commercial 

13 U.S. nuclear-powered surface ships currently include two aircraft carriers and five cruisers. Two more 
carriers and four cruisers are under conslrudion. 

14 The United States has no cruise missile submarines. 

!5 The former Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) was redesignated Military Sealift Command on 
August 1, 1970. Military Air Transport Service (MATS) became Military Airlift Command on January 1, 

16 Military cargo ship capacities vary from about 7,000 to 34,000 tons. U.S./Soviet tonnage comparisons 
might be more meamngful than tallying ships, but reliable unclassified statistics are not available. 

carriers. Jet transports of our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), for 
example, handled nine-tenths of all passenger service between the 
U.S. west coast and Vietnam during America's involvement in that 
conflict. 17 Soviet Aeroflot aircraft are predesignated for similar purposes. 
One anomaly is worth special mention. Soviet strategic mobility, 
unlike that of the United States, depends heavily on overland move- 
ment by road or rail to NATO Europe, the Middle East, the Indian/ 
Pakistani peninsula, and parts of Asia that front on the western 
Pacific. U.S. airlift and sealift assets therefore are counterbalanced in 
those critical areas by Soviet interior land lines. 

NATO/Warsaw Pact 

Europe is the only area where U.S. and Soviet combat forces are 
in direct and constant contact, The balance in that theater is currently 
more important than in any other. (See Figure 2). 

The United States presently provides about 10 percent of NATO's 
ground forces, 20 percent of its naval forces, and a quarter of its tactical 
air forces, discounting 50,000 American troops that perform specialized 
missions in Europe (such as those with Defense Communications 
Agency), but are not controlled by U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM). Soviet proportions in the Warsaw Pact are much greater 
in every category. 18 


United Soviet Warsaw 

States Union NATO Pac 

Combat/support personnel. 260,000 595,000 625,000 895, COO 


Committed 2 5 

Armor 2 

Other 3 

Reinforcements s 11 

Armor. 2 

Other 9 


Reserve * 



Grand total 24 

Tanks 5 2,100 

Tactical aircraft 5 400 

Light bombers 0) 

Medium bombers. Oj 

Fighter attack 40u 

I nterceptors C 


« NATO and Warsaw Pact figures include the United States and the U.S.S.R. European countries counted are West Ger- 
many, the Low Countries, Luxembourg, and Norway, plus British troops in Germany; East Germany, Czechoslovakia, 
Pcland, and most of European Russia. 

2 United States and NATO committed divisions include dual-based U.S. brigades normally stationed in the United 

a United States and NATO divisions for reinforcement purposes include all active U.S. Army divisions, less 1 in Korea, 
plus 1 Marine division. Soviet divisions are Category 1 and 2 only. 

4 Reserve component divisions include all U.S. National Guard divisions and Soviet Category 3 divisions. 

5 Tanks and tactical aircraft include only those in countries/regions noted above. U.S. carrier-aircraft and dual-based 
fighter squadrons are excluded. 












































300 { 











17 Annual Air Force Almanac Issue, 1973, Air Force Magazine, May, 1973, p. 80-81, 112-113. 
13 Proportions verified by DOD on January 19, 1976. 

65-3 1G— 76- 


United Soviet Warsaw 

States Union NATO Pact 






























































Combat support personnel 10,000 115.000 575,000 345.000 

Divisions: 2 









Land-based aircraft 2 3 

Fighter attack 

I nterce ptors 

Light bombers 

Surface combatants 4 

Attack carriers 

Helicopter carriers 


Other escorts 

Attack submarines 



Carrier aircraft 4 

Fighter squadrons... 

Attack squadrons 

1 NATO and Warsaw Pact figures include the United States and the U.S.S.R. 

2 Includes forces in Italy, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, plus selected Soviet units in Hungary and southern Russia. 

3 U.S. aircraft in Spain are included above with tactical air support for central Europe (3 fighter squardons, total 54 

4 Normal deployments only. All 3 Soviet aircraft carriers belong to the Black Sea Fleet, with 1 in the Mediterranean. 
Great Britain currently operates 1 attack carrier with 30 aircraft. France has 2 with 40 aircraft each. None is shown on 
figure 2, since all 3 normally operate in the Atlantic, rather than the Mediterranean. 

Source: Mainly the Military Balance, 1975-76, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975, pp. 5-26, 
95-102. Augmented and updated by various DOD agencies, January 1976. 

Ground forces of the two principal protagonists are grossly dis- 
proportionate in the crucial center sector, where 190,000 troops in 
U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) account for most of our personnel 
strength. Fewer than 75,000 of those are in divisions, versus 250,000 
for the Soviet Union. Twenty-five Soviet Category 1 divisions, backed 
by 7,000 tanks, confront five U.S. divisions with 2,100 tanks along 
the East German and Czech borders. 19 An estimated 46 more Soviet 
Category 1 and 2 divisions are sited in Hungary, Poland, and Euro- 
pean Russia as combat-ready reinforcements. 20 

Some 2,300 Soviet tactical aircraft face 400 from the United States 
astride the Iron Curtain. 21 The air-ground balance is better along 
NATO's south flank, where neither superpower stations sizable army 
elements and carrier aircraft augment shore-based squadrons. 

The naval balance in the Mediterranean tips markedly toward the 
United States on a day-to-day basis, but Soviet surge capabilities are 
impressive. The Kremlin, for example, massed 95 ships of all types off 
Turkey's south coast, plus 30 more in the Indian Ocean, during the 
Arab-Israeli outburst of 1973. The U.S. Sixth Fleet totalled 60 during 
the same period, including three attack carriers. An Essex-Class 

19 Statistics in Figure 2 conflict somewhat with those in the text, which considers only those divisions in 
East Germany and Czechoslovakia so as to present the best possible U.S. and the worst possible Soviet case. 

U.S. tank strength includes those stockpiled in Europe for divisions that would deploy by air from the 
United States in emergency. 

20 Ramifications are viewed in Record, Jeffrey, Sizing Up the Soviet Army, The Brookings Institution, 
1975, 51 p.; and in Lawrence, Richard D. and Record, Jeffrey, U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alterna- 
tive, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1974, 136 p. 

21 Tactical aircraft figures include fighter/attack and air defense interceptors. U.S. strength includes squad- 
rons based in Spain. The Soviet figure would swell to about 3,200 if fighter, attack units in the three western- 
most Military Districts of European Russia were added. 


carrier, with five escorts, constituted our Indian Ocean complement at 
that time. 22 

The true balance, of course, includes a blend of allies on both sides. 

Warsaw Pact air/ground forces in northern and central Europe 
outnumber NATO in nearly every category. NATO reinforcements, 
including U.S. National Guard units, are less numerous than those of 
rival nations. The Soviet side could quickly achieve the classic ratio 
of 3:1 superiority in ground combat forces that many military men 
cite as a prerequisite for successful offensive operations. 23 More im- 
portantly, the Kremlin could mass massive power at times, place-, and 
under conditions of its choosing, while NATO defends a front that 
stretches 500 straightline miles from the Baltic to the Austrian border. 

Quantitative comparisons between NATO and Warsaw Pact naval 
forces appear more advantageous, but Figure 2 affords an index only 
for those forces normally positioned in the Mediterranean. NATO, 
there as elsewhere, still has an absolute monopoly on attack carriers 
armed with high-performance fighter/attack aircraft, but ships from 
both sides, especially U.S. and Soviet men-of-war, enter and leave 
the Atlantic at will. Natural geographic choke points, such as the 
Greenland-Iceland-Faeroes Gap, Gibraltar, and the Dardenelies, 
would help NATO's navies restrict free Soviet passage after, but not 
before, any outbreak of hostilities. 


The raw quantitative balance just revealed must be conditioned by 
qualitative considerations, some of which benefit the United States, 
others the Soviet Union. A sample list, in no particular order of 
importance, includes: leadership; discipline; morale and motivation; 
education; training; combat experience; organization; command and 
control arrangements; staying power; and technology. The sum de- 
termines effectiveness. 

Superiority in all or most of those categories can enable numerically 
inferior forces to compete successfully — categorically, or within limits, 
according to circumstances. Conversely, forces with great quantita- 
tive superiority could prove insufficient if serious shortcomings were 
evident in even one of those entries. 

Coverage below simply hits a few high spots for exemplary purpose^. 


Comparing the U.S. and Soviet military manpower pools is a sub- 
jective process, since the basic building blocks are produced by sharply 
different social S3^stems. Observers at one pole opine that respective 
national characters exert a "permanent and often decisive influence 
upon the weight [each] nation is able to put into the scales of inter- 
national politics." 24 Authorities at the antipode scoff at national stere- 

-- Moorer, Thomas H., Soviet Presence in the Indian Ocean. A "talking paper" to assist his presentation 
to the. Senate Armed Services Committee on March 12, 1974, p. 3; and'Cottrcll, Alvin J.. The Political- 
Military Balance in the Persian Gulf Region, Washington, Georgetown Institute for InternatioD 
Strategic Studies, March. 1974, p. 8. 

23 The 3:1 ratio ostensibly required for offensive operations has no factual foundation. Victory frequently 
goes to small, but cleverly maneuvered forces. 

24 Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, 4th Ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, p. 122, 


o types (Americans are individualistic and inventive, Soviets physically 
strong and stoic), which they contend are unsubstantiated. 25 

Military training, complemented by civilian education, contributes 
to force effectiveness. Both sides stress comprehensive uniservice pro- 
grams, joint service exercises, and operations with allies. Each exhibits 
idiosyncrasies that can be assessed quite differently, depending on 
perspective. The Kremlin, for example, places top priority on political 
indoctrination, which many U.S. military men believe is less important 
than "practical" matters. The DOD stipulation that 80 percent of all 
U.S. Army enlisted men should have high school diplomas finds no 
counterpart in Soviet policy. 26 In short, indices that indicate training 
excellence in one establishment may not apply to the other. 

Combat experience is somewhat more straightforward. The Soviet 
Arm}^ and Air Force since World War II have been used only to sup- 
press unrest in satellite states and skirmish on the Chinese border. 
The Soviet "blue water" Navy has never fired a shot in anger. By 
way of contrast, all four U.S. services were committed in the Korean 
War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1965-1972), not to mention 
the Dominican Crisis (1965). However, the U.S. Navy was essentially 
unopposed at sea in every instance, and neither our Army nor Air 
Force experienced armed conflict under conditions analogous to those 
in NATO Europe. Whether U.S. combat experience constitutes pluses 
or minuses thus is contentious — some lessons may indeed be sound, 
others might best be unlearned. 

Intangibles like temper are especially tricky to evaluate, unless the 
evidence is clear, as it was in the early 1970s, when disciplinary 
difficulties devitalized U.S. armed forces: drug abuse, "underground" 
activity, crime, racial friction, irresponsibility, and rebellion against 
authority were common manifestations. 27 Positive action by the 
Defense Department and military services, combined with the U.S. 
withdrawal from Vietnam, eviscerated or eradicated many of the 
contributary causes. Order reputably has been restored — the Secretary 
of Defense last addressed such "special problems" in his annual posture 
statement two years ago — but only the crucible of combat could 
confirm the current United States/Soviet qualitative balance in this 


Technological supremacy traditionally has been a strong U.S. suit, 
and remains so in many areas, as Figure 3 shows. The day has passed, 
however, when U.S. scientific ascendancy can be taken for granted. 
Soviet efforts already equal our own in several respects, surpass us in 
others and exhibit strong momentum. 28 

25 Organski, A.F.K., World Politics, 2d Ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, p. 87. 

28 U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings before the Appropriations Committee on Department of Defense 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976. Part 2, Department of the Army. 94th Congress, 1st Session. Washing- 
ton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, p. 12. 

The Kremlin advocates 12 years of schooling for every Soviet citizen, but no policy excludes conscripts 
with less education until that aim is achieved. 

27 Congressional concern was considerable during that period. See for example U.S. Congress. House. 
Committee on Armed Services. Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the 
U.S. Navy. 92d Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Jan. 2, 1973. 29 p. 

2 s See Part II, section on Technological Influences, for a few specific comparisons of U.S. and Soviet 


Figure 3. — The technological balance 
U.S. Superiority Soviet Superiority 

Composite materials 
Guidance systems 
Night vision 
Nuclear-powered ships 
Optics; acoustics 
Submarine detection 
Submarine silencing 


Commonality of components 
Ease of maintenance 
Gas turbine engines for ships 
Rockets and ramjets 



Artillery ammunition 
Antisubmarine warfare 
Electronic counter-measures 
Guided munitions 
MIRV reliability 
Missile accuracy 
Survivable submarines 
Target acquisition 

1 A "pop up" technique that ejects ballistic missiles from silos or submarines using powerplants that are 
separate from the delivery vehicles. Primary ignition is delayed until projectiles aie safely clear of con- 
tainers/carriers, preserving the launcher intact for reuse if required. 

Armored personnel carriers 
Chemical warfare 
Cold weather equipment 
Engineer bridging 
ICBM "cold launch" 1 
ICBM payload, yield 
Low-level air defense 
Ship size versus firepower 
Short-range SSM 

NATO Warsaw Pact 

A wide range of qualitative considerations and constraints influence 
the NATO/ Warsaw Pact balance. 

Capabilities in the crucial center sector, for example, are conditioned 
especially by missions (large Soviet elements reputedly are required 
to enforce internal security in satellite states 29 ) ; the reliability of 
allies (some forces in the Soviet sphere might revolt in emergency, 
some NATO states stay neutral); mobilization speeds (Soviet ground 
forces fill Category 2 and 3 divisions already cadred, this country 
calls up Reserves and the National Guard) ; reinforcement times (the 
Soviets via short land lines, U.S. forces by sea and air) ; the readiness 
of reserves in terms of equipment and training; command structures 
(Soviet central authority versus NATO's need for consensus) ; com- 
monality of arms, ammunition, equipment, and repair parts (all 
accoutrements are similar on the Soviet side, many of NATO's are 
not); and vulnerabilities (NATO's installations are concentrated, the 
Warsaw Pact's are dispersed). 30 

Raw naval figures are misleading in the Mediterranean, where 
NATO outnumbers its rivals markedly. Soviet submarines are difficult 
to detect with available ASW devices, even in those shallow waters, 
because thermal layers and many merchantmen distort sounds. 
Moscow's new-model anti-ship cruise missiles pose potentially serious 
threats. Some are sea-skimmers. Some have steep trajectories that 

29 What percentage of Soviet forces are devoted to internal security is debatable. The Kremlin, however, 
did add five divisions to its East European deployments during the Czech rebellion of 1968, and all nv 

30 For basic considerations, see The Military Balance, 1975-76, p. 95-102 and Collins, John M., U.S. Military 
Support for NATO, prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee, Jan. 19, 1973, p. 20-31. Detail 
are developed in Record, Jeffrey, Sizing Up the Soviet Army, p. 8-32, 47-49. 


demand a different defense. Many can be deployed on small, speedy 
craft that are cheap to produce in comparison with NATO's surface 
combatants, which make superior targets. Soviet target acquisition 
capabilities currently are limited to the range of shipboard seekers 
for most purposes, but close peacetime contacts with NATO's naval 
forces in the Mediterranean help compensate — reaction times to 
surprise attacks might be measured in seconds. In short, comparing 
the combat effectiveness of forces whose functions and characteristics 
are so different leaves great latitude for error. 31 

The controlling matrix 

Manpower and materiel attributes like those just outlined are almost 
meaningless in isolation. The overall qualit}^ of opposing armed 
forces can only be ascertained in context with the organizational struc- 
ture, strategic concepts, and logistical apparatus needed to orchestrate 
their actions. Those elements to a large extent are shaped by factors 
in Part II. 

31 Rules of thumb for comparing the strengths and weaknesses of opposing naval powers are delineated 
and discussed in U.S. Congress. House. Means of Measuring Naval Power, With Special Reference to U.S. 
and Soviet Activities in the Indian Ocean. Prepared for the Subcommittee on the Near East and South 
Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Congressional Research Service. 93d Congress, 2d Session. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 16 p. 


Quantitative and qualitative analyses of United States/Soviet 
armed forces simply identify salient asymme tries. To assess the im- 
portance of imbalances, it is necessan^ first to know why they exist. 
Critical U.S. deficiencies then can be isolated from those of slight 

Inequities for and against the United States (Figure 1-3) can be 
traced in part to geographic circumstance, technological peculiar- 
ities, and U.S. threat appraisals, but the preponderance ensued be- 
cause of deliberate polic\ r decisions by both superpowers, beginning 
three decades ago. 

Geographic influences 

Soviet armed forces safeguard the world's largest state, which 
stretches 3,000 miles north-to-south and 7,000 east-to-west, the latter 
distance being equal to the expanse between Washington, D.C. and 
Burma. NATO's forward defense forces abut Warsaw Pact buffer 
states, whose loyalty depends in part on a strong Soviet presence. A 
hostile China shares Siberia's lengthy southern frontier. Huge Soviet 
standing armies, air defenses, and tactical air establishments thus are 
understandable. 1 Carrier-based fighters are unnecessary. IBBMs/ 
MRBMs and medium bombers provide the requisite reach across 
Eurasia's land mass. The United States, still isolated by oceans 
despite technological developments, currently has different homeland 
defense problems. 

The U.S. economy, including aspects associated with national se- 
curity, relies extensively on imports. Intercontinental commerce is 
important. Most of our defense commitments are overseas. We there- 
fore enjoin the U.S. Navy to keep critical sea lanes open in exigency 
and project offensive power onto foreign shores in support of American 
and allied interests. Strategic airlift plays imperative roles. 

The Soviet situation of course is quite different. That country is 
relatively self-sufficient in raw materials. Most allies under its aegis 
are directly accessible by land avenues. The Kremlin has been re- 
luctant to commit its own combat forces in far distant states since 
Khruschchev got his comeuppance in Cuba. 2 The Soviet Navy con- 
sequently is still structured primarily to protect the mother country 
by checking U.S. carrier air power and SSBNs, to shortstop U.S. rein- 
forcements for NATO, cut U.S. supply lines whenever required, and 
challenge Sixth Fleet's control of the Mediterranean. Attack sub- 
marines, anti-ship missiles, and fast patrol boats serve those purposes 
best. An embryonic core of aircraft carriers and amphibious ships 
is the first indication that Moscow may intend to extend its offensive 
reach and improve its ability to project political power. 

1 Many U.S. military men contend that Soviet forces far exceed t hose required for deterrence and defense, 
but Soviet standards for "how much is enough?" may be significantly different than ours. 

2 Soviet training teams, service troops, SAM crews, and interceptor pilots, all noncombatanf or defensive 
in nature, once flooded the Nile Delta to help protect the Kremlin's massive invest menl in miliiarv aid, but 
offensive forces in Egypt were always exclusively Aral). Cuban, not Soviet, forces now fight in Angola. 



Technological Influences 

Soviet quantitative advantages in fighter/attack aircraft count 
several models whose capabilities are grossly inferior to F-4 Phantoms, 
which have set the U.S. standard since 1962. 3 Even modern MIG- 
25s lack multipurpose adaptability, being mainly for reconnaissance 
and air defense. None equal our F-4's unrefueled combat radius, and 
none can be refueled in flight. Their ability to accomplish ground 
support missions falls far short of F-4s, which have a 16,000 lb pay- 
load capacity in comparison with an estimated 2,000 lb for MIG-21s 
and 2,800 lb for MIG-23s. 4 Some Soviet fighters could outperform 
F-4s in air-to-aii' combat, being fast, more maneuverable, and able 
to operate at higher altitudes, although U.S. avionic packages, elec- 
tronic countermeasures (ECM), and missile armaments reduce the 
margin. F-15 and F-16 aircraft hopefully will preserve our qualitative 
edge in the 19S0s. 3 As a result, U.S. decision-makers currently accept 
unspecified degrees of Soviet numerical superiority without undue 

The Soviet Army, with 1.710,000 more men than its U.S. counter- 
part, requires much more tactical airlift, as the balance sheet shows. 
The disparity in numbers, however, is disproportionate, becau-e 
nothing in the Soviet inventory matches performance characteristics 
of the U.S. C-130 fleet, which is easily the world's best. 

1 h reat character 1st ics 

Giant Soviet ground forces would imperil the continental United 
States only if accompanied by adequate amphibious assault, strategic 
airlift, and logi-tic support apparatus, which is not the case. Part of 
those forces, together with tactical air elements, are pinned down 
semipermanently along the Chinese border, where they pose no 
immediate threat to U.S. associates or allies. A substantial percentage 
of Soviet troops serve internal security purposes in satellite states. 
Such factors all limit U.S. general purpose force requirements. 

Pervasive policy decisions 

Deliberate U.S. policy decisions account for the quantitative and or 
qualitative ascendancy of Soviet armed forces in several areas. The 
seven summarized below overarch all others. 

Quantum instead of incremental improvements 
The prevailing U.S. approach to research and development, pred- 
icated on technological initiative, features "pioneering and aggressive 
innovation." 6 Quantum improvement are the aim. That policy 
stimulates creativity in one sense, but paradoxically cultivates con- 
servatism. Many mode-t advancements are accused of approaching 
obsolescence before they can be deployed. Successors for aging systems 
thus are often delayed indefinitely while U.S. scientists strain for 

3 About half of all Soviet counter air and a quarter of all close air support aircraft have been deployed since 
1970. according to U.S. Air Force sources. 

* SU-19A Fencer ground attack aircraft have a payload of about 7.500 pounds. Xo unclassified payload 
figures are available for SU-17 20 Fitter Cs, which are designed for deep interdiction. Both were deployed 
in 1974. 

5 Brown. Georee S., Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tnited States Military 
Posture for FY 1976, Washington, Joint Chiefs of Staff. February 5 .1976, pp. 106-107. 

- U.S. Congress. House. Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1976 before a subcom- 
mittee of the Committee on Appropriations. Part 4. Research. Development. Test, and Evaluation. 94th 
Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, p. 366-69, 531-32, 553-54. 


The Soviets since World War II have espoused incremental im- 
provements of the existing establishment. 7 Moderately modernize 1 
arms and equipment are procured as they become available. That 
procedure ensures continually improved capabilities which narrow or 
close qualitative gaps while U.S. forces "make do" with products in 
hand. 8 

y j Quality Instead of quantity 
The United States honors a Principle of War called Economy of 
Force. Conversely, the Soviets implicitly prefer the Principle of Mass. 
This country therefore chooses quality instead of quantity, and 
generally retires outdated items when new ones enter the inventory.'' 
The opposition, which opts for both, adds recent arrivals to existing 
stocks, winnowing out predecessors only when they cease to serve 
useful purposes. The effects of those diametrically different 
policies accentuate quantitative imbalances between U.S. and Soviet 
armed forces. 

Firepower instead of manpower 
The United States places a high premium on human life. This 
country therefore replaces manpower with firepower wherever 
possible. High dollar costs for pay and allowances reinforce that 
policy, which keeps personnel strengths down and support require- 
ments up in U.S. armed forces, but not in the Soviet Union. 

Sustained combat concepts 

Title 10 of the United States Code, which prescribes an Army, Navy, 
and Air Force that could, if required, conduct "sustained" combat 
operations, has a profound influence on U.S. force structure. 10 All 
three services must maintain solid logistic and administrative estab- 
lishments to fulfill that function wherever U.S. interests are involved. 

The Soviet Union seems to have a different philosophy. Its air 
and ground forces are best adapted for a short, decisive conflict if 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact clash. 11 Admiral Sergei Gorshkov also 
has shaped a first-strike, "one-shot" Navy, without much staying 
power. 12 "Tooth-to-tail" ratios therefore reflect poorly on U.S. general 
purpose forces, which are long on logistic support and sometimes short 
on combat power in comparison with Soviet counterparts. 

7 Ibid. 

s In practice, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union subscribes exclusively to quantum jump or 
incremental improvement policies. US. tanks, guns, aircraft, and other items often undergo repeated modi- 
fications that add to or alter original capabilities without replacing basic systems. The Soviets began em- 
phasizing both approaches about four j-ears ago (Ibid, p. 553-54). Nevertheless, the differentiations described 
are essentially correct. 

9 There are exceptions, as with any rule of thumb. The U.S. Army, for example, no longer uses M-4S tanks, 
but M-48A5s are being equipped with new diesel engines and 105mm guns for our Marines. Many items 
retired by U.S. armed forces still serve some allies. 

io Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 307. Section 3062; Chapter 503. Section 5012; and Chapter 807, 
Section 8061. See summary and amplification at Annex B under heading "Operational Functions of U.S. 
Armed Forces." 

11 See for example Canby, Steven L.. NATO Muscle: More Shadow Than Substance. Foreign Policv, 
Fall 1972. p. 44-16: also Lawrence, Richard D. and Records, Jeffrey. U.S. Force Structure in NAT* », | 
Some authorities suggest that both studies underestimate Soviet staying power but, if so, differences in 
I .S. Soviet concepts Still are clearly evident. 

u Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, Washington. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 
April, 1975, p. 19; and Spurr, Russell, Moscow: Drawing the Asian Battlelines, Far Eastern Economic 
Review, October 31, 1975, p. 26-34. 



Total j or ce concepts 
When the United States began to retrench during final stages of the 
conflict in Vietnam, the Defense Department placed increasing em- 
phasis on so-called Total Force Concepts, which count on collective 
security and reserve components to offset reductions in our active 
duty establishment. 13 Soviet leaders rely more on active force- and 
Less on allies to support national interests. Those conflicting policies 
contribute substantially to comparative force postures reflected in 
Figure 2 and Annex A. 

( 'iicliccd cutbacks 

Cutbacks in U.S. armed forces have followed every American war 
since we won our independence. The current cycle began about 1970. 
Since then, drawdowns have been drastic. No service escaped the 
knife, as the Air Force did after the Korean conflict. The Army has 
been sliced in half since personnel strengths reached high points in 
1968 (1,570,000 then, 790",000 now). Soviet personnel, which exceeded 
our own by 857,000 in 1955, currently surpass as by about 2.7 million. 14 
Their weapons inventory dilates similarly, while ours declines. 

U.S. decision-makers intended to constitute a smaller force which 
modernization measures would endow with greater capabilities than 
its predecessors. However, rates of retraction exceeded those of 
refurbishment. Size, therefore, was reduced without concomitant 
increases in strength. Moreover, the higher performance of new 
systems does not always compensate for the sharp reduction of flexi- 
bility caused by fewer numbers. 

All-volunteer force 

Three decades of U.S. conscription ended in January 1973, when 
draft calls registered zero, although the Selective Service System still 
functions on a standby basis. 15 

America's withdrawal from Indochina, implementation of the Nixon 
Doctrine (which demanded fewer general purpose forces than previous 
containment policies), budgetary difficulties, public opinion, and re- 
evaluations of pressing threats led U.S. leaders to establish manpower 
requirements at 2.2 million in 1973. 16 That ceiling has remained almost 
constant. 17 

The United States probably could slightly exceed stated recruiting 
limits in these times of tight economy, but if society were more afflu- 
ent, we would face serious problems filling quotas. In either event, 
this country is compelled to stress reserve components. Influences on 
the balance of U.S. and Soviet active forces thus are adverse. 

13 Laird, Melvin R.. Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 
1972-1976 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, Washington, Department of 
Defense. March 9, 1971, p. 21. 

14 See the following table : 

1965 1975 

Soviet personnel 3.510.000 4,812,000 

U.S. personnel 2,653,000 2,134,000 

Difference 857,000 2,678,000 

Figure? include strategic offensive and defensive personnel, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and 
Soviet border guards. 

15 Military Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1974, Washington, Department of Defense, February, 
1973, p. 1-2. 

16 Ibid., p. 5. 

17 The FY 1976 manpower authorization is slightly less than 2.1 million. Public Law 94-106, October 8, 


Money for manpower 

The cost of U.S. defense manpower has doubled during the pasl 
decade; owing to the initiation of annual comparabilit}^ pay raises and 
a one-time increase to make our All-Volunteer Force feasible. Pay and 
allowances now absorb about 53 percent of the defense budget. As- 
sociated outlays for troop housing, recruiting, human relations and 
various other activities presently push the total close to 65 cents out of 
every dollar. 18 Relative shares for manpower have been stabilized, but 
absolute outlays will continue to climb as programmed cost-of-living 
increases periodically take effect. 19 

The impact on force modernization is immense. Manpower costs 
added to inescapable expenditures for operations and maintenance 
sharply reduce funds for research, development, and procurement pro- 
grams in an inflationary environment that causes prices to escalate. 20 
The Soviet Union, with far lower pay scales and a controlled economy 
less afflicted by inflation, could afford a larger force and modernize at 
a more rapid rate if its total defense budget were exactly the same as 
that of the United States. 21 

Particular policy decisions 

A spate of subordinate policies, most of them derived at least in- 
directly from the seven above, affect United States/Soviet asymmetries 
in specific functional areas. The following list is depictive, rather than 

Strategic nuclear policies 

U.S. defense decision-makers settled on a strategic nuclear triad of 
bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs in the late 1950s, and have clung to it 
ever since, whereas the Soviets stress land-based ballistic mis-i'cs 
and downplay manned aircraft. 22 America's mixed force matrix was 
focused primarily on city targeting early in the 1960s to accommodate 
our second-strike strateg}^ of Assured Destruction, which preserved 
deterrence by means of a "balance of terror." Capabilities were 
required to eradicate "say, one-fifth to one-fourth of the [Soviet] 
population and one half of [Soviet] industrial capacity". 23 

Beyond those finite demands, U.S. decision-makers believed that 
relative strengths were irrelevant. The Defense Department placed 
less credence in the number of delivery vehicles than in the stock 

!8 Sehlesinger, James R. Report to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, p. 123-126. 
is Public Law 90-207, 90th Congress, (81 Stat. 649), Section 8. 

20 Schlesinger, James R. Report to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, p. Dl. 

21 Soviet pay and allowances were an estimated 18-25 percent of the total defense budget in 1969, the latest 
date for which unclassified data are available. Cohn, Stanley H., Economic Burden of Defense Expenditures. 
A chapter in U.S. Congress, Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies, a Compendium of Papers Submit- 
ted to the Joint Economic Committee. 93d Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 01T., 1973, 
p. 150. 

Such comparisons are always suspect. The Soviet defense budget is secret. Segments are concealed under 
civil headings. Expenditures are enumerated differently than in the United States. Rubles are difficult to 
convert accurately into dollars. Most Western calculations therefore are based on one of two methodologies. 
The first, which manipulates published Soviet data to correspond with U.S. categories and exchanges rubles 
for U.S. currency, risks underestimating the Kremlin's expenditures. The second, which judges how much it 
world cost to duplicate visible Soviet defense efforts in U.S. dollars, risks overestimations. 

22 About 30 percent of all U.S. warheads are on ICBMs, as opposed to 80 percent for the Soviet Union. 
MIRVing Soviet ICBMs may push that proportion to well over 90 percent unless Moscow elects to install 
multiple warheads on SLBMs. 

23 McNamara, Robert S., Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1969-73 
Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget, Washington, Department of Defense, Jan. 22, 1968, p. 50. 


of separately targetable nuclear warheads. 24 That conclusion strongly 
influenced this country to install MIRVs, instead of augmenting its 
inventory of bombers and ballistic missiles. Our ICBM/SLBM 
holdings have stayed static at 1054 and 656 respectively since 1967, 
while Soviet launchers increased. 

None of the U.S. weapons systems were expressly engineered with 
the requisite combinations of accuracy, payload, yield, and responsive- 
ness to neutralize time-sensitive hard targets like missiles in silos, 
because cit}^ targets are soft, sprawling areas. The Soviets, by way of 
contrast, specialize in heavy ICBMs and high megatonnage. 

Anns control accords have also shaped the balance since 1972. 
Phase I of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) produced 
an ABM Treaty that, with the amending protocol two years later, 
restricts each side to a single ABM site containing no more than 100 
missiles. 25 The SALT I interim agreement on strategic offensive 
systems "froze" selected force levels for the period Ma}^ 1972- 
October 1977 (see Figure 4), pending more lasting arrangements 
now addressed by SALT II negotiators. U.S. officials seek essential 
equivalence. 26 

Tactical nuclear policies 
A smorgasbord of tactical nuclear weapons was technologically 
feasible in the late 1950s. The United States experimented with all 
or most before deciding to stress adaptable aircraft and artiller}^ that 
hopefully have sufficient accuracy and small enough yields to fight a 
limited nuclear war in crowded NATO Europe without causing 
unconscionable civilian casualties and collateral damage, yet still 
function effectively in conventional combat. 27 

24 Ibid., p. 52. Decisions, for example, were taken in 1961 to reduce the planned number of Titan squadrons. 
Atlas ICBMs were retired in 1964. The Minuteman program was compressed from 1,200 to 1,000 missiles 
that same year. Data received telephonically from Air Force Systems Command Historical Office, Jan. 9, 

25 The SALT ABM Treaty permitted each side two ABM sites, one to defend the capital city, a second 
to cover ICBMs. The Protocol reduces authorization to one site each. U.S. Congress. House. Legislation on 
Foreign Relations, With Explanatory Notes, by House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations. Joint Committee Print. 93d Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., March 1974, p. 1175-1179; U.S. Congress. Senate. Protocol of the Treaty with the U.S.S.R. 
on the Limitation of ABM Systems. Executive I, 93-2, Sept. 19, 1974. In Legislative Calendar, Committee, 
on Foreign Relations, 93d Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Jan. 2, 1975, p. 14. 

26 SALT I and II interrelationships, together with current stumbling blocks, are summarized in Collins, 
John M., SALT II Issues (Issue Brief Number IB 75074), Washington, Congressional Research Service, 
updated as of November 13, 1975. 21 p. , 

27 For general background see Schlesinger, James R., The Theater Nuclear Posture in Europe: A Report 
to the United States Congress in Compliance with Public Law 93-365. Washington, Department of Defense, 
1975. 30 p. 

Honest John rockets, the least accurate of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, have largely been replaced by 
Lance missiles. 

U.S. R&D programs for mobile MRBMs were cancelled in 1964. Thor and Jupiter missiles were removed 
from Western Europe and Turkey that same year. Data received telephonically from Air Force Historical 
Office, Jan. 9, 1976. 



















Delivery system States U.S.S.R. 


"Freeze" level, May 1972 L 1,054 1,608 

Max conversions _. 1,000 1,399 

Already converted 32 

Current status. - 1,054 1,603 

"Heavy" ICBM's: 4 
Pre-1964 models: 

"Freeze" level, May 1972^ 54 209 

Exchanged forSLBM's . * 32 

Current status. 54 177 

Post-1964 models: "Freeze" level, May 1972 1 313 

Current total 


"Freeze" level, May 19721.... 

Maximum conversion 3 6 

Current status 

"Modern" ballistic missile submarines: 7 

"Freeze" level, May 1972 s... 

Maximum conversion 

Current status 9 .. 

Heavy bombers 

Total ICBM, SLBM launchers: 

"Freeze" level, May 19721 1,710 2,348 

Current status 1,710 2,348 

1 The "freeze" level of May 26, 1972, reflects Soviet delivery systems in operation and under construction at that time. 
All Soviet figures are U.S. intelligence estimates, since Moscow refused to furnish statistics. 

2 Open sources originally charged the U.S.S.R. with 1, 618 ICBM silos, but U.S. officials since have accepted about 10 of 
those as command and control centers or training sites, rather than launchers for operational missiles. 

3 Pre-1964 ICBM's could be exchanged for SLBM's on a 1-for-l basis, according to SALT I rules. Figures shown indicate 
ceilings if that course were chosen. The U.S. ceiling of 710 SLBM's was mathematically unattainable. We could trade 43 
of our 54 Titan ICBM's for 3 Poseidon boats with 16 launchers each or for 2 Trident boats with 24 launchers each. Either 
alternative would increase the number of SLBM's to 704. unless we switch to SSBN's with more than 16 tubes. 

* Pre-1964 "heavy" ICBM's, by U.S.definition, included U.S. Titan ll's (1962), Soviet SS-7's (1961), and SS-8's (1963). 
Post-1964 models, by U.S. definition, included all land-based ballistic missiles significantly larger than Soviet SS-ll's., 
When the SALT I Interim Agreement was signed, only SS-9's qualified. This study counts 100 SS-19's (as of January 1976) 
although SALT II accords may eventually consider them in the "light" ICBM category. 

5 Some Soviet SS-7's and SS-8's have been dismantled and exchanged for 2 nuclear-powered SLBM submarines. 

6 Soviet pre-1964 SLBM's on diesel submarines did not count, but those on H-class nuclear-powered boats did. Figures 
shown indicate the ceiling if the maximum allowable number of ICBM's were converted to SLBM's. 

; SALT I limitations did not include 10 Soviet H-class nuclear-powered submarines or 22 G-class diesel-powered boats. 
The former are armed with 3 SS-N-5 SLBM's each (range about 750 nautical miles). The latter carry 3 SS-N-5's or 3 
SS-N-4's (range 350 nautical miles). 

8 Only 25 Y-class Soviet ballistic missile submarines were in service in May 1972. All 41 U.S. SSBN's were operational. 

» Soviet submarines 44 and 45 replace an estimated 32 SS-7's and SS-8's. See footnote 5 above. 

10 Not covered by SALT I. 

The Soviets in contrast elected to emphasize unipurpose inter- 
mediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles, along with free rockets. 
None of their systems are capable of discriminating nuclear combat — • 
the yields are too large and they are too erratic. Airfields, ports, 
logistical bases, command/control installations, and other area 
targets (many of which are collocated with German cities) could be 
engaged most effectively. 28 

29 Wolfe, Thomas W., Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, 
p. 197-199, 203, 209, 211, 456-458. 


General purpose j or ce policies 

Records are replete with general purpose force policies that account 
for asymmetries in the United States/Soviet military balance. This 
section silhouettes four (one for each service) as illustrations. 

Soviet assembly lines turned out about 9,000 heavy tanks before 
they ceased production about 1962. An estimated 2,500 still are 
combat-effective. This country, however, never put much store in 
heavy tanks, and discontinued development a decade earlier than the 
Soviets. None remain in service. Instead, U.S. armored elements are 
equipped with more versatile mediums that trade steel plate protection 
for sp eed , maneuverability, air mobility, and ability to operate in 
areas where bridge capacities are low and terrain is somewhat re- 
strictive. 29 

The Soviet Navy specializes in ship-killing cruise missiles. An 
estimated 108 major combatants (including 68 submarines) and 135 
fast patrol boats are so equipped. The U.S. Navy, which has nothing 
comparable, assigns such roles to 14 aircraft carriers 30 and traditional 
submarines armed with torpedoes, as an outgrowth of polic}^ de- 
cisions taken two decades ago. 31 The consequent imbalance will 
persist until the United States begins to deploy Harpoon missiles 
in quantity (beginning late in 1976). 

America's fighter/ attack aircraft (Navy and Marine, as well as 
Air Force) all perform deep interdiction missions and provide close 
air support for ground combat units as a matter of policy. The Soviet 
Union would depend heavily on MRBMs and IRBMs for the former 
task in a nuclear war, and emphasizes massed tube artillery, mortars, 
and multiple rocket launchers along lines of contact between Soviet 
and enemy forces. 

Differences between tactical fighter inventories of U.S. and Soviet 
Air Forces thus are greater than statistics in Annex A indicate. Our 
aircraft generally have greater range, payload capacities, choices of 
ordnance, and loiter abilities. Soviet counterparts are comparatively 
simple, light, maneuverable, and less vulnerable on the ground, since 
they can fly from primitive strips that permit far greater dispersal than 
that enjoyed by U.S. forward-based fighters. 32 

The United States Marine Corps, organized, trained, equipped, and 
psychologic ally conditioned as an elite air/ground team, exists pri- 
marily to seize and defend lodgments on foreign shores in support of 
U.S. foreign policy predicated on collective security principles. 33 The 

29 U.S. Congress. House. Military Tank Procurement. Tenth report by the Committee on Government 
Operations. 85th Congress. 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1957, p. 16. 

30 One U.S. attack carrier was decommissioned in January, 1976. Another will leave active service before 
the close of FY 1976. 

31 U.S. Congress. House. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 12564 before the Committee on Armed 
Services. Part 2 of 4 Parts. Subcommittee No. 3 (Seapower). 93d Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. 
Govt. Print. Off., 1974, p. 1003. 

3 2 Military Forces Handbook: Military Forces of the U.S.S.R. and Peoples Republic of China, Washington, 
U.S. Air Force Systems Command, 1975, p. 13-14. 

33 See "Operational Functions of Armed Forces", Annex B. 


Soviet Union, which conducts its few overseas operations through 
proxies, as } r et has no analogous policy, although an emerging am- 
phibious assault force suggests that the Kremlin soon may have more 
than token intervention capabilities in Africa and South Asia. 

Strategic mobility policies 

U.S. policies have supported strategic air transport since the early 
1960s, when Congress and the Executive Branch collaborated in 
efforts to correct shortcomings. Succeeding crises, such as those in 
Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam, and Israel, underscored the importance of 
adequate intercontinental airlift to project U.S. power and/or supply 
allies. Assets afforded by C-5As and C-141s thus are unparalleled 
anywhere in the world. 34 

Deploying U.S. forces without being able to sustain them could 
sow the seeds of disaster. Corollary sealift forces consequent^ are 
required, 35 but our Merchant Marine has been allowed to languish. 
Only 118 ships remain in the Military Sealift Command Controlled 
Fleet, including 14 in ready reserve/reduced operating status. 36 In 
accord with national policy, we therefore place extraordinary depend- 
ence (95 percent) on U.S. -owned, but privately-operated, commercial 
carriers that fly foreign flags and are manned by alien crews who owe 
this country no allegiance. 37 Many of the ships are poorly suited for 
military purposes. Total force policies also pass heavy responsibility 
to selected allies, who are expected to provide ships and related serv- 
ices in times of common emergency, including offloading assistance 
and operations to clear supplies from terminal areas. 

The Soviet Merchant Marine, b}^ contrast, consists mainly of 
modern, highly-automated ships that currently carry more than half 
of all the Kremlin's transoceanic cargo. Coordination with the Soviet 
Navy is complete. 38 


U.S. quantitative superiority 

Areas of U.S. quantitative superiority over the Soviet Union are 
indicated on Figure 5. Some are negative or neutral in value. Some 
facilitate strong leverage in other contexts, but have almost no signif- 
icance in terms of the United States/Soviet balance. Some perhaps 
affect perceptions, but provide few credible capabilities. Only a few 
confer conclusive advantage on the United Statc>. 

3> MeNamara. Robert S., Statement on the FY 1969-73 Defense Budget, p. 139-140. 

35 More than 95 percent of all U.S. military bulk cargo bound for Vietnam moved by sea, including aviation 

36 Statistics furnished by Military Sealift Command, as of October 3, 1975. 

37 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, p. 39. 
ss Ibid., p. 39-40. 



United States Soviet Union U.S. Margin 




















386, 000 














Strategic offensive: 

MIRVed ICBM 550 

MIRVedSLBM. 416 

ALCM 1,140 

Heavy bombers 1 . 463 

Tankers 615 

ICBM/SLBM warheads 6,794 

Strategic defense: None.... NA 

Ground forces: 

Airmobile divisions 1 

Infantry divisions 6 

Marine divisions 3 

Nuclear artillery pieces 450 

Helicopters 2 . 9,487 

Naval forces: 

Personnel s 515,400 

Attack carriers... 14 

Helicopter carriers 7 

Cruisers *._ 27 

Destroyers * 70 

Nuclear-powered attack subs * 62 

Carrier aircraft 1, 508 

Marine fighter/attack aircraft 5 468 

Mobility forces: Strategic airlift 300 

i Excludes United States FB-lll's and Soviet Backfire bombers. 

2 Helicopters include 487 in the U.S. Marine Corps. 

3 Excludes ballistic missile submarine forces. 
* Cruisers and destroyers exclude SSM types. 

5 U.S. Air Force and Marine shore-based fighter/attack aircraft combined fail to equal Soviet counterparts (2,768 to 

Note : See Annex A for sources and explanatory notes. 

Superiority disadvantageous 
The United States has 129,000 more general purpose Navy personnel 
than the Soviet Union. Differences are due principally to U.S. logistic 
support and administrative elements that afford unparalleled staying- 
power. Nonetheless, this countn^ uses many more people than the 
opposition to operate fewer ships. That phenomenon deprives other 
defense sectors of much-needed funds in this era marked by high 
manpower costs. 

Superiority deceptive 

Token U.S. superiority in infantry, airmobile, and marine divisions 
is smothered by the Soviet total (19 to 168). Even if one U.S. division 
equalled two of the Kremlin's, which sometimes is true for personnel 
strengths but surely not combat power, 39 40 Soviet Category 1 divi- 
sions in north-central Europe outnumber our five by 4:1. Using that 
same criterion, Warsaw Pact divisions still outnumber NATO counting 
all ready reinforcements. 

America's numerical advantage in conventional cruisers and de- 
stroyers disappears when Soviet SSM ships are included in the tally 
(27 U.S. cruisers, 33 Soviet; 70 U.S. destroyers, 85 Soviet). Moscow's 
overall edge in escort-type vessels is 223 to 195, if one counts ships in 
our Naval Reserve, but excludes Coast Guard vessels. 40 

Similarly, the two-to-one U.S. numerical predominance in nuclear 
attack submarines is almost nullified if Soviet nuclear-powered cruise 
missile submarines (which carry torpedoes as well as SSMs) are 
considered: 62 U.S.; 75 Soviet. 

36 Soviet tank divisions have half as many men as ours. Their motorized rifle divisions are two-thirds 
the size of U.S. mechanized divisions. Tank strengths in each case are about equal. 
*° Total escort figures include cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and other escorts of all types. 


Superiority an ambiguous asset 

Manned bombers, the original component of the U.S. strategic 
nuclear triad, must penetrate increasingly effective enemy defenses- 
in-depth to reach targets. They have little ability to engage time- 
sensitive targets (such as ICBMs), since flights arc measured in many 
hours, not minutes. Consequent^, some skeptics assert that U.S. 
superiority in strategic aircraft and short-range attack missiles 
(SRAM) is a dubious asset. 41 As they see it, U.S. deterrent powers 
depend much more on ballistic missiles, which could strike swiftly 
and would be "home free" in the absence of a sound Soviet ABM 
shield. 42 

Immense U.S. superiority in MIRV launchers and ballistic missile 
warheads is often lauded. American preeminence clearly affects 
peacetime perceptions to our benefit, at home and abroad. Fixed-site 
ICBMs could survive a sneak attack with greater retaliatory capa- 
bilities than would be preserved if each silo contained a single warhead. 

Beyond that, however, the practical utility of many MIRVs is 
problematic, in the opinion of many observers. Most Soviet counter- 
force targets would be immune to a U.S. second strike, since Soviet 
reserves could be launched on warning. Huge stocks of U.S. MIRVs 
will be inessential for assured destruction missions until Moscow 
deploys a comprehensive and credible ABM system (presently 
proscribed by SALT), because a handful of survivable MIRVed 
missiles could cover sufficient targets. MIRVs would be equally 
superfluous for fighting a "tit-for-tat" war. Some critics therefore 
believe that maintaining U.S. superiority in MIRVs would divert 
dollars that could be used better to correct known deficiencies else- 
where in our defense establishment. 

Helicopters are another ambiguous asset. They provided unsur- 
passed battlefield mobility in Vietnam, but whether similar employ- 
ment would be possible in NATO Europe's high-risk air defense 
environment is subject to conjecture. If not, our numerical superiority 
would lose significance. 

Superiority an assured asset 

America's amphibious landing forces (but not amphibious lift) are 
much more numerous than three Marine divisions indicate, because 
several Army divisions are also qualified. The consequent flexibility 
opens up U.S. options not otherwise available. 

U.S. carrier air power is also greater than statistics show. Marine, 
as well as Navy, fighter/attack squadrons are trained to operate 
afloat when required. Soviet and proxy forces in under-developed 
areas still rely almost exclusively on land-based air support, and en- 
tirely lack high-performance carrier aircraft. The U.S. edge thus is 

« SRAMs can be used to improve the penetration powers of manned bombers by suppressing enemy 
defenses. They can also engage static targets of other kinds. To do so, however, the bombers they accom- 
pany must first breech enemy defenses-in-depth, since SRAM's effective range is only about 100 miles. 

<2 Many military men discourage attempts to analyze components of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad in 
isolation, since the synergistic effects of mixed forces far exceed the capabilities of any given system. Ballis- 
tic missiles and manned aircraft (or other airbreathers, like cruise missiles) create wholly dissimilar diffi- 
culties for defenders. The Soviets, not knowing where U.S. bombers might strike, must cover all critical 
points, whether we have many aircraft or few. Further, the current mix of U.S. forces confronts the Kremlin 
with insoluble first-strike scheduling problems. SLBMs, with flight times of six to ten minutes from firing 
positions along our continental shelf, might catch B-.52s on strip alert, but still lack the accuracy and 
yields to crush missile silos. Soviet ICBMs, enroute about half an hour, are best-suited for such targets, but 
would allow SAC ample time to "scramble" its bombers. U.S. SSBNs at sea are almost invulnerable in any 
case, given Moscow's present ASW capabilities. 

This section, which acknowledges the need for mixed forces, simply suggests that future effectiveness 
might be improved by amending the mix to counter Soviet countermeasures. 

65-316—76 5 


























United States /Soviet quantitative equality 

Between U.S. quantitative superiority on one hand and Soviet 
quantitative superiority on the other is a zone of approximate equality, 
where asymmetries are minor (Figure 6). 

[Active forces only) 

United States Soviet Union Difference 

Strategic offensive: Light ICBM's > 

Strategic defensive: ABM missiles 

Ground Forces: None 

Naval Forces: 

Escorts 2 

Patrol/ASW aircraft ashore 

ASW helicopters afloat.. 

Air Forces: Total tactical aircraft 

Mobility Forces: None 

1 This study counts all Soviet SS-19 ICBM's as "heavies", although SALT II accords may eventually consider them in 
the "light" category. 

2 Escorts on this table exclude cruisers, destroyers, and U.S. Coast Guard vessels. They include 34 U.S. Naval Reserve 

Note: See Annex A for sources and explanatory notes. 

The balance between light ICBMs is important, because that 
categor}^ contains most of the land-based ballistic missiles on both 

Neither country enjoys credible ABM capabilities. The U.S. site at 
Grand Forks, North Dakota, which functioned briefly as an active 
K&D facility, is being shut down, except for Perimeter Acquisition 
Radar and related facilities. The Congress expects "that the interceptor 
missiles and warheads will be expeditiously evacuated." 43 Even so, 
parity will continue to pertain for all practical purposes. The 64 
Soviet ABM missiles around Moscow could be easily saturated. 

The quantitative standoff in fixed- and rotary -wing ASW aircraft is 
meaningful only when measured against missions. Neither side has 
sufficiency, given current submarine strengths. 44 

Equal totals of tactical aircraft are far less important than superior- 
ity in particular types, such as fighter/attack. 

Soviet quantitative superiority 

United States/ Soviet correlations militarily immaterial 
Soviet quantitative superiority in any given category is of little 
concern when offensive forces or weapons systems compete against 
dissimilar defenses. If the Kremlin increased its cruise missile holdings 
by many multiples, there would be no call for this country to recipro- 
cate in kind. Stronger SAM defenses would serve our purposes better. 
Inequities are irrelevant where non-combat forces are concerned. Each 
side sizes according to missions, not enemy counterparts. Figure 7 
indicates cases where correlations consequent!}' are immaterial, except 
perhaps for perceptions. 

< 3 U.S. Congress. House. Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1976, Conference Report to 
accompany H.R. 9861. Report No. 94-710. 94th Congress, 1st Session. December 10, 1975, p. 28. 

* 4 Soviet ASW concentrates essentially on U.S. ballistic missile submarines. Our ASW efforts are directed 
primarily against Soviet attack submarines, which challenge U.S. abilities to control sea lanes and protect 
shipping in emergency. 



[Active forces only] 

United States Soviet Union Soviet margin 

Strategic offensive: 



Ballistic missile submarines . 

Medium bombers 

Strategic defensive: 

SAM launchers 


Ground Forces: SSM 

Naval Forces: 

Amphibious ships 1 

Patrol boats 

Shore-based bombers 

Air Forces: Reconnaissance aircraft. 

Mobility Forces: 

Strategic sealift 

Tactical airlift 2.. 

i Amphibious ships exclude helicopter carriers. 
2 U.S tactical airlift includes reserve C-130's. 

Note: See Annex A for sources and explanatory notes. 



[Active forces only] 






















United States Soviet Union Soviet margin 







2, 500, 000 

1, 710, 900 



34, 650 


40, 000 


17, 150 












Strategic offense: 


Heavy J 54 

Total 1,054 

Strategic defense: None NA 

Ground Forces: 

Army personnel 789, 100 

Divisions 2.. 19 

Main battle tanks 2... 8,975 

Armored carriers 19,000 

Tube artillery 3 5,610 

Naval Forces: 

SSM cruisers 

SSM destroyers 

Attack submarines 73 

Air Forces: Fighter/attack *_._ 2, 300 

Mobility Forces: None NA 

1 This study counts all Soviet SS-19 ICBM's as "heavies," although SALT II accords may eventually consider them in 
the "light" category. 

2 Includes Army and Marines. 

s Artillery includes Army and Marine conventional and nuclear capable pieces. 
4 Fighter/attack aircraft exclude those based on carriers. 

United States/ Soviet correlations militarily important 
The balance in any given category affects military capabilities 
directly when like offensive forces or weapons systems compete against 
each other: U.S. divisions versus Soviet divisions; U.S. fighter aircraft 
versus similar Soviet aircraft; and so on. Examples are indicated in 
Figure 8. Kegional balances frequently are more important than total 
inventories, as already noted. 

U.S. quality compensates for quantities in different degrees. U.S. 
overages in some categories could counteract shortages elsewhere 
(more SAMs, fewer interceptors, for example, but we are strong in 
neither). However, certain imbalances create distinct disadvantages. 


Soviet quantitative superiority in ICBMs may soon imperil the 
U.S. second-strike force of ballistic missiles in silos. At the very least, 
America's ICBM launchers should outnumber Moscow's anticipated 
stock of warheads with single-shot kill probabilities. Otherwise, the 
U.S.S.R. at some time in the future might compromise one leg of the 
U.S. triad. 

Numerical imbalances between U.S./Soviet and NATO 'Warsaw 
Pact ground forces are considerable. 45 Disparities both in deployed 
strengths and ready reserves are especially evident in central Europe, 
where our troops are spread very thinly. Five division equivalents in 
the U.S. zone, including two armored cavalry regiments, cover a 
250-kilometer (155-mile) front, approximately twice the desired dis- 
tance. Those forces are insufficient to conduct a mobile defense, featur- 
ing selected strong points well forward. We have no locally-available 
reserves above division level. 

The "small" U.S. contingent presently in place is to be reinforced 
rapidly in emergency by elements now in the United States. Expedi- 
tious arrival would depend on strategic warning, readily-available 
airlift/sealift assets in adequate amounts, rapid action by NATO's 
politico-military leaders, and the preservation of vulnerable reception 
facilities in Europe, none of which is assured. 46 

Asymmetries between U.S. and Soviet cruisers, destroyers, and 
attack submarine strengths also are important, because all such ships 
can engage each other in combat. There is no direct relationship 
between like systems, as there is for ICBMs, because submarines sink 
surface ships, and vice versa, but numerical superiority nonetheless 
would assist the so-called "one shot" Soviet Navy if a war of attrition 


There is no consensus concerning the implications of many asym- 
metries identified in foregoing sections. Those who believe in bald 
U.S. superiority across the board discern impending disaster for the 
United States. They recommend that America's military establish- 
ment be reinforced immediately. Even those who prefer quantitative 
parity as the U.S. force posture standard feel some queasiness when 
confronted with statistics like those in Annex A. 

Superiority and parity, however, are oriented exclusively on Soviet 
holdings, without regard for real U.S. requirements. Sufficiency, a 
better standard, concentrates on what this country can do despite 
Soviet opposition, not on what each side has} 1 

The following exposition therefore focuses on possible conflicts 
between available U.S./Soviet assets (Figures 5-8) and announced 
U.S. aims (Figure 9). Findings are summarized on Figure 10. 48 

« Refer back to Figure 2. 

«« For fuller discussion, see Collins, John M., U.S. Military Support for NATO, p. 21-28. 

47 Superiority is a force planning concept which demands markedly greater capabilities of certain kinds 
than those possessed by opponents. Parity/essential equivalence is predicated on particular capabilities that 
are approximately equal in overall effectiveness. Friendly and enemy numbers need not jibe in either case, 
but statistical strengths tend to be overemphasized, because friendly force levels depend on the extent of 
enemy deployments. By way of contrast, sufficiency as a force-sizing criterion calls for adequate abilities to 
attain desired ends without undue waste. Superiority thus is essential in some circumstances; parity suffices 
under less demanding conditions; and inferiority (qualitative as well/as quantitative) sometimes is 

« See Annex B for force sufficiency factors. 


Figure 9. — U.S. aims to be accomplished 

National security interests 

Plrysical Security 

World Power 
Self Determination 
Freedom of Action 

National security objectives 
Deter aggression 

Defend United States if deterrence fails 
Safeguard other states whose security is linked with our own 

Military roles and missions 

Title 10, United States Code 

Overcome aggressors that imperil U.S. peace and security 
Conduct prompt and sustained operations on order 
Protect U.S. snipping 
DoD Amplification 

Gain general air superiority 

Gain general naval supremacy 

Deal with one major and one minor contingency concurrently 

U.S. objectives in NATO Europe 

Deter Warsaw Pact aggression 

Defend without major loss of territory if deterrence fails 

Maintain a high tactical nuclear threshhold 

Strategic mobility aims 

Reinforce and resupply NATO Europe in emergency 
Facilitate U.S. operations elsewhere as required 
Supply selected allies 

U.S. defense commitments l 

Congressional resolutions 
Executive agreements 
Policy declarations, communiques 

1 See Annex C for details. 

Figure 10. — Key U.S. shortcomings ! 

Strategic nuclear problems 

Prelaunch survivability of ICBMs 
Postlaunch survivability of bombers 
Defense for U.S. population, production base 

NA TO — Related problems 

Active Army small compared with global commitments 
Key assets extremely concentrated 
Absence of ABM defense in Europe 
Cracks in the NATO alliance 
Readiness/responsiveness of U.S. reserve components 

Naval combat problems 

Protect U.S. shipping/reinforce NATO 

Navy small compared with global commitments 
Surface combatants exposed to short-range missiles 
ASW unable to cope with large-scale submarine threat 

Amphibious lift insufficient for landing forces 

Strategic mobility problems 

Airlift insufficient to move ready reserves rapidly 
Sealift depends on foreign-flag carriers 

1 The Soviet Union is plagued with its own set of problems. Some are precise counterparts of those shown 
above. Others are different. Thus study concentrates on U.S. problems that call for U.S. solutions. 


Present balance 

Strategic nuclear problems 

The present balance between U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive 
forces would be degraded dramatically by pre- and post-launch 
attrition at the onset of a general nuclear war. Our ICBMs and, 
bombers both are vulnerable in different degrees. This country, 
having absorbed a Soviet first strike, would have to retaliate with 
truncated elements whose coordination and control could be disrupted. 
Our forces would have to function in a chaotic atmosphere, where 
nuclear effects (blast, heat, radiation) might drastically decrease 
expected capabilities. 

U.S. strategic defensive problems are perhaps even greater. If 
deterrence should fail for any reason, and massive Soviet attacks hit 
the United States, we would" be exposed to the full effects, unable to 
protect our population or production base. The Soviet Union, like 
the United States, lacks sizable ABM capabilities but, unlike this 
country, still stresses strong air and civil defenses. 49 Some studies in 
fact claim that city evacuation plans shortly will enable the Soviets to 
engage in nuclear combat with far fewer casualties than this country. 50 
That contention is unconfirmed, but even partial defenses could 
buttress the Kremlin's bargaining power in times of intense inter- 
national crisis, by undercutting our second-strike Assured Destruction 

NATO-related problems 
The vulnerability of U.S. and allied ground combat, tactical air, 
support, and command/control forces in central Europe increased 
sharply when France withdrew from military participation m NATO. 
At West Germany's waist, the theater now is barely 130 miles wide, 
less than one-third the distance from Los Angeles to San Francisco. 
Maneuver room for armies is at a premium. Congestion at air bases 
approaches supersaturation. Some U.S. aircraft and logistical instal- 
lations were repositioned in the United Kingdom, but most U.S. 
supplies, including ammunition, are stored within a 30-mile radius of 
Kaiserslautern. The first sharp Soviet surge could sever friendly sup- 
ply lines, which radiate from Bremerhaven, Kotterdam, and Antwerp, 
then run closely behind and parallel to the prospective front. Air- 
fields also could be overrun.' Every lucrative military target, including 
command/control centers, air bases, ports, and supply depots is 
within easy reach of Soviet IRBMs and MKBMS. 51 The absence of 
ABM defenses thus is critical. The Soviets, who have less need for a 

49 Titov, M.N., Yegorov, P.T., Gavko, B.A., and others, Civil Defense, Moscow, 1974. Translated from 
the Russian. Ed. by G.A. Cristy, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Document 0RNL-TR-2845), July, 
1975. 118 p.; Goure, Leon, Soviet Civil Defense in the Seventies, Coral Gables, Florida. Center for Ad- 
vanced International Studies, University of Miami, September, 1975, 128 p.; Scott, Harriet Fast, Civil 
Defense, in the USSR, Air Force Magazine, October, 1975, p. 29-33; Fact Sheet, Soviet Civil Defense, De- 
fense Civil Preparedness Agency, May 2, 1973. p. 4. 

50 Baker, Howard H., Jr. Reassessing and Refining Our Foreign Policy. Remarks in the Senate. Congres- 
sional Record, June 24. 1975, p. S11410; 

Wigner, Eugene P., The Myth of "Assured Destruction." Survive, July-August, 1970, pp. 2-4; 

Defense Civil Preparedness Agency briefing of Post Nuclear Attack Study (PONAST) II, prepared by 
JCS Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency on May 23, 1973. No pagination. (116 p.) 

5i Bowen, John W., then Chief of Staff for the U.S. European Command, in personal correspondence to 
the author, November 27, 1967. The situation he perceived at that time remains essentially unchanged. 

France has not undertaken any agreement to realign herself militarily with NATO. The use of French 
forces and territory in time of crises would be subject to a political decision. NATO therefore does not plan 
on French participation. Senate Hearings on FY 73 Authorization for Military Procurement, Op. Cit., 
Part 2, p. 523. For implications of de Gaulle's decision to evict NATO forces from France see Moon, Gor- 
don, A., II, "Uncertain Future," Army, March 1967 and "Invasion in Reverse" Army, February 1967. 


tactical ABM system and possess strong antiaircraft capabilities, 
are not so disadvantaged. 52 

Total force concepts applied to NATO Europe also exhibit flaws. 

The entire south flank, for example, is shaky from the Atlantic 
seaboard to Asia Minor. Portugal has been politically unstable and 
militarily unreliable since Spinola was ousted in autumn 1974. 
Italy, with continual government crises, a sick economy, and a 
strong Communist Party, faces serious problems. Greece and Turkey 
are more concerned with threats from each other than from the 
Warsaw Pact. French forces would assist in NATO's forward defense 
only if French leaders concluded that French interests were endangered. 

U.S. reserve components display spotty degrees of responsivenc— . 
Some tactical fighter, reconnaissance, and airlift units reputedly 
could be enroute to Europe almost immediately, others in less than 
10 days. 53 Army National Guard divisions, despite recent improve- 
ments in readiness, still would require weeks to receive personnel 
and equipment fillers, complete team training, and deploy. (Soviet 
Category 2 divisions allegedly could be on site in days). 54 If war with 
the Warsaw Pact were short and decisive, as some students of the 
subject suggest, only those elements mobilized and positioned early 
would count. The remainder would be ineffective, no matter how 
impressive they might look on paper. 55 

Naval combat problems 

The scarcity of U.S. surface combatants compared with global 
commitments and contingency requirements strains capabilities. 
The U.S.S.R. can concentrate power where and when it wants before 
hostilities break out, while the U.S. Navy must cover extended sea 

Carrier aircraft and shipboard SAM defenses would afford a fair 
shield for U.S. fleets if the Soviets fired anti-ship cruise missiles from 
long range, but the U.S. Navy has almost no protection against 
surprise attacks launched from close quarters. Soviet ships so armed 
could stand close in during crises, perhaps interspersed with U.S. 
elements, then strike suddenly with a high probability of success. 

The Soviet inventory of ballistic missile and attack submarines 
is a bit smaller than it was 10 years ago (376 then, 326 now), but 
capabilities have expanded significantly, while U.S. cruiser, destroyer. 
and escort strength declined by 131 ships. 56 We discarded nine aged 
ASW carriers during the same decade. That shift in the quantitative 
balance, coupled with continued ASW detection difficulties, seriously 
impairs America's ability to protect sea lanes required for important 
U.S. commerce and NATO resupply/reinforcement purposes. Steps 
to bottle up Soviet boats before war began might well provoke combat, 
not prevent it. Outnumbered U.S. forces therefore would initially be 

5 - French and British ballistic missiles can reach targets on Soviet soil, but those in fixed sites are vulner- 
able to surprise attacks by IRBMs, MRBMs, and SLBMs with short flight times. They might not be de- 
stroyed, but their reliability would be in doubt. 

» U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, on Fiscal Year 1 173 
Authorization for Military Procurement. Part 2 of 6 Parts. 92d Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. 
Govt. Print. OS.. 1972, p. 1123. 

54 Data received from Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5) on January 18, 1076. 

55 Greater reliance on brigade and battalion-sized Army National Guard forces, and less on full divisions, 
recently was announced by former Defense Secretary Schlesinger. He contended thai "we should stop 
pretending that we can use [National Guard and Reserve divisions] as full substitutes for active dm v ground 
forces." Guard Divisions Played Down, Army Times. March 12. L975, p. 31. 

M Includes ships in U.S. Naval Reserve, but excludes Coast Guard. 


compelled to find, fix, fight, and finish Soviet submarines beneath 
open seas. Enemy boats returning to base for refills would have to 
transit attrition barriers at choke points, but before then they could 
deal great damage. 57 

Assault sealift problems are also imposing. One marine amphibious 
force (MAF) — a marine division with its associated air wing — normally 
embarks on 48 amphibious ships. 58 U.S. Nav}* holdings today total 
just 64, including seven helicopter carriers. Ten on the average are 
undergoing overhaul at any one time. The 48-ship requisition thus 
constitutes 88 percent of all operational assets. Only half of our am- 
phibious lift is available in the Atlantic area. The remainder is located 
along the U.S. west coast and elsewhere in the Pacific. Lead times to 
assemble, load, move, and conduct a division-sized amphibious 
assault would approximate two months from time of alert. 59 Whether 
such operations could succeed under general war conditions is 

Strategic mobility problems 

Increased dependence on strategic reserves in the United States 
instead of forward deployment places increased demands on mobility 

x^merica's airlift assets, the world's best, still exhibit shortcomings. 
Figure 5 shows 300 aircraft (70 C-5As and 230 C-141s) in operational 
squadrons, but a substantial slice is grounded for maintenance at any 
given moment. 60 Moving our only airborne division to the Middle 
East (where Brezhnev threatened to commit ground combat troops 
during the 1973 Arab-Israeli crisis) would take a week if alert times 
permitted prior preparation, longer if not. 61 Flights to NATO Europe 
are shorter, but lift requirements are much larger. A lengthy period 
thus would elapse before all airlifted elements closed. 

U.S. sealift dependence on foreign flags has already been discussed 
(see strategic mobility policies) . 

Projected balance 

Nothing in United States/Soviet R&D, deplo} T ment, or budgetary 
trends is likeh 7 to eliminate the problems just enumerated. A few will 
be eased. Others will be exacerbated. 

Research and development 
Air- and land-mobile missiles now in design stages would reduce 
pre-launch attrition threats to U.S. ICBMs, if a sizeable percentage 
of our present force were converted. Better low-level performance and 
penetration aids should improve post-launch survival prospects for 
future U.S. bombers, although evolving Soviet countermeasures en- 
sure continued sharp competition. 62 Other strategic offensive R&D 

57 Sea control problems related to potential Middle East oil crises are covered in U.S. Congress. House. 
Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study. Prepared for the Special Subcommittee on In- 
vestigations of the Committee on International Relations by the Congressional Research Service. 94th 
Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, pp. 19-20, 66-67. 

58 Statistics were drawn from a Marine Corps Command and Staff manual. They would be modified to 
meet specific contingencies, but requirements would be similar. 

» Schlesinger, James R., Report to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, p. 11-93. Supple- 
mented by telephone conversation with Operations and Amphibious Matters Branch, Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps, June 27, 1975. 

so Airlift availability rates were reviewed in Report to the Congress: Airlift Operations of the Military 
Airlift Command During the 1973 Middle East War, Washington, Comptroller General of the United States 
(GAO), April 16, 1975, pp. 10-15, 57-58. 

61 Includes roughly 11,000 men, a basic load of ammunition, and five-day supplies of rations and fuel. 
Statistics furnished telephonically by staff members of the 82d Airborne Division, April 8, 1975. 

62 U.S. bombers on final approaches to many Soviet targets would have to overfly open water or flat 
terrain that facilitate low -level radar coverage for air defenders. 


programs, like bigger ballistic missiles and maneuverable reentry 
vehicles (MaRV), do little to circumvent key shortcomings. Perfecting 
cruise missiles might strengthen short-term U.S. deterrence, but might 
also prove to be a long-term liability if the Soviets deploy equivalent 
systems: they have stout air defenses, whereas we do not. 

U.S. and Soviet scientists both seek to solve ABM problems, but no 
breakthroughs appear imminent. The Department of Defense has 
no programs that specifically concern air defense for the United States. 
R&D related to U.S. civil defense receives very low priority. 

Laser-guided anti-tank weapons, "smart" bombs, new artillery 
ammunition, and SAM-D are among the R&D innovations U.S. 
forces count on to compensate for superior Soviet numbers in NATO 
Europe, but science offers no other relief for U.S. shortcomings. One 
crucial problem, the absence of ABM defenses, is susceptible to R&D 
solutions, but if a suitable system surfaced tomorrow, the SALT I 
Treaty would preclude deployment. Additional complications actually 
are anticipated, since the Soviets already are testing mobile IRBMs 
in a MIRVed mode. 

R&D programs seem unlikely to ease basic naval combat problems 
in the predictable future. On the contrary, quieter, faster Soviet 
submarines, long-range Soviet SLBMs that allow larger operational 
areas, and improved ECM for Soviet anti-ship missiles will increase 
U.S. ASW detection and fleet air defense difficulties. 

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is experimenting 
with any equipment expected to alter strategic mobility means 

Procurement J deployment programs 

Replacing B-52s with B-ls is the only strategic nuclear procure- 
ment/deployment plan directly related to current L.S. shortcomings. 
Introducing Trident simply will complicate Soviet ASW problems. 
SALT accords prohibit increasing the number of American ICBMs to 
equal or exceed those of the Soviet Union. Multiplying MIRVs to 
include all U.S. missiles would maintain a lead in warheads, but be 
of limited value in light of our ke}^ shortcomings. 

Soviet modernization efforts, in contrast, are of unsurpassed magni- 
tude. They feature four new ICBM families, all with greater payload 
capacities than their predecessors, and all being tested with MIRVs. 
Two systems incorporate "cold launch" techniques that allow retire 
capabilities using larger missiles in existing silos. Backfire bombers, 
vastly superior to aged Bear and Bison aircraft, are entering the 
inventory. 63 Eight new Delta-class submarines with 12 long-range 
missiles each have already been launched. "Stretched" versions with 
16 launch tubes are now under construction. 64 

America's strategic defensive plans include no procurement and 
extensive cutbacks. All anti-ballistic missiles will be removed this 
year. 65 All six Air National Guard F-101 interceptor squadrons will 
phase out by the end of FY 1977, partly because of budgetary priori- 

63 Backfire bombers, a SALT II issue, could strike targets in the United States without in-flight refueling, 
then recover in Cuba or some neutral country in Latin America. The Soviets have only a few tankers, and 
only a few of those could serve Backfires. 

8 < Schlesinger, James R., Report to the Congress on the FY 1076 and Transition Budgets, pp 1112-1116; 
Updated informally. 

65 U.S. Congress, House. Department of Defense Appropriations. Fiscal Year 1976, Conference Report, 
p. 28. 

65-316 — 76 6 


ties, partly because of beliefs that "without effective ABM defenses, 
air defenses are of limited value against aggressors armed primarily 
with strategic missiles." 66 

Soviet strength is growing rapidly in central Europe, according to 
recent statements by the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee. 67 
This country, which annually considers sharp force cutbacks, has no 
plans to significantly alter the present balance by adding forces. 68 
Exchanging F-4 squadrons for F-15s and F-16s will curtail tactical 
nuclear capabilities, since neither new aircraft can carry nuclear 
weapons. 69 No solution to congestion problems or exposed supply lines 
is seen to be soon forthcoming. 

One U.S. attack carrier was retired in January, 1976. Another will 
be decommissioned before the end of this fiscal year. At that time, the 
Navy will be able to maintain no more than two on station in the 
Pacific and two in the Atlantic/Mediterranean at any one time. Only 
12 ships will be available for active duty. The 13th is designated for 
training. 70 Carrier aircraft, a prime means of projecting naval po *er 
and protecting U.S. fleets, will be reduced commensurately. 

Meanwhile, the Soviets are equipping gun destroyers with anti- 
ship cruise missiles as an extra capability. The U.S. Harpoon, when 
deployed, should strengthen deterrence by promising counterbattery 
fire in kind, but Soviet first strikes could still be destructive. The 
Soviets' forward deplojinent posture is improving in Cuba and along 
the littorals of Africa and South Asia, where several countries already 
service Soviets ships. 71 The United States is experiencing difficulties, 
expecially in Turke}" and Greece. 72 

The United States is doing nothing to reduce dependence on 
merchant ships f^ing foreign flags. Few ships suitable for military 
purposes are being built. Soviet programs, which emphasize small 
ships for use in small ports, ensure responsive forces under firm 
control that support operations in underdeveloped areas and assist in 
projecting political power. 

Budgetary emphasis 

U.S. budgetary projections paint a bleak picture when related to 
pressing U.S. problems, even though absolute outlays are very large. 

DOD's baseline budget has been cut by 20 percent since 1964. 
Expenditures continue to decline in terms of purchasing power, 
percent of the total federal budget, and U.S. GNP. 73 High disburse- 
ments for pay, allowances, and other manpower costs will persist, 
given prevailing policies. Comparatively little will be left over for 
expansion and modernization after unavoidable operations/mainte- 
nance outlays are deducted. 

66 Sehlesinger, James R., Report to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, p. 1141. 

« 7 NATO Warned of Soviet Offensive Power, Aviation Week, December 15, 1975, p.19. 

6S Adding two or three U.S. Army brigades and associated elements to USAREUR will have little effect 
on the overall U.S./Soviet military balance in Europe. 

6« New U.S. Fighters a Worry in Europe, New York Times, December 22, 1975, p. 17. F-15s are not wired 
to handle nuclear weapons. Modifications could be incorporated only at great cost. F-16s are designated as 
"nuclear capable", but could carry nuclear weapons only if retrofitted. F-lll squadrons could be dedicated 
to NATO in emergency, at the expense of other missions. Clarification received from Air Force staff members 
on Januarvl3. 1976. 

7 ° Sea Power Cut in the Pacific, Washington Star-News, December 24, 1975, p. D-10. Updated by Office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations, January 19. 1976. 

7i See for example Means of Measuring Naval Power With Special Reference to U.S. and Soviet Activities 
in the Indian Ocean, p. 4, 10-12. 

72 See especially U.S. Congress. House. Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Related to NATO 
and the Middle. East. Prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs by the Congressional Research Service. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 63 p. 

73 Schlosinger, James R., Report to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, pp. 123-126. 
The baseline budget excludes incremental war costs, foreign military assistance, and retired pay. 


Such trends sap qualit}^ as well as quantity, since consequences 
include fewer flying hours and less ship steaming time, fewer maneuvers 
and other exercises, maintenance slowdowns, and program stretchouts. 
(The latter actually increase costs in the long run.) 

The Soviet Union, according to some authorities, is outspending 
this country at a rapid rate. 74 Those conclusions are almost impossible 
to substantiate, for reasons already enumerated. It seems clear, 
however, that the Kremlin is willing to commit sizeable resources for 
national defense. Even if pessimistic U.S. estimates were radically 
erroneous, and rival budgets were equal, the Soviets would have more 
money for modernization, being less bothered by inflation and immense 
manpower costs. 

Still, the U.S. situation is not all bad. Budgetary crimps, real or 
imagined, stimulate the search for innovative, less expensive solutions 
to our national defense problems. Necessity really is the mother of 

Predicting Soviet intentions 

No appraisal of the United States/Soviet military balance would be 
complete without some note of Soviet intentions, which reflect change- 
able states of mind among men in the Kremlin. Otherwise, there woidd 
be no way to predict the imminence or intensity of prospective perils. 

Two opposing schools of thought (with kaleidoscopic shades in 
between) currently collide. A quick summary of associated philosophies 
points up the differences. 75 

School "A" discounts the significance of Soviet strides since the 
mid-1960s. America's Assured Destruction capabilities afford a sound 
nuclear deterrent, so the argument goes. Accommodations in Europe, 
including those at Helsinki in 1974, stabilize that area, reducing 
risks of armed conflict. Soviet influence elsewhere allegedly depends 
more on diplomacy than military power. Equally important, Moscow's 
adventures in uncommitted countries, such as Somalia and Angola, 
are little related to compelling U.S. interests. 

School "B" is less sanguine. As its members see it, the sapping of 
U.S. relative strength has far-reaching implications for a foreign 
policy predicated on partnership and negotiation. Inability to provide 
a strategic nuclear shield for the Free World, coupled with failure to 
defeat a ninth-rate country like North Vietnam, erodes America's 
alliance system. Consequently, reciprocal arms control accords, 
which once were strategic adjuncts, assume crucial proportions. U.S. 
national security, School "B" contends, quite literally depends to a 
high degree on cooperation by a canny competitor, whose incentives to 
collaborate are slight. 

Ascertaining which school is correct exceeds the scope of this 
unclassified study. Suffice it to say here that the extent to which 
suspected Soviet intentions should shape actual U.S. capabilities is a 
subject that calls for caution. Intentions can change overnight, but 
improving military capabilities is a time-consuming process. 

74 See for example CIA Finds Soviet Arms Budget Now is Ahead of "U.S., New York Times. July 22, 
1074, p. 2; and Schlesinger, James R., letter to Senator John L. McClellan, Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, October 23, 1975, p. 2. 

75 For discussion, see Blechman, Barry M., Handicapping the Arms Race: Are the Soviets Ahead? The 
New Republic, January 3 and 10, 1976, p. 19-21. 


The primary mission of U.S. defense decision-makers is to match 
realistic ends with measured means, minimizing ri^ks in the process. 
This brief section suggests courses of action that, singly or in combina- 
tion, could correct shortcomings shown in Figure 10. 1 

Some shortfalls would be excised spontaneously if the Executive- 
Branch and Congress compressed America's aims. Reshaping >trategy 
would eliminate or ease several others. So would force adjustments. 
Additional cures are conceivable. 

This section explores prime options in turn, posing sample questions 
which Congress, if so inclined, could use as a starting point for hearings 
on the subject. 


Review U.S. interests 

The only sacrosanct U.S. interests are survival and physical security, 
which must be satisfied to preserve the American people and their 
production base as an independent state with territorial integrity, 
national institutions, and values intact. 

Interests in world peace, world power, world stability, self-deter- 
mination, freedom of action, democracy, human rights, national 
honor, and credibility all stem from convictions (subscribed to by 
seven presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt) that America's future 
is closely linked with the world community. Current gaps between 
U.S. ends and means would assume less significance if: such interests 
in international security affairs were rescinded or reduced. 

A fundamental review of U.S. foreign policy to identify which in- 
terests are essential, which are of secondary importance, and which 
are irrelevant thus ranks first in order of importance. Cogent ques- 
tions include : 

— Are U.S. national security interests inseparable from our con- 
nections with other states? Why? Which ones? 

— Does U.S. economic prosperity demand input from other coun- 
tries? Which countries? What items? How much? What con- 
sequences would be caused by loss? 

— Does the United States have a moral obligation to help safeguard 
countries overseas? If so, which ones? 

1 U.S. military posture is affected by our balance with countries and coalil ions other than the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact, as noted on page 1. None of those relationships are reviewed in this study, but courses 
of action addressed in this section could be used to adjust U.S. ends and means in any geographic or functional 
area where the United States experiences problems. 



Review U.S. objectives 

Amending America's national security objectives could basically 
affect the way available forces influence the U.S. /Soviet balance, 
whether interests changed or not. As}^mmetries between ground com- 
bat strengths in central Europe, for example, would assume less im- 
portance if this country abandoned its objective of maintaining a high 
tactical nuclear threshold in XATO Europe. 

There is very little latitude for improving relationships between 
U.S. ends and means by altering strategic nuclear objectives. Deterring 
general war, generally acclaimed as the most important of all aims, is 
not negotiable. Lip service or less is presently paid to goals affiliated 
with aerospace defense. Consequently, the only significant opportuni- 
ties for adjustment concern safeguarding other countries. 

Answers to questions of the following sort would help sort out the 
issues : 

— Should the United States still seek to contain Soviet expansion? 
To contain the spread of Soviet influence through the use of 
proxy states? If so where? Under what circumstances? 
— Is maintaining a global balance of power an imperative U.S. 

objective? Regional balances? Why? Where? 
— Should the United States strive to deter regional wars? What 
kinds (conventional, tactical nuclear, revolutionary)? Why? 
— Should this country be able to cope with one major and one minor 
contingency concurrentlv if regional conflicts occur? 2 What kinds? 
Why? Where? 
— Wherever answers seem to be "no," what substitute objectives 
would satisfy U.S. interests? 

Review U.S. commitments 

America's security commitments overseas were concluded between 
1947 and the mid-1960s, during the United States/Soviet Cold War 
confrontation that predated the current period loosely called "de- 
tente." All told, they obligate the United States in one way or another 
to help defend Latin America and nearly every nation along the Sino- 
Soviet rim (refer to Annex C). 

The Atlantic Alliance, •which considers "an armed attack against 
one or more [members] ... an attack against them all," commits 
each signatory to take, "such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force." 3 No other pact is that specific, and none is 
so centrally affected by the United States/Soviet military balance, but 
most nonetheless have related implications. 

Downgrading or discontinuing certain commitments in consonance 
with altered interests and objectives could help correct military im- 
balances between the United States and the Soviet Union if forces 
freed from inconsequential areas were shifted to sites of crucial con- 
cern. Associated questions include : 

— -Which commitments contribute least to U.S. security? 

— Would inimical implications arise if they were scrapped? 

— -What forces would be freed? In what numbers? 

— -What use would they be elsewhere? 

2 Such as Soviet armed intervention in NATO Europe or the Middle East, with diversions elsewhere. 
» Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 


Review U.S. military roles and missions 

Title 10, United States Code and related DOD Instructions assign 
roles/missions to U.S. armed forces (see Annex B for details). Mi- 
matched ends and means ensue when strength is insufficient to fulfill 
assigned functions. "It is the intent of Congress," for example, to 
provide combat power capable of "overcoming [not just deterring] any 
nations responsible for aggressive acts" that imperil U.S. peace and 
security, 4 but U.S. war-winning capabilities and intentions have been 
absent for a good many years. 

Removing unrealistic requirements and/or revising resources would 
bring U.S. assets and aims into better balance. Several questions 
thus seem in order: 

— Should strategic nuclear roles/missions be segregated from those 

for conventional forces? In either instance, 
— Is war-winning an essential requirement? If not, what should be 
substituted? Deterrent capabilities only? Conflict control capa- 
bilities? How would changes affect U.S. security? 
— Should U.S. armed forces be charged with conducting prompt 
combat operations? If so, how promptly? On what scale? Where? 
Globally or in selected regions? Relate to active force require- 
ments, the readiness of reserve components, and Soviet threats. 
— Should U.S. armed forces be charged with conducting sustained 
combat operations? Under what conditions? Relate to total 
force size and tooth-to-tail ratios. 
— Should this country seek to gain and maintain general air and 
naval supremacy? What are the alternatives? How would ad- 
justments affect the United States/Soviet balance? 


Prevailing U.S. policies cause many asymmetries between U.S. 
and Soviet armed forces, and mismate ends with means. Each should 
be analyzed to ascertain its continued advisability. Questions below 
are keyed to salient U.S. aims and shortcomings shown on Figures 
9 and 10. 

Review strategic nuclear policies 

— What policy is best suited to deter a Soviet first-strike? Deter- 
rence based mainly on city targeting or a combination of counterforce/ 
countervalue capabilities across the conflict spectrum? 

— Is peacetime essential equivalence in ICBMs an acceptable U.S. 
force structure standard, given our second-strike strategy? If not, 
what policy adjustments would ensure survivability? Reduce reliance 
on ICBMs? Renew launch-on-warning options? 

— Are the American people well-served by deterrent policies that 
downgrade strategic defense? How would alternatives affect U.S. 

— Should SALT policies control U.S. efforts to achieve a satisfac- 
tory balance with the Soviet Union? What advantages and dis- 
advantages are evident? What alternatives? 

* Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 307, Section 3062. 


— Do "bargaining chip" policies help or hinder U.S. efforts to achieve 
a satisfactory balance with the Soviet Union? If they holp, which 
"chips" are advantageous? Why? 

Review general purpose policies 

— Is unilateral U.S. disarmament, as repeatedly practiced, a sound 
policy in the present world environment? Relate to U.S. objectives 
and Soviet capabilities. 

— Does a high nuclear threshold in NATO Europe best serve U.S. 
purposes? Would changes in policy strengthen or undercut deterrence? 
In what ways? Would increased risks be serious or inconsequential? 

— Are total force concepts still sound? If so, should the balance 
between U.S. active and reserve forces remain constant or change? 
Between U.S. forces and allies? In what ways? What substitute 
policies should be considered? 

— Does the All-Volunteer Force permit an acceptable balance 
between U.S. and Soviet forces? If not, would conscription be prefer- 
able? What are the alternatives? 

— What is the optimum balance between U.S. forces in specific 
overseas areas? Relate to requirements for responsive reserves. 

— Are forward defense policies obsolete? If not, what is the optimum 
balance between U.S. forces in overseas areas and those in strategic 

— Is military assistance an effective policy? How does it improve 
U.S. security? To what extent? In what areas? 

— Should the United States institute stringent controls over the 
sale of conventional arms? Would the Soviets sell where we decline? 
If so, how would it affect our security? 

— Should present pay and allowances policies be perpetuated? If 
not, what options should be studied? Reduced pay scales for regular 
forces? Constant scales that disregard cost-of-living increases? Lower 
scales for conscripts if we ever return to the draft? 

— Is continued dependence on foreign-flag shipping a sound U.S. 
policy? Relate to U.S. objectives and commitments. What cost- 
effective alternatives would improve our security? 


Review U.S. force structure 

Significant improvements in the United States/Soviet military 
balance would ensue if ways were found to eliminate excessive redun- 
dancy and extraneous capabilities caused by outdated concepts, 
shaky assumptions, interservice rivalry, vested interests in govern- 
ment and industry, and various other influences. Answers to questions 
of the following kind would assist. 5 

— Is a strategic nuclear triad the most effective U.S. force structure? 
What affect would fewer systems have on U.S. security? More s} r stems? 

— Do current components of our triad comprise the optimum mix? 
If not, what replacements would be preferable? Mam' cruise missiles 
instead of manned bombers? Mobile instead of fixed ICBMs? 

5 It is important in each instance to ascertain the impact on overall U.S. defense posture as well as in- 
fluences on the U.S./Soviet military balance. 


— Should air defense aircraft be replaced entirely by surface-to-air 
missiles? If not, what mix would be most advantageous? To what 
extent should tactical fighters supplant specialized interceptors for 
continental air defense? 

— Should U.S. tactical nuclear capabilities include IRBMs/ 
MRBMs? Compare strengths and weaknesses with those of tactical 

— Could much larger inventories of less sophisticated weapons 
increase U.S. capabilities at reduced costs? What would be the 
optimum distribution of high-cost, high-performance items to rela- 
tively low-cost, low-performance items in specific systems (the so- 
called hi-lo mix)? 

— To what extent could lightly-armored, low-cost fighting vehicles 
supplant U.S. tanks in NATO Europe? What missions would suffer? 
How would overall security be influenced in consequence? 

— Does a three-division Marine Corps contribute significantly to 
the United States/Soviet military balance? Would U.S. capabilities 
increase or decrease if the Army absorbed major Marine Corps 
functions? Wiry? Are amphibious assault capabilities still an essential 
U.S. asset? What would we gain or lose by scaling back? 

— Do Marine air wings contribute significantly to the United 
States/Soviet military balance? Would U.S. capabilities increase or 
decrease if the Air Force absorbed marine air wing missions? Why? 

— Does continued emphasis on large surface combatants contribute 
significantly to the United States/Soviet naval balance? Would 
capabilities increase if many small, fast ships were substituted? 
Relate to survivability in conventional and nuclear attack 

— Would fast, comparatively cheap, easy-to-service gas turbine 
engines serve future U.S. cruisers and destroyers better than nuclear 
power? What credits would accrue? What debits could be expected? 

— What advantages would accure from increased cooperation with 
NATO on R&D, production, procurement, and standardization? 
What disadvantages? 

Review U.S. budget procedures 

Inflation, recession, balance of payments problems, and dollar 
devaluations all inhibit efforts to create U.S. military capabilities 
that can compete successfully with the Soviet Union. 

Two procedures in particular bear review: 

— The Congress tends to judge individual programs in isolation. 
To what extent would ends and means merge more successfully if 
Congress also examined manpower and materiel interrelationships 
within and between the several services? 

— Total life cycle costs of competitive systems still are not clear. 
How could DOD and the Congress better assess long-term expenditures 
in relation to expected capabilities for proposed weapons and 


Quantitative and, in some instances, qualitative deficiencies, dis- 
advantageous deployments, and attributes ill-designed to accomplish 
essential aims all contribute to imbalances between U.S. and Soviet 
armed forces. That condition is by no means static. Annex A clearly 
shows a thrust that likely will continue unless U.S. decision-makers 
take dynamic steps to ratify, reinforce, retard, or repeal current trends. 

As it stands, the quantitative balance continues to shift toward 
the Soviet Union. U.S. qualitative superiority never compensated 
completely and, in certain respects, is slowly slipping away. America's 
global responsibilities, coupled with U.S. reliance on reserve compo- 
nents, permit the Soviet Union to concentrate power while we remain 
dispersed, depending heavily on allies and arms control accords to 
safeguard our national interests. Force structure standards that stress 
essential equivalence instead of sufficiency encourage overemphasis 
on arms and equipment that bear scant relationship to pressing 

Quantitative asymmetries that favor the Soviet Union attract the 
most attention, but the absence of comparable capabilities is only 
occasionally cause for concern, as Figures 7 and 8 indicate. Mismatched 
U.S. ends and means are much more important (see Figures 9 and 10). 
Very few positive U.S. programs, contemplated or in progress, will 
alleviate associated problems. 

Some of the cogent U.S. shortcomings identified in earlier sections 
would lose significance if this country scaled down its overseas in- 
terests, accepting uncertain costs related to reduced world power 
status, the possible loss of Free World leadership, and long-range U.S. 
security. Others could be corrected (entirely or in part) by policy 
changes, such as amending military pay scales to allow more money 
for modernization without a bigger budget. A third course of action 
could contribute by scrapping inessential and/or inappropriate 
capabilities, present or proposed — the contemplated expansion of our 
strategic nuclear triad from three to seven systems typifies programs 
that are ripe for review. 6 Some steps, like reshaping the U.S. Navy 
to meet emerging Soviet threats, might demand additional expending 
funds. Risks courted by allowing any or all shortcomings to remain 
uncorrected should be carefully calculated. 

Which combination would be most suitable (indeed, whether any 
action is essential) might best be ascertained by a national debate 
to sharpen issues and identify optimum options. This study lays the 
groundwork for Congressional participation. 

Sound conclusions would allow Congress and the Executive Branch 
in concert to chart a course that matches ends and means in ways 
that assure America's ability to deter and, if need be, defend success- 
fully against any sort of Soviet armed aggression for the rest of the 
20th Century. 

8 Manned bombers, hard-site ICBMs, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles comprise oiu current 
triad. Air-launched and land-mobile ballistic missiles, along with air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, are 
in various stages of R&D. All are considered as add-ons, rather than replacements for present systems. 



Annex A 

Statistics contained herein are calculated to show changes in the 
U.S./Soviet quantitative balance over the last 10 years. Columns for 
1965 and 1975 first indicate comparative force levels, then identify 
how far ahead or behind the United States was at those selected 
times. The right hand column reflects cumulative shifts in U.S. status. 
In 1965, for example, we had 630 more ICBMs than the Soviet Union. 
Today, they have 549 more than we do. The net change in balance 
thus is 1,179 in favor of the Soviet. Some entries in the net change 
column are positive, although this country currently is behind. Those 
circumstances occur when Soviet reductions exceed those of the 
United States, but Soviet inventories remain numerically superior. 
Other entries are negative, although the United States currently is 
ahead. Those conditions are caused by Soviet expansion that narrows, 
but does not close, specific gaps. 

Comparisons include active inventories only, except as noted. 
Reserve components and allied forces are addressed in the text. 

Multiple open sources were used to compile basic data. Various staff 
sections in the Pentagon amended and/or supplied many statistics. 









Net U.S. 









Personnel i_. 

220, 800 

308, 000 

-87, 200 

76, 700 


-337, 300 

-250, 100 


16, 550 


+8, 550 

18, 400 

14, 000 

+4, 000 


Air Force... 

204, 250 

300, 000 


58, 300 

400, 000 


-245, 950 

Ballistic/cruise missiles: 









Heavy 2. .. 













+ 10 











+ 376 












































Heavy 8 








Medium 7 








Tankers » 


+ 1,000 





Ballistic missile sub- 





4 16 














ICBM/SLBM warheads... 



+ 1,312 



+3, 352 

+2, 040 














See footnotes at end of table. 











Net U.S. 









Personnel 5 


500, 000 

-379, 250 

25, 100 

600, 000 




23, 050 

400, 000 



500, 000 

-499, 100 








Air Force.. 

93, 750 

100, 000 

-6, 250 

23, 000 

100, 000 



ABM missiles i° 






SAM launchers «... 



- 6, 205 



-9, 170 


Interceptors '2 



-2, 687 



—2, 304 




Personnel 13 



-860, 050 

789, 100 

2, 500, 000 



Divisions i* 











































Tanks 15 _ 


30, 500 


10, 100 

40, 000 

—29, 900 




—2, 500 








34, 500 

—26, 000 










Armored carriers 16 __ 


35, 000 

14, 300 


40, 000 

—21, 000 


SSM 1 - 





-1,673 .. 












—990 . 




—100 .. 

Nuke artillery is 




+450 .. 

Other artillery i» 

At missiles 2 « 

1 750 

2 100 

17, 000 

-14, 900 . 

16,500 . 


-3,600 . 
+6, 420 . 




190, 000 

10, 000 

+ 180,000 

197, 000 

12, 000 

+185, 000 

+5, 000 






Separate regiments 2 '. 



































200, 000 




-400, 000 


Border Guards 

-200, 000 


Personnel 22 ... 

650, 500 

292, 000 



386, 000 


-229, 100 

Aircraft carriers 







Attack 23 . 


+ 16 










Other 2 * 





+ 5 


Cruiser 25 









• 14 





















SSM 2 <s 














Other escorts 25 , 27 



(—27)— 65 





Attack submarines 28 
































SSM 2 s 




















SSM 2 « 







Motor torpedo 







Amphibious ships 29 








Tactical aircraft 30 






+2, 775 










Bombers 31 






Patrol/ASW 3 2... 








Afloat 'J 


+2, 132 

















ASW 3 * 







Fixed wing. 




+1 ^ 







+1 1 


Sealift 35 . 







-2, 782 

See footnotes at end of table. 










Net U.S. 









Personnel 39 . 

.. 531,000 

400, 000 

+ 131,000 

530, 700 

500, 000 

+30, 700 


Tactical aircraft 30 . 








Fighter/attack 37 



+ 1,000 














Strategic 38 








Tactical 3« 








» U.S. reductions reflect the inactivation of strategic bomber squadrons. 

2 Definition of "heavy" ICBM's conforms to U.S. SALT I unilateral statements. Includes U.S. Titans; Soviet SS-7, 
SS-8, SS-9, SS-18, SS-19, although SALT II accords may eventually consider SS-19's in the "light" category. An esti- 
mated 100 of them were deployed in January 1976. 

3 Definition of "light" ICBM's conforms to U.S. SALT I unilateral statements. Includes U.S. Minuteman II, III; Soviet 
SS-11 SS-13 SS-17 

<ALCM's with nuclear warheads include U.S. Hound Dog, SRAM; Soviet AS-3 (Kangaroo), AS-4 (Kitchen), AS-6. 
Where statistics are lacking, but mass production confirmed, figures shown reflect standard force loadings— for example, 
2 Hound Dogs per B-52, 1 AS-3 per Bear bomber, 2 AS Ill's per Backfire. 

5 Strategic sea-launched cruise missiles currently are limited to Soviet Shaddock, which has a maximum range of about 
250 nautical miles (NM). Its estimated effective range is closer to 150 NM. Figures shown are tubes only, not missiles. 
Their primary mission probably is antiship. 

6 "Heavy" bombers include U.S. B-52; Soviet Bear, Bison. 

' "Medium" bombers include U.S. B-47, B-58, FB-111, Soviet Badger, Blinder, and Backfire. 

8 U.S. 1965 tanker figure i ncludes 50 squadrons (average 20 aircraft each). 

8 U.S. reductions reflect the inactivation of interceptor squadrons, SAM batteries, and radar sites. 

10 Soviet 1965 ABM figure excludes abortive deployment of possible first-generation missiles around Leningrad. 

11 SAM air defense launchers include U.S. Bomarc, Hawk, Nike-Hercules, both Active and National Guard. Soviet forces 
include SA-1 through SA-6. Soviets have 12,000 missiles for 9,500 launchers. 

12 Interceptors include U.S. Air National Guard squadrons as well as those in the Regular Air Force. 

13 Army strengths exclude strategic nuclear elements. U.S. figure for 1965 parallels that prior to the Vietnam war buildup. 
The peak in fiscal year 1968 was 1,570,000. 

14 U.S. figures exclude separate brigades and regiments which sometimes are used to calculate "division equivalent" 
strengths. Soviet tank divisions are shown as armor. Soviet motorized infantry divisions are shown as mechanized. 

"U.S. medium tanks include M-48 and M-60; all others are light tanks. Soviet heavy tanks include JS-2, 3, T-10; 
T-54 55, T-62 are mediums; PT-76 is light. 

18 U.S. figures are limited to armored personnel carriers. Soviet statistics include scout cars. 

17 U.S. SRBM's include Pershing, Lance, and Honest John (Lance has entirely replaced HJ. in Europe). Soviet SRBM's 
include Scud A B, Scaleboard, Frog. The Soviet LRCM is Shaddock, a land-based version of their strategic nuclear SLCM. 

i g U.S. nuclear artillery includes 155 mm and 8-in howitzers. The Soviets may have nuclear rounds for 203 mm gun- 
howitzers and 240 mm mortars, but perhaps only for training purposes. 

" Conventional artillery excludes mortars, antitank guns, rocket launchers, recoilless weapons, and antiaircraft artillery. 

20 U.S. antitank missiles include Dragon and Tow. Soviet models include Snapper, Swatter, and Sagger. No Soviet 
missiles are helicopter mounted. 

21 Soviet marines (naval infantry) in 1965 comprised small units with the 4 fleets (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and 
Pacific). They now are organized into regiments. 

22 Naval personnel strengths include naval air elements, but exclude ballistic missile submarine forces. 

23 The Soviet VSTOL carrier Kiev is sometimes called a cruiser. 

24 Soviet helicopter carriers of the Moskva class a re sometimes called helicopter cruisers. U.S. counterparts are commonly 
categorized as amphibious ships. 

25 U.S. Navy reclassified many cruisers, destroyers, and other escorts in the spring of 1975 to conform more closely to 
international terminology. The 1965 column reflects 1975 classifications to facilitate comparisons. 

2 «SSM refers to anti-surface-ship cruise missiles in this table. Soviet SS-N-2,3,9, 10, and 11 are included. SS-N-3s 
(Shaddocks) are shown as strategic missiles, but have antiship missions. 

27 Escorts include frigates, destroyer escorts, and other comparable oceangoing craft of 1,000 tons or more. U.S. Naval 
Reserve ships, shown in parentheses, are immediately available to augment active forces in emergency. U.S. Coast Guard 
vessels are omitted. 

28 Soviet coastal submarines are excluded. 

28 Amphibious ships exclude helicopter carriers and landing craft (such as LCU, LCM, LCVP). 

30 Total aircraft for Navy and Air Force include all types. Subordinate entries, which include selected types only, do not 
equal the total. 

31 Soviet naval bombers include Badger, Blinder, Beagle, Backfire. 

32 Soviet naval patrol/ASW aircraft include Bear, May, and Mail. The latter is an amphibian. 
83 U.S. naval aircraft afloat exclude those assigned to Marine squadrons. 

34 The sharp drop in U.S. Navy ASW aircraft between 1965 and 1975 reflects the decommissioning of 9 ASW aircraft 

a U.S. sealift included 329 vessels in the Military Sealift Command (MSC)-controlled fleet in 1965 and 118 in 1975. 
(MSC was called Military Sea Transport Service in 1965). The remainder are Merchant Marine. No such breakout is possible 
for Soviet ships. 

36 Air Force personnel strengths exclude strategic nuclear and naval air elements. 

37 Current Soviet fighter/attack figures include 2,000 aircraft intended primarily for counterair missions and 1,500 
earmarked primarily for close air support of ground forces. 

38 Strategic airlift forces include U.S. C-5 and C-141 aircraft, Soviet Cock and Candid. 

38 Tactical airlift forces include U.S. C-130's, active and reserve. Soviet figures indicate Cub only. 

Annex B 

Whether the prevailing and projected United States/Soviet military 
balance is acceptable depends on relationships between ends (interests, 
objectives, commitments) and means (manpower, materiel), as 
conditioned by acknowledged and anticipated threats, Wherever 
detrimental risk-versus-gain ratios appear, adjustments are in order. 1 

This annex silhouettes the full range of fundamental force sufficiency 
considerations, including policy guidelines and constraints. 


National security interests 

National security interests exerted minimum influence on U.S. 
force requirements before World War II, because our interests were 
essentially self-satisfying. Their influence todav is central. The 
nation now must have sufficient power, both real and apparent, to 
satisfy two irreducible interests: 

— Survival 

— Physical security 

Contributing U.S. interests, like world peace, stability, national 
credibility as discerned by others, and strategic freedom of action also 
affect force requirements. 

National security objectives 

Three overriding U.S. objectives stem directly from the fundamental 
interests identified above : 

— Deter attacks against the United States 

— Defend this country if deterrence fails 

— Help safeguard other states whose security is closely linked with 
our own. 

The first two objectives are rarely challenged, but controversy 
constantly arises concerning how many forces of what kinds are 
essential to accomplish them. Force requirements for the third 
objective range from few to many, depending on which states in 
which parts of the World are designated. There currently is no 

Commitments related to contingencies 

America's alliance system, designed to assist in satisying U.S. 
interests despite present and potential threats, includes eight mutual 
defense pacts, whose membership totals 42 countries, Executive agree- 
ments and other pledges involve 30-odd more. 

1 Decision-makers have litt le control over risks that result from miscalculations, such as overrating friendly 
capabilities, underrating the opposition, or placing excessive emphasis on shaky assumptions. Calculated 
risks, including those incurred by Congress in the appropriations process, can be restricted to considerable 



It would be impossible to honor all such commitments concurrently, 
except in special curcumstances (for example, general nuclear war). 
Current U.S. concepts therefore prescribe sufficient forces to: 

— Deal simultaneously with one "major" contingency (wherever it 
might occur) and one "minor" contingency. 

— Redeploy rapidly from one major theater to another, as required. 

Among all possible contingency areas, four receive top priority: 

—NATO Europe 

— Northeast Asia 

— Caribbean/Panama Canal 

—Middle East 

Forces for one area are not necessarily appropriate for the others, 
either in size or structure. The Caribbean is essentially a naval theater, 
while Northeast Asia needs combined arms. The mass formations 
which are effective in NATO Europe would find little space to ma- 
neuver in Panama. 

Operational functions oj U.S. Armed Forces 

Congress, in accord with Title 10, United States Code, confirms 
fundamental functions for each U.S. military service. The Depart- 
ment of Defense, with Presidential approval, prescribes primary and 
collateral functions in greater detail. Forces should be sufficient to 
fullfill each function effectively. 

Title 10 Junctions (Chapter 307, section 3062) 
It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in 
conjunction with other armed forces, of: 

— Overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive 
acts that imperil the peace and security of the United 
— Conducting prompt and' sustained operations on land. 
DOD directive 5100.1 Selected primary -function 
— Defeating enemy land forces 
— Seize, occupy, and defend land areas 
— Assisting in air defense of the United States 2 
— Participating in joint amphibious and airborne opera- 

Collateral Junctions 
— Interdicting enemy air /sea power and communications 
through operations on or from land 
Special responsibilities 
— Operating land lines of communication 
— Providing administrative/logistic support for unified 
and specified commands 
Title 10 Junctions (Chapter 503, section 5012) 

— Conducting prompt and sustained combat operations 
incident to war at sea, including naval air operations. 3 
■ — Protecting shipping 

2 "Aerospace defense" is a more accurate term than "air defense", since Army functions include anti- 
ballistic missile defense. 

3 There is no explicit statutory authorization for the Navy to conduct strategic nuclear operations. That 
function is implicitly included under "operations incident to war at sea", according to current interpretation. 


BOB directive 5100.1 

Selected primary functions 

— Seek out and destroy enemy naval forces 

— Suppress enemy sea commerce 

— Gain and maintain general naval supremacy 

— Participate in joint amphibious and airborne 

— Protect vital sea lines of communication 
— Conduct land and air operations essential to naval 

Collateral Functions 
— Interdict enemy land/air power and communications 

through operations at sea 
— Provide close air and naval support for land operations 
— Participate in overall air efforts as directed 
Special responsibilities 
— Provide sea transport for other services 
— Provide administrative/logistic support for unified and 

specified commands 
— Provide for sea-based air defense of the United States 
Air Force 

Title 10 junctions {Chapter 807, section 8061) 
— Conduct prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air 

BOB directive 5100.1 

Selected primary functions 

— Defend the United States against air attack 

— Gain and maintain general air superiority 

— Defeat enemy air forces 

— Prepare for strategic air warfare 4 

— Furnish close combat and logistic air support to the 

Army, and air transport for all services 
— Participate in joint amphibious and airborne opera- 
Collateral functions 

— Interdict enemy sea power through air operations 
— Conduct antisubmarine warfare operations 
— Conduct aerial minelaying operations 
Special responsibilities 

— Provide administrative/logistic support for unified and 
specified commands 
Marine Corps 

Title 10 function {Chapter 503, section 5013) 
— In conjunction with the Navy, seize or defend advanced 

naval bases 
— Conduct land operations essential to naval campaigns 
BOB directive 5100.1 

Selected primary functions 

— Participate in joint amphibious operations 

— Protect naval property 

4 "Strategic aerospace warfare" is a more accurate term than "strategic air warfare", since ballistic missiles 
are involved. 


Collateral functions 

— Interdict enemy air power and communications 

through operations at sea 
— Provide close air support for land operations 
— Participate in overall air efforts as directed 
Special responsibilities 
— Contribute to sea-based air defense of the United 


Military missions 

Service functions outlined above influence force requirements for the 
U.S. military establishment as a whole. Specific missions and areas of 
responsibility assigned to unified and specified commands under the 
Unified Command Plan and various operations/contingency plans help 
determine whether implementing forces should be many or few. 

The number of U.S. troops needed merely to act as a "nuclear 
trip wire" in NATO Europe, for example, would be somewhat less 
than those that underpin present missions of U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM), which is enjoined to: 

— Maintain an effective conventional as well as a tactical nuclear 

— Defend assigned sectors without major loss of territory 

Strategic reserves under Readiness Command (REDCOM) must 
furnish forces to : 

— Reinforce NATO in emergency 

— Reinforce other areas in accord wuth U.S. treat}' commitments 
and contingency plans 

And so on. 


If decision-makers perceived no threats, there would be no need 
for armed forces to deter or defend against aggression. U.S. ends 
would be easily attained. 

Three types of threat impinge on U.S. interests and objectives in 
ways that influence the United States/Soviet military balance : 

— Strategic nuclear threats to the United States 

— Challenges on the high seas 

— Direct confrontations between U.S. /allied and Soviet troops, as 
in Europe and perhaps the Middle East. 

Since deterrence is the paramount U.S. objective, psychological 
impressions on our primary adversary are very important. What 
numerical relationships are necessary is a contentious matter. 

Threats to allies, but not the United States (like Soviet threats to 
NATO) determine the size and structure of U.S. general purpose and 
strategic mobility forces. 

Threat estimations 

Two basic considerations dominate the threat-evaluation process. 
Capabilities indicate what opponents could do, if they were so in- 
clined. Intentions indicate what they are likely to do. Heavy weights 
assigned to capabilities sometimes create greater demands for forces 
than strong reliance on intentions. Since even the best of estimates 


may be erroneous, U.S. decision-makers would be well advised to 
adopt postures that will secure essential interests if estimates prove 

Armed forces 

The numbers and types of armed forces needed to discourage 
aggressors are not necessarily the same as those needed to fight a 
war if deterrence fails. Overoptimizing forces in favor of the former 
aim thus may incur inadvertent risks. Consequently, sufficiency 
standards should foster flexibility. Further, abilities to concentrate 
power at appropriate times and places is more meaningful than the 
extent of total inventories. 

The quantitative balance is most significant militarily when like 
offensive forces or weapons systems compete against each other, as 
one division against another. Pitting dissimilar forces against each 
other (SLBMs versus aircraft, for example) dispells any need for 
balance between like systems on either side. Quantitative/qualitative 
correlations between mobility and other non-combat forces are ir- 
relevant, because missions, not enemy counterparts, determine 

Nevertheless, quantitative and/or qualitative superiority would 
be advisable if any other posture so adversely affected perceptions 
on either side that peacetime stability would be deeply eroded and/or 
U.S. confidence in wartime capabilities seriously undercut. 

Nonmilitary means 

Armed forces are only one element in deterrence/defense equations, 
and maybe not the most important. When political, economic, or 
psychological power can satisfy objectives, military requirements 
usually can be reduced. Tradeoffs, however, are not always obvious. 
When time is a crucial factor, firepower may be essential for deterrent 
and defensive purposes. 


National security policies 

Assorted U.S. defense policies spell out ground rules for attaining 
stated objectives. Each affects force requirements in special ways. 
A few cogent policies are surveyed below for illustrative purposes. 

Total force concept 

This country currently subscribes to a total force concept that 
relegates indispensable roles to U.S. Reserve Components and 
armed forces of allies. That approach has been used to justify sharp 
reductions in U.S. ground forces since 1969. Overall sufficiency is 
strongly conditioned by the following factors: 

— The readiness of U.S. Regulars 

— The responsiveness of U.S. Reserves and National Guard 

— The reliability of allies 

All three considerations are in question. 

Flexible response 
A simple, relatively low-cost U.S. strategy called Massive Retalia- 
tion substituted nuclear firepower for manpower in the 1950s, before 


Moscow amassed assured destruction capabilities against America. 
Since then, this country has implemented a complex, costly strategy 
called flexible response, which calls for a wide range of deterrent/ 
defense options. Force requirements, especially in the conventional 
realm, increased. 

Forward deployment j Forward defense 
A substantial (but changeable) percentage of all U.S. general 
purpose forces are deployed overseas as tangible evidence of U.S. 
resolve, in position to react rapidly if regional threats appear to 
imperil U.S interests. The remainder of our deployable forces (as 
opposed to those for base operations) comprise a strategic reserve 
in the United States, ready to reinforce wherever required or establish 
a new U.S. presence in troubled territory. 

— High proportions deployed overseas generate greater demands 

for combat and associated support forces. 
— High proportions retained in reserve generate greater demands 
for quick-reaction airlift/sealift forces and for base support. 

Nixon J Ford doctrine 
The Nixon Doctrine, adopted and slightly adapted by President 
Ford, stipulates that "we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power 
threatens the freedom of [an alty] or a nation whose survival we 
consider vital to our security ... In cases involving other types of 
aggression ... we shall look to the nation directly threatened to 
assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its 
defense." Three influences on U.S. force requirements are readily 
apparent : 

— Sufficient forces are needed for nuclear deterrence/defense 
— Forward deplo} T ment assumes reduced importance in most areas 
— Emphasis shifts to air and sea power at the expense of ground 


The United States proclaims a strategic nuclear second-strike 
policy that spurns "launch-on-warning' ' options for ballistic missiles. 
U.S. SLBMs on station at sea are unaffected, being almost invulner- 
able. Fixed-site ICBMs ate sure to suffer heavily from attrition — even 
peacetime superiority (which we do not enjoy) could translate into 
inferiority following a Soviet attack. 

Second-strike policies also influence U.S. requirements for general 
purpose forces that would be susceptible to heavy losses if the Soviets 
triggered surprise attacks (surface combatants, for example, are 
vulnerable to Soviet short-range anti-ship cruise missiles). 


Geograph ic constraints 

Geography has a direct and sometimes decisive influence on strategic 
nuclear as well as general purpose force requirements. Representative 
considerations include : 

— Size of operational areas 

— Number of points/ areas to seize and secure or defend 


— Type terrain 

— Ownership of contested terrain 

— •Time/distance factors 

— Lines of communication 

Each factor influences different type forces in different fashions. 
Few conventional forces, for example, are required to defend the huge 
U.S. land area with its diverse targets, because ocean depths and 
distance effectively isolate us from invader-. By way of contrast, a 
comprehensive array of strategic nuclear forces would be needed to 
defend that same area from attack- by enemy bomber- and ballistic 
missiles, since distance affords no screen. Soviet force- fighting on 
XATO soil could use tactical nuclear weapons with little concern for 
collateral damage. The United States, defending friendly territory, 
could not. 

Budgetary constraints 

Ideally, national security interests are the bases for objectives and 
commitments which, within policy guidelines, shape strategy. Strate- 
gic concepts conditioned by threats generate military force require- 
ments. Budgetary assets then are allocated to satisfy need<. 

That Utopian sequence rarely occurs in real life. National defense 
competes with other sectors. There never is enough money to go around. 
The trick is to walk a tightrope between excessive defense expenditures 
that emasculate political, economic, social, scientific, and ecological 
programs on one hand, and deficient defense expenditures that actively 
endanger national security on the other. Equally important, over- 
allocations in any given military sector can undercut essential capa- 
bilities elsewhere. 

Trend forecasts 

Satisfaction with the status quo is insufficient. Defense decision- 
makers must also ensure that major military trends best serve future 
U.S. security interests. Early identification of inimical trends is 
imperative, since elemental changes in most military capabilitie- 
require long lead times measured in years, not days or months. United 
States, Soviet budgetary emphases, R&D programs, and procurement 
deployment patterns are among the important indicators. 


Xo number of armed forces, regardless of quality, is sufficient when 
strategic concepts are seriously flawed. Conversely, superior strategy 
can overcome otherwise insurmountable obstacles. Mao. totally unable 
to compete successfully with Western technology, capitalized on cheap, 
but highly effective, concepts for revolutionary war. The United 
States still has no adequate antidote. Material force, of course, is 
important, but Emerson was right when he wrote that "Thoughts 
rule the world." 


Sufficiency requirements are especially sensitive to assumptions, 
which apply to every criterion cited above. Paradoxically, excessively 
optimistic and pessimistic assumptions both foster insufficiency. The 
former cause decisionmakers to underestimate true force requirements. 


The latter cause decisionmakers to feel that no number would be 
enough, so why waste manpower and money. A few conflicting 
assumptions currently in vogue are exemplary : 

— Force is (not) outmoded as a foreign polic\ r tool 

— Detente does (not) reflect benign Soviet intentions 

— U.S. nuclear superiority (parity) is (not) essential 

— Controlled nuclear war is (not) conceivable 

— Considerable strategic warning of war will (not) be available 

— War in Europe would (not) be short and conclusive 

Annex C 



Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact 1947) : 
United States Dominican Republic Panama 

Argentina Ecuador Paraguay 

Bolivia El Salvador Peru 

Brazil Guatemala Trinidad and Tobago 

Chile Haiti Uruguay 

Colombia Honduras Venezuela 

Costa Rica Mexico 

Cuba * Nicaragua 

North Atlantic Treaty (1949) : 
United States Italy Greece (1952) 

Belgium Luxembourg Turkey (1952) 

Canada Netherlands Federal Republic of 

Denmark Norway Germany (1955) 

France Portugal 

Iceland United Kingdom 

Security Treaty between the United States and Australia and New 
Zealand (ANZUS 1951). 

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO 1954) : 
United States Pakistan 

Australia Philippines 

France Thailand 

New Zealand United Kingdom 


Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines (1951) 
Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea (1953) 
Mutual Defense Treaty with China (Taiwan) (1954) 
Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation with Japan (1960) 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain (1976) 2 


There have been five Congressional resolutions since 1945. Each of 
these has been requested by the President to mobilize Congressional 

1 Cuba was excluded from the Rio Pact in 1962. 

2 Signed January 24, 197(5. Senate ratification pending: 



support at times of foreign policy crisis. The five resolutions follow. 
Dates of the joint resolutions refer to the day they were signed into 
law. The date for H. Con. Res. 570 is the clay the resolution was 
cleared by Congress. It did not require the President's signature and 

does not carry the force of law. 

Formosa resolution, H.J. Res. 159, Jan. 29, 1955, covering Formosa 
(Nationalist China) and the Pescadores Islands against "armed 
attack" from Communist China. 

Middle East resolution. H.J. Res. 117. March 9. 1957, proclaiming 
U.S. policy to defend Middle East countries "against aggression from 
any country controlled by international communism." 

Cuban resolution. S.J. Res. 230, Oct. 3, 1962. to defend Latin 
America against Cuban aggression or subversion and to oppose the 
deployment of Soviet weapons in Cuba capable of endangering U.S. 

Berlin resolution H. Con. Res. 570. Oct. 10. 1902. reaffirming the 
U.S. determination to use armed force, if necessary, to defend West 
Berlin and the access rights of Western powers to West Berlin. 

Vietnam resolution. H.J. Res. 1145. Aug. 10. 1964, known as the 
Tonkin Gulf resolution, authorizing the President to use armed forces 
to repel attacks against U.S. forces and affirming U.S. determination 
to defend any SEATO treaty member or protocol state (this includes 
Vietnam') requesting assistance. 


The United States has entered defense arrangements by executive 
agreement with the following countries: 

Denmark 1951 Iran 1959 

Iceland 1951 Turkey 1959 

Spain 1953 Pakistan 1959 

Canada 1958 Philippines 1959, 1965 

Liberia 1959 


The State Department's 1967 compilation of U.S. commitment- 
includes 34 Executive Branch policy declarations and communiques 
issued jointly with foreign governments. The following areas and 
nations are covered by these pledges: Latin America (Monroe Doc- 
trine). Berlin. Iran. India. Jordan, Israel. Thailand. South Vietnam, 
the Republic of China and the Philippines. With the exception of 
India, these policy declarations and communiques cover nations which 
also have received U.S. pledge- under treaties, executive agreements 
or Congressional resolutions. India received a pledge in 1954 from 
President Eisenhower that the United States would act to prevent 
Pakistan from using U.S. military aid against India. 3 

irtesy of Congressional Quarterly Service. From Global Defense; I'. • Commitments Abroad, 

L'pdated by author. January 1^76. 

Annex D 

ABM: Set Antiballistic missile defen 

Administrative support: Personnel and logistical managem 
also Logisti< s. 

Aero-};,-' defense: An inclusive term encompassing all meas 

intercept and do-troy hostile aircraft, missiles, and space vehicles, 
or otherwise neutralize them. See also Air Defense and Antiballistic 
missile def< 

A__: - i >n: The first use of armed force to satisfy political, economic, 
or social aims. 

Airborne force-, operation-: Ground combat and airlift forces deigned 
primarily to conduct parachute and or other type air assaults that 
open up new area- of operation; the employment of such forces in 
combat. Set also Airmobile force-, operation-. 

Air defense: All measures to intercept and destroy hostile aircraft and 
cruise missiles, or otherwise neutralize them. Equipment includes 
interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, surveillance devices, 
and ancillary installations. 

Air-launched ballistic missile: Any ballistic missile transported by 
and launched from land- or sea-based aircraft and or lighter-than- 
air conveyance-, such as blimp.-, balloon-, and dirigible.-. See also 
ballistic missiles. 

Air-launched cruise missile: Any cruise miss ile transported by and 
launched from land- or sea-based aircraft and or lighter-than-air 
conveyances, such as blimps, balloons, and dirigible-. See also 
cruise missile. 

Airmobile force-, operation-: Ground combat units using assig 
and or attached fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft under their control 
to maneuver rapidly within given areas of operation: the employ- 
ment e »rces in combat. See also Airborne forces, operation-. 

Air superiority: Dominance in the air to a degree that permits friendly 
land, sea, and air fo] - I operate at specific times and place- with- 
out prohibitive interference by enemy air fo 

ALBM: r-launched ballistic missile. 

ALA JjM : S ' Air-launched cruise missile. 

Amphibious operatic tdt on a hostile shore launched from 

bynavi ground forces trained, organized and equi] 

for that purpo 

Amphibious ship-: Navy vessels specifii ed to trans] 

land, and support I ration-. Loading 

and unloading without external assistance. Set also Amphibious 

Antiballistic missile defense: All measures to intercept and destroy 
hostile ballistic tralize them. Equipment 



includes weapons, target acquisition, tracking and guidance radars, 
plus ancillary installations. 

Antisubmarine warfare: All measures to reduce or nullif}^ the effec- 
tiveness of hostile submarines; in relation to this study, specifically 
concerns operations to detect, locate, track, and destroy submarines 
used for strategic nuclear and conventional purposes. 

Area target: A target whose dimensions encompass two or more geo- 
graphic coordinates on operational maps. Cities and military bases 
are representatives. 

A rms control : Explicit or implicit international agreements that govern 
the numbers, types, characteristics, deployment, and use of armed 
forces and armaments. See also arms limitation; Disarmament. 

Arms limitation: An agreement to restrict quantitative holdings of or 
qualitative improvements in specific armaments or weapons systems. 
See also Arms control; Disarmament. 

Assumption: A supposition concerning the current situation or future 
events, presumed to be true in the absence of positive proof to the 
contrary. Used for planning and decision-making purposes. 

Assured destruction: A highly reliable ability to inflict unacceptable 
damage on airy aggressor or combination of aggressors at any time 
during the course of a nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a 
surprise first strike. 

ASW: See Antisubmarine warfare. 

Attack aircraft: Tactical aircraft used primarily for interdiction and 
close air support purposes. See also Fighter aircraft. 

Attack carrier: An aircraft carrier designed to accommodate high- 
performance fighter/attack aircraft whose primary purpose is to 
project offensive striking power against targets ashore and afloat. 

Attack submarine: A submarine designed primarily to destroy enemy 
merchant shipping and naval vessels, including other submarines. 

Balance: See Military balance; Strategic balance. 

Ballistic missile: A pilotless projectile propelled into space by one 
or more rocket boosters. Thrust is terminated at some early stage, 
after which reentry vehicles follow trajectories that are governed 
mainly by gravity and aerodynamic drag. Mid-course corrections 
and terminal guidance permit only minor modifications to the 
flight path. See also Reentry vehicle. 

Bargaining chip: Any military force, weapons system, or other re- 
source, present or projected, which a country expresses willingness 
to downgrade or discard in return for concessions by a particular 

Basic load: That quantity of nonnuclear ammunition authorized and 
required to be on hand within a military unit or formation at all 

Bomb : A weapon dropped from a manned aircraft of any sort. Gravity 
is the primary force, but "smart" bombs can be guided electronically. 

Calculated risk: The deliberate acceptance of gaps between ends and 
means in accord with estimates that enemies are unlikely to initiate 
actions that will interfere unacceptably with friendly arms. See 
also Intention; Risk. 

Capability: The ability of a country or coalition of countries to execute 
specific courses of action. Capabilities are conditioned by many 
variables, including the balance of military forces, time, space,, 
terrain, and weather. See also Intention. 


Civil defense: Passive measures designed to minimize the effects of 
enemy action on all aspects of civil life, particularly to protect the 
population and production base. Includes emergency steps to repair 

or restore vital utilities and facilities. 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet: U.S. commercial aircraft and crewS allocated 
in emergency for exclusive military use in international and domestic 

Close air support: Air strikes against targets near enough to ground 
combat units that detailed coordination between participating air 
and ground elements is required. 

Cold launch: A "pop up" technique that ejects ballistic missiles from 
silos or submarines using power plants that are separate from the 
delivery vehicles. Primary ignition is delayed until projectiles are 
safely clear of the Launcher. 

Cold war: A state of international tension at the lower end of the con- 
flict spectrum, wherein political, economic, technological, sociologi- 
cal, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of 
sustained, armed combat are orchestrated to attain national 

Collateral casualties and damage: Physical harm done to persons and 
property collocated with or adjacent to targets. Collateral effects 
may be welcome or unwanted, depending on circumstances. 

Combat power: A compilation of capabilities related to a specific 
military balance between countries or coalitions. Ingredients include 
numbers and types of forces; technological attributes of weapons 
and equipment; discipline; morale; pride; confidence; hardiness; 
elan; loyalty; training; combat experience; command/control 
arrangements; staying power; and leadership. Combat power is 
illusory unless accompanied by the national will to use it as re- 
quired. See also Military balance; National will. 

Command and control: An arrangement of facilities, equipment, per- 
sonnel, and procedures used to acquire, process, and disseminate 
data needed by decision-makers to plan, direct, and control 

Commitment : An obligation or pledge to carry out or support a given 
national policy. See also National security policies. 

Conflict spectrum: A continuum of hostilities that ranges from sub- 
crisis maneuvering in cold-war situations to the most violent form 
of general war. 

Containment: Measures to discourage or prevent the expansion of 
enemy territorial holdings and/or influence. Specifically, a U.S. 
policy directed against communist expansion. 

Contingency plans and operations: Preparation for major event- 
that can reasonably be anticipated and that probably would have a 
detrimental effect on national security; actions in case such events 

Controlled counterforce war: War in which one or both side- concen- 
trate on reducing enemy strategic retaliatory force- in a bar- 
gaining situation, and take special precautions to minimize collateral 
casualties and damage. See also Controlled war. 

Controlled war: A war waged in response to the continuous receipt and 
evaluation of information concerning changes in the situation, 
combined with the competence to adjust accordingly. See also 
Controlled counterforce war. 


Conventional (forces, war, weapons): Military organizations, hostili- 
ties, and hardware that exclude nuclear, chemical, and biological 

Cost effectiveness: A condition that matches ends with means in ways 
that create maximum capabilities at minimum expense. 

Counter city: See Countervalue. 

Counterforce: The employment of strategic air and missile forces to 
destroy, or render impotent, military capabilities of an enemy 
force. Bombers and their bases, ballistic missile submarines, ICBM 
silos, ABM and air defense installations, command and control 
centers, and nuclear stockpiles are typical counterforce targets. 
See also Countervalue. 

Countervalue: A strategic concept which calls for the destruction or 
neutralization of selected enemy population centers, industries, 
resources, and/or institutions which constitute the social fabric of a 
society. See also Counterforce. 

CRAF : See Civil Reserve Air Fleet. 

Credibility: Clear evidence that capabilities and intentions are suffi- 
cient to support purported policies. 

Cruise missile: A pilotless aircraft, propelled by an airbreathing 
engine, that operates entirely within the earth's atmosphere. Thrust 
continues throughout its flight. Air provides most of the lift. In- 
flight guidance and control can be accomplished remotely or by on- 
board equipment. Conventional and nuclear warheads are available. 

Cruiser: A large, long-endurance surface warship armed for independ- 
ent offensive operations against surface ships and land targets. Also 
acts as an escort to protect aircraft carriers, merchantmen, and 
other ships against surface or air attack. May have an anti-sub- 
marine capability. Own aircraft-handling capability restricted to 
one or two float planes, helicopters, or other short take-off and 
landing t} T pes. 

Damage limitation: Active and/or passive efforts to restrict the level 
and/or geographic extent of devastation during war. Includes 
counterforce actions of all kinds, as well as civil defense measures. 
See also Counterforce ; Civil defense. 

Defense: Measures taken b}^ a country or coalition of countries to 
resist political, military, economic, social, ps}xhological, and/or 
technological attacks. Defensive capabilities reinforce deterrence, 
and vice versa. See also Deterrence. 

Defense-in-depth: Protective measures in successive positions along 
axes of enemy advance, as opposed to a single line of resistance. De- 
signed to absorb and progressively weaken enemy penetrations. 

Destroyer: A medium-sized warship configured to escort and protect 
other ships against air, submarine, and surface attacks. May also be 
used for independent offensive operations against enemy ships or 
land targets. Some embark one or two helicopters. 

Detente: Lessening of tensions in international relations. Ma}' be 
achieved formally or informally. 

Deterrence : Steps taken to prevent opponents from initiating armed 
actions and to inhibit escalation if combat occurs. Threats of force 
predominate. See also Defense; Escalation. 

Disarmament: The reduction of armed forces and/or armaments as a 
result of unilateral initiatives or international agreement. See also 
Arms control and Arms limitation. 


Division Equivalent: Separate brigades, regiments, and comparable 

combat forces whose aggregate capabilities approximate those of a 

division, except for staying power. 
ECM : See Electronic countermeasures. 

Electronic countermeasures: A form of electronic warfare that pre- 
vents or degrades effective enemy uses of the electromagnetic 

spectrum. Jamming is a typical tactic. See also Electronic counter- 

Electronic counter-countermeasures : A form of electronic warfare 

taken to insure effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite 

enemy ECM efforts. See also Electronic countermeasures. 
Ends: National security interests, objectives, and commitments, along 

with military roles and missions, which establish aims to be ac- 
complished. See also Means. 
Escalation: An increase, deliberate or unpremediated, in the scope 

and/or intensity of a conflict. 
Escort: Cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and other surface warships 

expressly configured to defend other ships against enemy attack. 

May be multipurpose (e.g. anti-air, anti-submarine) or unipurpose. 

May also be assigned independent offensive missions. See also 

Cruiser; Destroyer; Frigate. 
Essential equivalence: A force structure standard that demands 

capabilities approximately equal in overall effectiveness to those of 

particular opponents, but does not insist on numercial equality in all 

cases. See also Parity. 
Fighter aircraft: Tactical aircraft used primarily to gain and maintain 

air superiority. See also Attack aircraft. 
First-strike: The first offensive move of a war. As applied to general 

nuclear war, it implies the ability to eliminate effective retaliation 

by the opposition. See also Second strike. 
First use: The initial employment of specific military measures, such 

as nuclear weapons, during the conduct of a war. A belligerent could 

execute a second strike in response to aggression, yet be the first 

to employ nuclear weapons. See also First strike. 
Flexibility: Capabilities that afford countries and weapons systems a 

range of options, and facilitate smooth adjustment when situations 

change. See also Flexible response. 
Flexible response : A strategy predicated on meeting aggression at an 

appropriate level or place with the capability of escalating the level 

of conflict if required or desired. See also Flexibility. 
Forward base: A military installation maintained on foreign soil or on 

a distant possession that is conveniently located with regard to 

actual or potential areas of operations. 
Forward defense: A strategic concept which calls for containing or 

repulsing military aggression as close to the original line of contact 

as possible to protect important areas. 
Free rocket: A missile with completely self-contained propellant 

package that is neither guided nor controlled in flight. 
Frigate: A medium to small surface warship armed as an escort 

against surface attack and either air or submarine attack. Ma}^ be 

capable of embarking and handling one or two helicopters. See 

also Escort. 


General purpose forces: All combat forces not designed primarily to 
accomplish strategic offensive, defensive or strategic mobility 

General war: Armed conflict between major powers in which the 
national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. Commonly 
reserved for a showdown between the United States and U.S.S.R., 
featuring nuclear weapons. 

Hard-site ICBM: Any ICBM in a silo that provides substantial 
protection against nuclear attack. See also Hard target; Intercon- 
tinental ballistic missile. 

Hard target: A point or area protected to some significant degree 
against the blast, heat and radiation effects of nuclear exposions 
of particular yields. See also Soft target. 

Heavy bomber: A multi-engine aircraft with intercontinental range, 
designed specifically to engage targets whose destruction would 
reduce an enemy's capacity and/or will to wage war. See also 
Medium bomber. 

Heavy ICBM: U.S. Titan II; Soviet SS-7, SS-8, SS-9, SS-18, SS-19 
for purposes of this study. See also Light ICBM. 

Heavy tank: Tanks weighting more than 60 tons are generally 
designated as "heavies," although the United States no longer 
uses heavy, medium, and light as classifications. See also Light 
tank; Medium tank. 

High threshold: An intangible line between levels and types of conflict 
across which one or more antagonists plan to escalate with great 
reluctance after other courses of action fail, or which they could be 
compelled to cross only if subjected to immense pressures. See also 
Low threshold and Threshold. 

Hi-Lo mix: Mingling high-cost, high performance items with relatively 
low-cost, low performance items in any given weapons system to 
achieve the best balance between quantity and quality in ways that 
maximize capabilities and minimize expenses. 

ICBM : See Intercontinental ballistic missile. 

Intention: The determination of a country or coalition to use capabili- 
ties in specific ways at specific times and places. Intentions are 
conditioned by many variables, including interests, objective-, 
policies, principles, commitments, and national will. See also 
Capability; National will. 

Interceptor: An air defense aircraft designed to identify and/or 
destroy hostile airbreathing weapons systems such as bombers and 
cruise missiles. 

Intercontinental ballistic missile. A ballistic missile with a range of 
3,000 to 8,000 nautical miles. See also Ballistic missile. 

Interdiction: Operations to prevent or impede enemy use of an area or 

Interests: See National security interests. 

Intermediate-range ballistic missile: A ballistic missile with a range 
of 1,500 to 3,000 nautical miles. See also Ballistic missile. 

IRBM: See Intermediate-range ballistic missile. 

Launch-on-warning: Retaliatory strikes triggered upon notification 
that an enemy nuclear attack has been launched, but before any 
weapons hit friendlv territory. 

Light ICBM: U.S. Minutemen; Soviet SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, for pur- 
poses of this study. See also Heavy ICBM. 


Light tank: Tanks weighing less than 40 tons are generally designated 
as "light," although the United States no longer uses heavy, 
medium, and light classifications. See also Heavy tank; Medium 

Limited war: Armed encounters, exclusive of incidents, in which one 
or more major powers or their proxies voluntarily exercise various 
types and degrees of restraint to prevent unmanageable escalation. 
Objectives, forces, weapons, targets, and geographic areas all can 
be limited. 

Line of communication: Land, sea, and aerospace route- essential to 
the conduct of international security affairs, particularly the de- 
ployment of armed forces and associcated logistic support. 

Logistics: Plans and operations associated with the design, develop- 
ment, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, 
evacuation, and disposition of materiel; the movement, evacuation, 
and hospitalization of personnel; the acquisition or construction, 
maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and the 
acquisition or furnishing of services. 

Low threshold: An intangible line between levels and types of conflict 
across which one or more antagonists plan to escalate with scant 
regret, or which they would be compelled to cross quickly if sub- 
jected to pressures. See also High threshold and Threshold. 

Maneuverable reentry vehicle: A ballistic missile warhead or decoy 
whose accuracy is improved by terminal guidance mechanisms. 

MaRV: See Maneuverable reentry vehicle. 

Massive retaliation: The act of countering aggression of any type with 
tremendous destructive power; particularly a crashing nuclear 
response to any provocation deemed serious enough to warrant 
military action. 

Means: Money, manpower, materiel, and other resources converted 
into capabilities that contribute to the accomplishment of national 
securities aims. See also Capability; Ends. 

Medium bomber: A multi-engined aircraft that lacks intercontinental 
range without in-flight refueling, but is suitable for strategic bomb- 
ing on one-way intercontinental missions, even lacking tanker 

Medium-range ballistic missile: A ballistic missile with a range of 600 
to 1,500 nautical miles. See also Ballistic missile. 

Medium tank: Tanks weighing between 40 and 60 tons generally are 
designated as "mediums," although the United States no longer 
uses heavy, medium, and light classifications. See also Heavy tank: 
Light tank. 

Merchant marine: All non-military vessels of a nation, publicly- and 
privately-owned, together with crews, which engage in domestic 
and/or international trade and commerce. 

Military balance: The comparative combat power of two competing 
countries of coalitions. See also Combat power; Strategic balance. 

Military power: See Combat power. 

Military strategy: The art and science of employing military power 
under all circumstances to attain national security objectives by 
applying force or the threat of force. See also Tactics. 

MIRV: See Multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle. 

Mission: A function or task assigned to specific armed force-. 


Mobile missile: Any ballistic or cruise missile mounted on and or 
fired from a movable platform, such as a truck, train, ground effects 
machine, ship, or aircraft. 

Mobilization: The act of preparing for war or other emergencies by 
assembling and organizing raw materials; focusing industrial efforts 
on national security objectives; marshalling and readying Reserve 
and National Guard units and individuals for active military 
service; and or activating and readying new military organizations 
filled with personnel inducted from civilian life. 

MRBM: See Medium-range ballistic missile. 

MRY: See Multiple reentry vehicle. 

Multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle: A missile payload 
comprising two or more warheads that can engage separate targets. 
See also Multiple reentry vehicle; Reentry vehicle. 

Multiple reentry vehicle: A missile payload comprising two or more 
warheads that engage the same target. See also Multiple inde- 
pendently targeted reentry vehicle; Reentry vehicle. 

National interests: A highly generalized concept of elements that con- 
stitute a state's compelling needs, including self-preservation, inde- 
pendence, national integrity, military security, and economic well- 

National objectives: The fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a 
nation toward which policies are directed and energies are applied. 
These may be short-, mid-, or long-range in nature. 

National policies: Broad courses of action or statements of guidance 
adopted by a government in pursuit of national objectives. 

National power: The sum total of sltij nation's capabilities or potential 
derived from available political, economic, military, geographic, 
social, scientific, and technological resources. Leadership and na- 
tional will are the unifying factors. 

National security: The protection of a nation from all types of exter- 
nal aggression, espionage, hostile reconnaissance, sabotage, subver- 
sion, annoyance, and other inimical influences. See also National 
security interests, National security objectives, and National secu- 
rity policies. 

National security interests: Those national interests primarily con- 
cerned with preserving a' state from harm. See also National interests 
and National security. 

National security objectives: Those national objectives primarily 
concerned with shielding national interests from threats, both 
foreign and domestic See also National objectives and National 

National security policies: Those national policies which _ provide 
guidance primarily for attaining national security objectives. See 
also National policies and National security. 

National will: The temper and morale of the people, as they influence 
a nation's ability to satisfy national security interests and or 
attain national security objectives. 

Naval superiority : Dominance on the high seas to a degree that permits 
friendly land, aerospace, and naval forces to operate at specific times 
and places on, over, or adjacent to the high seas without prohibitive 
interference bv enemv naval elements. See also Sea control. 


Nuclear delivery system : A nuclear weapon, together with its means of 
propulsion and associated installations. Includes carriers such as 

aircraft, ships, and motor vehicles. See also Nuclear weapon. 

Nuclear weapon: A bomb, missile warhead, or other deliverable ord- 
nance item (as opposed to an experimental device) that explode- as 
a result of energy released b}^ atomic nuclei resulting from fission, 
fusion, or both. See also Nuclear delivery system. 

Objective: See National security objective. 

Overkill: Destructive capabilities in excess of those which logically 
should be adequate to destroy specified targets and/or attain spe- 
cific security objectives. 

Operations and maintenance: All activities of armed forces, in peace 
and in war, to carry out strategic, tactical, training, logistic, and 
administrative missions. 

Parity: A force structure standard which demands that capabilities 
of specific forces and weapons systems be approximately equal in 
effectiveness to enenry counterparts. See also Essential equivalence. 

Payload: The weapon and/or cargo capacity of any aircraft or missile 
system, expressed variously in pounds; numbers of bombs, air-to- 
air and air-to-surface missiles, CW canisters, guns, sensors, ECM 
packets, etc; and in terms of missile warhead yields (kilotons, 
megatons) . 

Policy: See National security policies. 

Postlaunch survivability : The ability of any given delivery system to 
breach enemy defenses and attack designated targets. See also 
Prel aunch survivability . 

Posture: The combined strategic intentions, capabilities, and vulner- 
abilities of a country or coalition of countries, including the strength, 
disposition, and readiness of its armed forces. 

Prelaunch survivability: The ability of any given delivery system to 
weather a surprise first-strike successfully and retaliate. See also 
Postlaunch survivability. 

Proxy war: A form of limited w T ar in which great powers avoid a direct 
military confrontation by furthering their national security inter- 
ests and objectives through conflict between representatives or 
associates. See also Limited war. 

Rapid reload capacity: The ability of a strategic nuclear delivery 
system to conduct multiple strikes. This characteristic presently is 
confined to aircraft, but land-mobile missiles and hard-site ICBMs 
have the potential. Submarines conceivabh r could be replenished at 
sea, but a significantly greater time lag would occur. 

Readiness: The ability of specific armed forces to respond in times 
allotted and thereafter perform assigned missions effectively. 

Reentry vehicle: That part of a ballistic missile designed to reenter 
the earth's atmosphere during terminal stages of its trajecti 

Reinforcement: Augmenting military capabilities in any given area 
by introducing locally-available and/or strategic reserves. See also 
Strategic reserve. 

Reserve component: Armed forces not in active service. U.S. Reserve 
Components include the Army National Guard and Army Reserve; 
the Naval Reserve; the Marine 4 Corps Reserve; the Air National 
Guard, and Air Force Reserve. 


Reserves: See Reserve component: Strategic reserve. 

Revolutionary war: Efforts to seize political power by illegitimate and 

coercive means, destroying existing systems of government and 
social structures in the process. 

Risk: The danger of disadvantage, defeat, or destruction that results 
from a gap between ends and means. See al«o Calculated risk. 

R b: See Minion. 

SALT: See Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 

Sea control: The employment of naval forces, supplemented by land 
I aero-pace forces as appropriate, to destroy enemy naval foi 
suppress enemy oceangoing commerce, protect vital shipping lanes, 
and establish local superiority in areas of naval operati 
Naval superiority. 

-strike: A strategic concept wh emptivei 

.ive actions before the onset of a war. After an aggressor initii 
hostilities, the defender retaliates. In general nuclear war. this 
implies the ability to survive a surprise first strike and respond 
lively. S ah First strike. 

SLBM: See Submarine sea-launched ballistic mi- - 

S .' M: Sa Submarine sea-launched cruise missile. 

get: A target not protected against the blast, heat, and 
radiation pi I by nuclear explosions. There are many degrees ot 

sonnet. Some missiles and aircraft, for example, are built in ways 
that ward off certain effects, but they are sofi u urison 

with shelters and silos. >'. i ah Hard target. 

Specified command: A top-echelon U.S. combats- 
regional or functional n - -. which noi - sed of 
forces from one military service. 1: has a broad, coi g missiou 
I is established by the President, through the Secretary of 
Defense, with the advi< --i-tance of the Joint Chiefs of Si 
See also Unified command. 

Stability. See Strategic stability. 

Strategic airlift : Transport aircraft, both military and civilian, used to 
move armed forces, equipment, and supplies expeditiously over 
long distance-, especially intercontinentally. Set ih Tactical air- 

Strategic air war: Aerospace operatic::- against the em a 

war-making capacity. Typical targets include industry, stockpiles of 
raw materials and finished products, power systems, transp 

and communication centers, strategic weapon- systems, and cities. 

Strategic arm- limitation talks: Negotiations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union to curtail the expansion of. and if p 
ble reduce, strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems of 
both countries in an eqi y Arms control: Arms 

lire i 

Strategic balance: The comparative national power of two competing 
countries or coalitions. 5 ah ■ Military balance; Xa:i >wer. 

Strategic defense: The strategy and forces designed primarily to pro- 
tect a nation, its outposts and or allies from the hazard- of general 
war. It features defense against missiles, both land- and sea-launched, 
• long-range bombers. See also Strategic offense. 

Strategic mobility: The ability to shift personnel, equipment, and sup- 
plies effectively and expeditiously between theaters oi :ion. 
See also Strategic airlift: Strategic sealift. 


Strategic offense: The strategy and forces designed primarily to de- 
stroy the enemy's war-making capacity during general war or to so 
degrade it that the opposition collapses. See also Strategic defense; 
Strategic retaliatory (concepts and forces). 

Strategic reserve: Uncommitted forces of a country or coalition of 
countries winch are intended to support national security interest 
and objectives, as reouired. 

Strategic retaliatory (concepts and forces): Second-strike strategies 
and forces designed primarily to destroy the enemy's war-making 
capacity during general war or to so degrade it that the opposition 
collapses. See also Strategic defense; Strategic offense. 

Strategic sealift: Naval and merchant ships, together with crews, 
to move armed forces, equipment, and supplies over long distance , 
especially intercontinentally. 

Strategic stability: A state of equilibrium which encourages prudence 
by opponents facing the possibility of general war. Tendencies to- 
ward an arms race are restrained, since maneuvering for marginal 
advantage is meaningless. 

Strategic warning: Notification that enemy offensive operations of any 
kind may be imminent. The alert may be received minutes, hours, 
days, or longer before hostilities commence. See also Tactical warn- 

Submarine/sea-launched ballistic missile: Any ballistic missile trans- 
ported by and launched from a ship. May be short-, medium-, in- 
termediate-, or long-range. See also Ballistic missile. 

Submarine/sea-launched cruise missile: Any air-breathing missile 
transported by and launched from a ship. May be short-, medium-, 
intermediate-, or long-range. See also Cruise missile. 

Sufficiency: A force structure standard that demands capabilities ade- 
quate to attain desired ends without undue waste. Superiority thus 
is essential in some circumstances; parity /essential equivalence 
suffices under less demanding conditions; and inferiority, qualita- 
tive as well as quantitative, is sometimes acceptable. See also Supe- 
riority; Essential equivalence; and Parity. 

Superiority: A force structure standard that demands capabilities 
markedly greater than those of opponents. 

Survivability: The ability of armed forces and civilian communities 
to withstand attack and still function effectively. It is derived mainly 
from active and passive defenses. See also Pre-launch survivability ; 
Post-launch survivability. 

Tactical aircraft: Land- and carrier-based aircraft designed primarily 
as general purposes forces. Selected U.S. elements are routinely 
assigned strategic nuclear missions. 

Tactical airlift: Transport aircraft (military only in the United States) 
used to move armed forces, equipment, and supplies expeditiously 
within theaters of operation. See also Strategic airlift. 

Tactical nuclear forces, weapons, operations: Nuclear combat power 
expressly designed for deterrent, offensive, and defensive purposes 
that contribute to the accomplishment of localized military missions; 
the threatened or actual application of such power. May be employed 
in general as well as limited wars. See also General war; Limited 


Tactical warning: Notification thatfenemy offensive operations of any 
kind are in progress. The alert may be received at any time from 
the moment the attack is launched until its effect is felt. See also 
Strategic warning. 

Tactics: The detailed methods used to carry out strategic designs. 
Military tactics involve the employment of units in combat, in- 
cluding the arrangement and maneuvering of units in relation to 
each other and/or to the enemy. See also Military strategy. 

Theater of operations: A geographical area outside the United States 
for which the commander is a U.S. unified or specified command has 
been assigned milita^ responsibilit}". See also Specified command; 
Unified command. 

Threat: The capabilities, intentions, and actions of actual or potential 
enemies to prevent or interfere with the successful fulfillment of 
national security interests and/or objectives. 

Threshold: An intangible and adjustable line between levels and types 
of conflict, such as the separation between nuclear and non- 
nuclear warfare. The greater the reluctance to use nuclear weapons, 
the higher the threshold. See also High threshold; Low threshold. 

Throw weight: The payload capacity of a ballistic missile expressed in 
aggregate poundage for reentry vehicles of all types ( warheads, 
decoys). See also Payload. 

Time-sensitive target: Am^ counterforce target which is vulnerable 
only if it can be struck before it is launched (as with bombers and 
missiles) or redeplo}^ (as with ground combat troops and ships). 

Tooth-to-tail ratio : The proportion of combat forces to administrative/ 
logistic support in a nation's armed forces and in specific military 
organizations, such as divisions, air wings, and fleets. 

Triad: Any group of three military elements with separate charac- 
teristics but common basic missions. Specifically, the tripartite U.S. 
strategic retaliatory force, which comprises manned bombers, inter- 
continental ballistic missiles, and ballistic-missile submarines. 

Tripwire: A largely symbolic force positioned on an ally's soil to 
advertise the owner's commitment to a particular country or 
coalition of countries. Attacks against the token contingent would 
trigger a massive response. 

Tube artillery: Howitzers and guns, as opposed to rockets and guided 
missiles. May be towed or self-propelled. 

Unified command: A top-echelon U.S. combatant organization with 
regional or functional responsibilities, which normally is composed 
of forces from two or more militar}^ services. It has a broad, con- 
tinuing mission and is established by the President, through the 
Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. When authorized by the JCS, commanders of 
unified commands established by the President may from one or 
more subordinate unified command within the jurisdictions. See also 
Specified command. 

Vulnerability : The susceptibility of a weapons system to any action by 
any means through which its combat effectiveness may be dimin- 

War-fighting: Combat actions, as opposed to deterrence (which is 
designed to prevent, rather than prosecute, wars). 

Warhead: That part of a ballistic or cruise missile which contains 
nuclear explosives. 

Will: See National will. 

Annex E 

Abbreviations listed below are limited to those cited in text or tables. 

ABM Anti-ballistic missile 

ADCOM Air Defense Command 

ALCM Air-launched cruise missile 

ALCOM Alaska Command 

ANG Air National Guard 

APC Armored personnel carrier 

ARADCOM Army Air Defense Command 

ASW Anti-submarine warfare 

AT Anti-tank 

CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

DOD Department of Defense 

ECM Electronic countermeasures 

EUCOM European Command 

FROG Free rocket over ground 

FY Fiscal Year 

GNP Gross National Product 

ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile 

IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile 

LANTCOM Atlantic Command 

LAW Light assault weapon 

LCM Landing craft, mechanized 

LCU Landing craft, utility 

LCVP Landing craft, vehicle, personnel 

LRCM Long-range cruise missile 

MaRV Maneuverable reentry vehicle 

MAC Military Airlift Command 

MAF Marine Amphibious Force 

MATS Military Air Transport Service 

Max Maximum 

MIRV Multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle 

MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile 

MRY Multiple reentry vehicle 

MSC Military Sealift Command 

MSTS Military Sea Transport Service 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NM Nautical mile 

NORAD North American Defense Command 

PACOM Pacific Command 

R&D Research and development 

Recon Reconnaissance 

REDCOM Readiness Command 

SAC Strategic Air Command 



SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

SAM Surface-to-air missile 

SLBM Submarine sea-launched ballistic missile 

SLCM Submarine sea-launched cruise missile 

SOUTHCOM Southern Command 

SRAM Short-range attack missile 

SRBM Short-range ballistic missile 

SSB Ballistic missile submarine 

SSBX Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine 

SSM Surface-to-surface missile 

Sub Submarine 

TOW Tube-launched, optically- tracked, wire-guided 

(anti-tank weapon) 

USAF United States Air Force 

USAREUR U.S. Army, Europe 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

VSTOL Vertical/short takeoff and landing (aircraft) 



ABM. See Anti-ballistic missile defense. 

ADCOM. See Air Defense Command. Page 

Aeroflot: Supplements Soviet military airlift •__ 7 

Aerospace defense. See Air defense; Anti-ballistic missile defense. 

Aircraft carriers: 

Quantitative trends, ships, 1965-75 6, GX. 44 

In Indian Ocean, 1973 - 9 

In Mediterranean, 1973 

NATO monopoly on attack carriers 9 

A< index to Soviet intentions. i:; 

As offensive weapons system 20 

Soviet limitations 23 

Marine pilots carrier qualified 'S\ 

Against antiship missiles 29 

Declining U.S. capabilities 32 

Quantitative trends, aircraft, 1965-75 44 

Air defense: 

Quantitative trends, SAMs, interceptors, 19(55-75 4-5,44 

U.S. limitations 25 

Soviet stress 28 

Related to cruise missiles 31 

U.S. R. & D. programs 31 

Lip service to objectives 36 

Soviet Army forces 44 

Defined 57 

Air Defense Command: U.S. SAM batteries assigned 5N 

Air Force. See Soviet Union. United States: Strategic offensive forces; 
Strategic defensive forces; Tactical air forces; Airlift. 

Air-launched cruise missiles : 

U.S. quantitative superiority 4 

Short-range attack missiles I 4N, 23. 23 X 

Related to air defense 31 

Quantitative trends. 19(15-75 43 

United States, Soviet missiles identified 45N 

Defined 57 

Airlift : 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 6-7, 45 

U.S. assets unparalleled 14. 21 

U.S. tactical airlift problems 30, 30N 

U.S. R. & D. programs 31 

United States, Soviet types identified 45 

Related to forward depl< >yment : 52 

Strategic, tactical airlift defined 66, 67 

Air Xational Guard. See National Guard. 

ALCM. See Air-launched cruise missiles. 


Related to military balance 1 

Related to total force concepts 16, 51 

United States, Soviet reliance compared 16, 4! 

Related to sealift requirements _ 21 

Related to commitments 47 4^ 

Threats related to U.S. force requirements 50 

U.S. commitments enumerated 55-56 

See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Warsaw Pact. 

All-Volunteer Force: 

Manpower ceiling 16, L6N 

Related to Reserve components 16 

Financial costs 17 



Amphibious (operations, ships): Page 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 6, 44 

As index to Soviet intentions ' 13 

Emerging Soviet capabilities 13 ; 21 

U.S. Army amphibious qualifications ' 23 

M AF lift requirements 30, 30N 

Available U.S. lift 30, 44 

Current U.S. lift deployments ' 30 

U.S. assembly times for lift 30 

Definitions 57 

ANG. See National Guard. 
Antiballistic missile defense: 

Present quantitative balance 4, 28 

SALT I authorizations 18, 23, 31 

Soviet ABM related to U.S. deterrent 23 

Soviet systems easily saturated 24 

U.S. site closes down _ 24 

Related to NATO 28-29 

United States, Soviet R. & D 31 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

I )ehned 57-58 

Antiship missiles: 

Soviet monopoly 6, 6N, 20 

Characteristics 11-12 

U.S. problems in Mediterranean 11-12 

Soviet surprise attack capabilities 12, 29 

SSM ships related to cruiser/destroyer balance 22 

Soviet types identified 45 

Related to U.S. second-strike policy 52 

Antisubmarine warfare : 

Quantitative balance in aircraft 6, 44 

U.S. problems in Mediterranean 11 

United States, Soviet insufficiency cited 24 

United States, Soviet missions differentiated 24N 

U.S. ASW ships versus Soviet submarines 29-30 

U.S. R. & D. related to problems 31 

1 )efined 58 

Antitank weapons: 

Present quantitative balance 5, 5N, 44 

U.S. R. & D 31 

United States, Soviet types identified 45 

APC. See Armored personnel carriers. 

ARADCOM. See Army Air Defense Command. 

Armed Forces. See Soviet Union, United States: Armed Forces. 

Armored personnel carriers: 

Present quantitative balance 5, 44 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

Arms control: 

U.S. emphasizes 33, 41 

See also Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 
Arms Limitation. See Arms control; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 
Army. See Soviet Union, United States: Army. 

Army Air Defense Command: SAM batteries inactivated 4-5 

Assumptions: As force sufficiency factor 53-54 

Assured destruction: 

Linked with U.S. second-strike policy 17 

Purpose 17 

Force requirements 17-18 

Related to MIRV requirements 23 

Related to SALT 23 

Related to Soviet city evacuation plans 28 

Defined 08 

ASW. See Antisubmarine warfare. 

AT. See Antitank weapons. 

Atlantic Alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Attack aircraft. See Fighter/attack aircraft. 

Attack carriers. See Aircraft carriers. 


Attack submarines: ^ a se 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 6, 44 

Soviet monopoly on SSM submarines 20, 44 

SSM boats related to total balance 22 

U.S. ASW focused on 24X 

Soviet submarines versus U.S. ASW ships 29-30 

1 )efined 58 


B-l bomber: related to U.S. problems 31 

Backfire bomber: strategic nuclear capabilities 5, 31 X 

Badger bomber: penet ration prospects poor 5 

Ballistic missiles. See Intercontinental, Intermediate-range, Medium-range, 

and Submarine sea-launched ballistic missiles. 
Ballistic missile submarines: 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 3, 43 

Soviet ASW focused on 24X 

Versus U.S. ASW ships 29 

U.S. R. & 1). related to ASW problems 31 

New Soviet deployments 31 

Nuclear-powered 43 

See also Submarine/sea-launched ballistic missiles. 

U.S. quantitative superiority cited 4 

Penetration prospects for Badger bombers 5 

As an element of U.S. triad 17, 23, 23N, 41, 41 X 

Influence of finite deterrence 18 

Utility quest ioned 23 

Post-launch survivability 28 

Future penetration capabilities 30, 30N 

U.S. R. & D. related to problems 30 

Soviet Backfire bomber- 31 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 43 

United States, Soviet heavy, medium types identified 45 

Heavy, medium bombers defined 62, 63 

Budget. See Defense budget. 


Calculated risks. See risks. 


Related to threats 50 

Defined 5s 

Character. See National character. 

Choke points : use by U.S. Navy 9, 30 

Civil defense: 

Soviets stress 28 

Soviet city evacuation plans 2s 

U.S. R. & D. urograms 31 

Defined _ 59 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet: Supplements U.S. military airlift 7 

Cold Launch: 

Applied to Soviet ICBM's 11. 31 

Defined 59 

Combat experience: As ambiguous quality 10 


As force sufficiency factor 47--1S 

U.S. priorities 4s 

Defined 59 

Congressional resolutions: defense commitments identified 5.") .~>r> 

Contingency plans, operations, requirements: 

Related to U.S. commitments 47 < s 

Defined 59 


Count erf orco: Page 

Related to bomber penetration problems 2;> 

Related to U.S. MIRY requirements 23 

I )efined 60 

CRAF. See Civil Reserve Air Fleet. 

Cruise missiles. See Air-launched cruise missiles; Submarine/sea-launched 
cruise missile-. 


Present quantitative balance 22. 44 

Related to Soviet submarine threat 29 

Quantitative trends, 1905-75 44 

Defined 60 


Defense budget : 

Influence on U.S. force ceilings 16 

Related to All-Volunteer Force 17 

United States, Soviet compared 17, 17X, 33 

Effects on U.S. modernization 32 

U.S. trends 32-:;:; 

Effects on force quality 33 

As force sufficiency factor 53 

A- index to trends 53 

Defense Communications Agency: Not controlled b3~ EUCOM 7 


Present quantitative balance 22, 44 

Related to Soviet submarine threat 29 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

Defined 60 

Detente: Related to Soviet intentions 54 


As primary U.S. objective 47, 50 

Force requirements versus those for combat 51 

Defined 60 

Discipline: U.S. problems in early 1970's 10 


Present quantitative balance 5, 5N, 44 

United States, Soviet divisions compared 5N, 22N 

Available to NATO, Warsaw Pact 7, 8, 11, UN, 29, 29N 

U.S. strength in USAREUR 8, 26 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

Draft. See Selective Service. 


ECCM. See Electronic counter countermeasures. 

Electronic counter countermeasures: Related to Soviet SAM defenses 5N 

Escort ships: 

Present quantitative balance 22, 44 

Related to Soviet submarine threat 29 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

Defined 61 

Essential equivalence: 

As U.S. SALT II goal, 18 

As U.S. force structure standard 26 

Influence on military balance 41 

Defined 61 

EUCOM. See European Command. 

European Command: 

Percentage of NATO forces 7 

Selected missions 50 

Executive agreements: Defense commitments identified 56 




F-4 aircraft : Compared with Soviet fighters 14 

F-15 aircraft : 

Designed to preserve U.S. qualitative edge 14 

No tactical nuclear capability 32, 32N 

F-16 aircraft : 

Designed to preserve U.S. qualitative edge 14 

Must be modified to deliver nuclear weapons 32, 32N 

F-101 aircraft: Being eliminated from ANG 4N, 31- 32 

Fighter aircraft. See Fighter/attack aircraft. 

Fighter attack aircraft : 

Carrier airpower 6, 9, 20, 23, 44 

Marine air power 6, 20, 23, 44 

United States, Soviet aircraft compared 14, 14N, 20 

As multipurpose systems 18 

I .S. missions 20 

F-15, F-16 tactical nuclear limitations 32, 32N 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

Defined 58, 61 

Finite deterrence : Influence on force requirements 17-18 

Flexible response: 

As for sufficiency factor 51- 52 

Defined 61 

Forward basing. See Forward deployment/defense. 

Forward defense. See Forward deployment/defense. 

Forward deployment/defense : 

Related to strategic mobility requirements 30 

Present Soviet posture 32 

As force sufficiency factor 52 

Defined 61 

Franca: Reliability as a NATO ally 29 

Functions of U.S. Armed Forces: 

As force sufficiency factor 48-50 

See also Military missions; Title 10, United States Code. 


General purpose forces. See specific types. 


As cause of United States, Soviet asymmetries 13 

As force sufficiency factor 52-53 

Gorshkov, Admiral Sergei G.: Shapes Soviet Navy 15 

Greece : 

Concerned with Turkish threats 29 

U.S. naval basing problems 32 

Ground Forces. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Soviet Union, 
Army, Marines; United States, Army, Marines; Warsaw Pact. 

Harpoon missiles: 

Deployment date 20 

As deterrent to Soviet antiship missiles 32 

Heavy bombers. See Bombers. 

Heavy ICBMs. See Intercontinental ballistic missiles. 

Heavy tanks. See Tanks. 

Helicopter carriers: 

Supporting NATO 8 

As element of U.S. amphibious lift 30 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44, 45N 


Present quantitative balance 5, 44 

Usefulness to NATO questioned 23 

Hi-lo mix: 

As force structure option 39 

Defined 62 

Huntington, Samuel P.: On United States/Soviet balance 3 



ICBMs. See Intercontinental ballistic missiles. 

Intentions: Page 

Conclusions circumscribed in this study 2 

Schools "A" and "B" address Soviet intentions 33 

Related to capabilities 33 

As element of threats 50 

Related to detente 54 

Defined 62 

Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance: members 55 


U.S. reductions 4, 4N, 31-32 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 4, 4N, 44 

Defined 62 

Intercontinental ballistic missiles: 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 3, 43 

Soviets stress 17 

As element of triad 17, 23N, 41X 

Percent of U.S., Soviet warheads on 17N 

Influence of finite deterrence 17-18 

SALT limitations 19, 31 

Heavy versus light status of SS-19's 35, 24 N, 25N 

Soviets silos counted 19 

Poor targets for bombers 23 

Related to U.S., MIRV requirements 23 

Light ICBM balance 24 

Soviet threats versus U.S. requirements 26 

Pre-launch survivability 28, 52 

Mobile models related to vulnerability 30 

New Soviet deployments 31 

Air- and land-mobile candidates for triad 41 X 

Types defined 62 

Interests. See National security interests. 

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles: 

Typical targets in NATO Europe 19 

Soviets stress 19, 20 

Related to NATO's need for ABM r 28-29, 29N, 31 

Soviet mobile models in R. & D 31 

Soviet MIRVs in R. & D 31 

Quantitative trends, 1975-75 44 

Defined 62 

IRBM. See Intermediate-range ballistic missiles. 

Italy: Reliability as a NATO member 29 


Light ICBM. See Intercontinental ballistic missiles. 


MAC. See Military Airlift Command. 
Main battle tanks. See Tanks. 

Maneuverable reentry vehicles: related to key U.S. shortcomings 31 


Costs related to modernization 17, 32, 33 

See also Personnel strengths. 

Mao Tse-tung: Outflanks Western technology 53 

Marines. See Soviet Union, Marines ; United States, Marine Corps. 
MaRV. See Maneuverable reentry vehicles. 
Massive retaliation: 

As force sufficiency factor 51-52 

Defined 63- 

Medium bombers. See Bombers. 


Medium-range ballistic missiles: T&ge 

U.S. programs canceled is 

Typical targets in NATO Europe 19 

Soviets stress 19, 20 

Related to NATO's need for ABM 28-29 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

Denned 63 

Medium tanks. See Tanks. 

Merchant marine : 

United States, Soviet Fleets compared 21 

Denned 63 

MiG aircraft: Compared with U.S. F-4's 14 

Military Airlift Command: increasing assets 6 

Military balance: 

Assessment problems 1 

Related to strategic balance 1 

Defined 63 

See also Qualitative balance; Quantitative balance. 

Military missions : 

As force sufficiency factor 50 

Defined (See Mission) (*,;> 

Military Sealift Command: 

Declining assets 6 

Current size of controlled fleet 21 

Military strategy : 

As force sufficiency factor 53 

Defined Go 

MIRV. See Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. 

Missile warheads. See Warheads. 

Missions. See Military missions. 

Mixed force concept. See Triad. 

MRBM. See Medium-range ballistic missiles. 

MRV. See Multiple reentry vehicles. 

MSC. See Military Sealift Command. 

Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles: 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 3, 4. 43 

Related to finite deterrence 18 

Related to ICBM second-strike capabilities 23 

U.S. superiority analyzed 23 

Related to Assured Destruction requirements 23 

Related to U.S. shortcomings 31 

New Soviet deployments 31 

For Soviet IRBM's 31 

Defined 64 

Multiple reentry vehicles : 

Quantitative trends 3, 43 

Denned 64 


National character: As ambiguous quality 9-10 

National Guard: 

Diminishing air defense role 4, 4N, 31-32 

As NATO reinforcements 9, 11 

Readiness of U.S. Army divisions 29, 29N 

National interests. See National security interests. 

National objectives. See National security objectives. 

National security interests: 

Basic U.S. interests identified 35, 47 

As force sufficiency factor 47 

Defined 64 

National security objectives: 

Comments concerning U.S. goals 36 

As force sufficiency factor 47 

Basic U.S. objectives 47 

Defined 64 


NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Naval balance. See Soviet Union Navy; U.S. Navy. 

Navy. See Soviet Union Navy; U.S. Navy. 

Nixon/Ford doctrine; Page 

Influence on All-Volunteer Force 16 

As force sufficiency factor 52 

North Atlantic Treatv Organization: 

Tactical nuclear matters 5, 5N, IS, 19, 28-29, 29N, 36, 53 

Key contingency area 7, 48 

Soviet land lines to 7 

Percentage contributions of U.S. forces 7 

Quantitative balan ce, tactical air forces 7, 8 

Quantitative balance, ground forces 7, 8, 8N, 9, 22, 26 

Personnel strengths 7, 8 

Soviet IRBM/MRBM threats 7, 19 

Divisions available 7, 8, 8N, 11, 22, 29 

U.S. air forces in Spain 8 

British, French aircraft carriers s 

Air, ground balance, south flank 8 

Quantitative naval balance 8-9 

Defense frontage 9 

Monopoly on attack carriers 9 

U.S. combat experience related to 10 

Forces, installations concentrated 11, 28 

Reliability of members 11, 29 

Range cf qualitative considerations 11 

Targets vulnerable to Soviet IRBM, MRBM 19 

Role of helicopters questioned 23 

No U.S. local reserves 26 

U.S. reinforcement problems 26, 29, 30 

Maneuver room 28 

Supply lines 28 

Need for tactical ABM 28-29 

Problems on south flank 29 

Airlift problems 30 

Related to U.S. R. & D 31 

Quantitative trends 32, 32N 

U.S. ground forces strengthened _• 32N 

U.S. forces related to nuclear threshold 36 

High nuclear threshold as objective 36 

U.S. committments 36, 36N, 48, 55 

Article 5, Atlantic Treaty 36 

"Trip wire" related to force requirements 50 

Selected EUCOM missions 50 

REDCOM missions 50 

Threats related to U. S. force requirements 50 

Selected assumptions ' 54 

Member states ^ o-^ 

Nuclear-powered ships : Quantitative balance 6, 6N, 44 

Nuclear "trip wire": 

As force sufficiency factor 50 

Defined (see trip wire) 68 

Objectives. See National security objectives. 


As a force structure standard 26, 26N 

Defined 65 

Perceptions : As force sufficiency factor 51 


Personnel strengths: Fage 

Quantitative balance, ground forces 5, 5N 

NATO 7,8 

United State, Soviet compared 14, 16, 16N 

All-Volunteer Force ceiling 16, 16N 

United States, Soviet navies compared 22 

Strategic offensive forces 4:5 

Strategic defensive forces 44 

Quantitative trends, army, 1965-75 44 

Quantitative trends, navy, 1965-75 44 

Quantitative trends, marines, 1965-75 44 

Quantitative trends, air forces, 1965-75 45 

See aim Manpower. 

Portugal: Reliability as a NATO member 29 

Principle of Economy : Stressed by United States 15 

Principle of Mass: Stressed by Soviets 15 

Procurement policies: 

United States, Soviet philosophies 15 

Related to manpower costs 17 

Projections. See Trends. 


Qualitative balance: 

As counterbalance to quantity 1, 41 

Basic ingredients 9 

Role of national character 9-10 

Training 10 

Combat experience 10 

Temper (discipline, morale) 10 

Technological trends 10-1 1 

Trends 41 

As force sufficiency factor 51 

Quantitative balance : 

Related to quality 1. 41 

Trends since 1965 3, 4, 6, 43-45 

Favors Soviet Union 3, 41 

As force sufficiency factor 51 


Readiness Command: Selected missions 50 

R. & D. See Research and Development. 

REDCOM. See Readiness Command. 

Research and Development: 

Soviet technologj- improving 10 

United States, Soviet philosophies 14-15 

Related to manpower costs 17 

U.S. MRBM programs canceled 18 

U.S. strategic offensive programs 30-31 

U.S. civil defense priorities 31 

ABM research related to SALT 31 

As index to trends 53 

Reserve component s : 

Related to military balance 1 

Related to NATO* reinforcement 1 1 . 29 

As element of total force concepts 16, 51 

Related to All-Volunteer Force 16 

United States, Soviet readiness reviewed 29 

Defined 65 

Risks : 

Causes 47N 

Defined 66 

Roles and missions. See Functions of U.S. Armed Forces; Military missions; 
title 10, United States Code. 


SAC. See Strategic Air Command. 

SAM. See Surface-to-air missiles. 

SALT. See Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 


Seal if t: f»ago 

Quantitative trends, 1965-76 6, 6N, 44 

U.S. dependence on foreign-flag shipping 21, 32 

United States, Soviet compared 21 

Related to total force concepts 21 

R. & D. trends 31 

Small Soviet ships for small ports 32 

Projects Soviet political power 32 

Related to forward deployment 52 

Strategic sealift defined 67 

SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. 
Second-strike policy: 

Linked with assured destruction 17, 28 

Influence on U.S. MI RV requirements 23 

Linked to ICBM survivability 26, 28 

Linked to bomber survivability 28 

Related to Soviet city evacuation plans 28 

As force sufficiency factor 52 

Selective Service: U.S. draft calls end 16 

Shaddock missiles: 

Essentially antiship missiles 4X 

Land-based version 45 

Range, mission 45 

Short-range attack missiles: 

Onlv deployed U.S. ALCM 4N 

Characteristics 42, 42N 

Short-range ballistic missiles: United States, Soviet types identified 45 

Short-war concepts: 

Influence on Soviet forces 15, 15N 

As assumption 54 

SLBM. See Sumbarine/sea-launched ballistic missiles. 
SLCM. See Submarine/sea-launched cruise missiles. 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization: Member states 55 

Soviet Union: 

Challenges America militarily 1 

Intentions 2, 33, 54 

R. & D. policies 15, 15N 

Honors Principle of Mass 15 

Procurement policies 15 

Short-war concepts 15, 15N 

Reliance on allies 16 

Defense budget 17, 17N 

Armed forces: 

Tactical nuclear considerations 5, 5N, 19, 28, 53 

ProDortionate share of Warsaw Pact 7 

Emphasize political* indoctrination 10 

Combat experience 10 

Reinforcement times in Europe 11 

Internal security missions 11, UN, 14 

Geographic influences 13, 14 

Employment overseas 13, 13N, 21, 32 

Related to manpower costs 17 

Need for tactical ABM 28-29 

Strategic offensive forces: 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 3, 4, 18, 43 

Ballistic missile submarines 3, 29, 31 

Stress ICBM's 17, 18 

SALT I authorizations 18, 19, 23, 31 

Immunity to U.S. second-strike 23 

Parity in light ICBM's 24 

Potential peril to U.S. ICBM's 26, 28 

Threat to U.S. bombers 28 

Projected threats 30-31 

Long-range SLBM's 31 

New ballistic missile submarines 31 

Deployment programs 31 


Strategic defensive forces: Page 

Quantitative trends, L965-75 4, 5, 5N, 18, \\ 

SALT I authorizations 18, 23, 31 

ABM related to U.S. deterrent 23 

A B M vulnerabilities 24 

Stress air defense 2s 

R. & J), programs 31 

Army forces 44 

Air Force forces 44 

Army : 

Present quantitative balance 5, 5N, 44 

Divisions compared with United States 5N, 22 X 

Tanks 5, 5N, 20, 44, 45N 

Divisions for European reinforcement 8 

Divisions, tanks, personnel along Iron Curtain 8, 8N 

Readiness of reserves 11, 29 

Personnel strength 14, 16, 16N, 44 

Shaped for short war 15 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

See also Soviet Armed Forces. 
Navy general purpose force- : 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 6, 44 

Nuclear-powered submarines 6, 43, 44 

Antiship missiles 6, 11-12, 20, 22, 29, 32, 45N, 52 

Aircraft carriers, Black Sea, Mediterranean 8, 9 

Reinforcement capabilities in Mediterranean 8 

Missions related to economy, geography 13 

"One-shot" capability 15, 26 

Cruiser-destroyer-escort balance 22 

Attack submarine balance 22 

Carrier air power 23 

ASW forces, focus of 24, 24X 

Quantitative superiority related to survival 26 

Freedom to concentrate 29 

Submarines versus U.S. ASW ships 29-30 

Bombers, ASW aircraft identified 44, 45N 

See also Soviet Armed Forces. 
Tactical Air Forces: 

Tactical nuclear aircraft 5, 5N 

Quantitative balance 6, 45 

Balance in central Europe 7, 8, 9 

U.S., Soviet aircraft compared 14, 14N, 20 

Shaped for short war 15 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 45 

See also Soviet Armed Forces. 
Marines (naval infantry) : 

Present quantitative balance 5 

Compared with USMC 5, 2D-21 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

See also Soviet Armed Forces. 

Present quantitative balance 6-7, 45 

Soviet requirements 14 

Quantitative trends, 1 965-75 45 


Quantitative trends, 1965-75 6, 44 

U.S., Soviet compared 21 

Small ships for small ports 32 

Projects political power 32 

Civil defense: 

Soviet stress 28 

City evacuation plans 28 

SRAM. See Short-range attack missiles. 

SRBM. See Short-range ballistic missiles. 

SSB, SSBN. See Ballistic missile submarines. 

SSM. See Surface-to-surface missiles. 


Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: Page 

U.S. goal essential equivalence IS 

Influence on force requirements IS, L9 

Limits on ABMS 18, 23, 31 

Limits on ICBM's 19, 31 

Related to assured destruction 23 

Precludes deploring tactical ABM 31 

Defined 66 

Strategic balance 1 : 

Related to military balance 1 

Defined 66 

Strategic defense: 

Defined 66 

See also Air defense; Antiballistic missle defense; Civil defense-. 

Strategic mobility: 

Strategic land lines 7, 13 

Defined 66 

See also Airlift; Sealift. 

Strategic nuclear submarines. See Ballistic missile submarines. 

Strategic offense: 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 3, 43 

Defined 67 

See also Assured Destruction; Ballistic missile submarines; Bomber-; 
Counterforce; Deterrence; Flexible response; Intercontinental 
ballistic missiles; Massive retaliation; Research and development; 
Second-strike policy; Submarine/sea-launched ballistic missiles; 

Strategic retaliatory. See Strategic offense. 

Strategy. See Military strategy. 

Submarines. See Attack submarines; Ballistic missile submarines. 

Submarine/sea-launched ballistic missiles: 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 3, 43 

As element of triad 17, 23N, 41N 

Influence of finite deterrence IS 

French ballistic missiles as targets 29 

Long-range Soviet SLBM's 31 

Defined 67 

See also Ballistic missile submarines. . 

Submarine/sea-launched cruise missiles: 

Soviet quantitative superiority 4, 4N 

Related to air defense 31 

As candidate for triad 41 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 43 

Shaddock range, missions 45 


As force structure standard 26, 26N 

Factors for determining. 47-54 

Related to nonmilitary power 51 

Defined 67 

Superiority : 

As force structure standard 26, 2GN 

Defined 67 

Surface-to-air missiles : 

U.S. batteries inactivated 4-5, 5N 

U.S. batteries under ADCOM 5N 

Soviet strengths 5, 5N 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

L nited States, Soviet missiles iden tified 45 N 

Surface-to-surface missiles. See Anti-ship missiles; Intercontinental bal- 
listic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; Medium-range 
ballistic missiles; Short-range ballistic missiles; Submarine/sea-launched 
ballistic missiles; Submarine/sea-launched cruise missiles. 


Tactical aircraft. See Airlift; F-4 aricraft; F-15 aircraft; F-16 aircraft; 
Fighter attack aircraft; MiG aircraft. 

Tactical air power: Page 

Soviet Limitations 14, 14N, 20 

United State-, Soviet parity cited 24 

See also Soviet Union, Air Force; United States, Air Force, Marine 
Corps, Navy. 

Tactical nuclear forces, weapon-, operations: 

U.S., Soviet differences 5, IS, 19, 53 

Balance in central Europe 5 

Soviet pilots qualified ">N 

No Warsaw Pact capability .JN 

U.S. Navy systems 5N 

F-15, F-16 capabilities 32, 32N 

High threshold as NATO objective 36 

Related to deterrence 50 

Defined 67 


Present quantitative balance 5, 44 

Numbers in United States, Soviet divisions 5N 

Soviet heavy tank- 5N, 20, 44 

In NATO.! 7,8 

M-48 modifications 1 5N 

U.S. discontinues heavy tanks 20 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

United States, Soviet types identified 45 

Heavy tank defined 62 

Light' tank defined 63 

Medium tank defined 63 


As a qualitative factor 9, 10 

See also Research and development. 

Threats : 

Basic types defined 50 

As force sufficiency factor 50 

Evaluation process 50-51 

Dfined 68 

See also Capabilities; Intents. 

Title 10, United States Code: 

Sustained combat requirement 15, 48, 49 

Requirement to overcome agressors 37, 48 

Army functions 48 

Navy functions 48 

Air Force functions 49 

Marine Corps functions 49 

Total force concepts: 

Causes 16 

Related to sealift 21 

Applied to NATO 29 

As force sufficiency factor 51 


As qualitative factor 10 

Budgeting restrictions 33 

Treaties: Current U.S 55 

Trends : Kev indicators 53 


Composition 17,23,41 

Bombers original component 23 

Synergistic effects 23N 

Partial compromise impending 26 

Contemplated expansion 41, 41N 

Denned 68 

Trident: Related to U.S. problems 31 

"Trip wire". See Nuclear "trip wire". 


Turkey : Page 

Concerned with Greek threats 29 

U.S. naval basing problems 32 

United States: 
General : 

Soviets challenge U.S. militarily 1 

R. & U. policies . 14-15, 15N 

Honors principle of economy | ;, 

Premium on human life 15 

Procurement policies 15, 1.">X 

Sustained combat policies l .", 48, 49 

Total force concepts 16, 21, 2!). 51 

Defense budget 16, 17, 32-33 

Armed forces: 

Tactical nuclear considerations 5, 5N, 18-19, 53 

Percentage of NATO forces 7 

Combat experience 10 

Reinforcement times to Europe 11 

Geographic influences 13 

Strength related to Soviet problems 14 

Staying power, tooth-to-tail ratios 15 

Impact of manpower costs 16, 17, 32 

Title 10, DOD-directed functions 15, 37, 48, 49 

Selected military missions 50 

Strategic offensive forces : 

Quantitative trends, 1 965-75 3, 4, 4N, 1 S. 43 

Ballistic missile submarines 3, 31, 43 

Stress triad 17, 23, 23N, 26, 41. 41X, 68 

Assured destruction policy 17-18, 23, 28, 58 

SALT I authorizations 18, 19, 23, 31, 66 

Bomber penetration problems 23 

MIRV requirements 23 

Second-strike policy problems 17, 23, 26, 28, 52 

Parirv in light ICBM's ' 24 

ICBM survivability 26, 28 

Prelaunch threat to U.S. bombers 28 

R. & D. programs 30-31 

Cruise missiles related to air defense 31 

Deployment programs 31 

Strategic defensive forces : 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 4, 4N, 5, 18, 44 

Air defense reductions. 4, 4N, 5, 5N, 24 

SALT I authorizations 18, 19, 23, 31 

ABM site shuts down 24 

SAM, interceptor weaknesses 25 

Related to cruise missiles 31 

R. & D. programs 31 

Lip service to objectives 36 

Army : 

Strategic air defense role reduced 4-5, 5N 

Tactical nuclear weapons 5, 5N 

Present quantitative balance 5, ')^<, 44 

Divisions compared with Soviet 5N, 22 X 

Percent of NATO ground forces 7 

Troops in USAREUR 7, 8, 32N 

Divisions, tanks in USAREUR 7, 8, 8N, 26 

Personnel in USAREUR divisions 8 

Personnel strength 8, 16, 16N, 44 

Discontinues M-48 tanks 15 

Amphibious qualifications 23 

Readiness of reserve components 29 

Airborne assault forces 30, 37N, 44 

Selected R. & D. programs 31 

Adding brigades to NATO 32X 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 44 

Title 10, DOD-directed functions 48 

See also United States, Armed Forces. 


Navy general purpose forces Bage 

Tactical nuclear weapons 5, 5N 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 6, H 

Nuclear-powered ships 6, 13, 41 

Carrier air power 6, 6N, 8, 9, 2d. 29, 32 

Percent of NATO naval forces 7 

Forces for NATO 8, 9, 11-12 

Forces in Mediterranean 8,9, 11 12 

Mediterranean buildup, 1973 8 

Idnian Ocean buildup, 1973 

Use of choke points 9, 30 

Threats from antiship missiles 11-12, 20, 29-30, 32, 52 

Missions related to national policy, economy . 13 

No U.S. antiship missiles deployed 20 

Cruiser-destroyer-escort balance 22, 44 

Attack submarine balance 22. 44 

ASW forces, focus of 24, 24N 

Quantitative inferiority related to survival 20 

( 11 ol >al c< >mm itments 29 

Discards ASW carriers 29 

Soviet submarines versus U.S. ASW ships 29-30 

Amphibious lift capabilities 30 

R. & D. related to problems 31 

Declining attack carrier force 32 

Harpoon missiles 20. 32 

Title 10, DOD-directed functions. 4- 19 

See also United States, Armed Forces. 

Tactical air forces: 

Tactical nuclear systems 5, 32, I 2N 

Present quantitative balance 6, 45 

Percent of NATO air forces 7 

Quantitative balance in central Europe 7. 8, vX -~ 

U.S., Soviet aircraft compared ] I . 

F-15, F-16 nuclear capabilities 32, 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 45 

Title 10, DOD-directed functions 49 

See also United States, Armed Forces. 

Marine Corps: 

Present quantitative balance 5. 5N, 14 

Divisions included in U.S. total 5. 22 

Compared with Soviet naval infantry 5. 20-2 1 

Tactical air power 6, 23, 41 

Use of M-48 tanks 15N 

Mission 20 

Carrier air qualifications 23 

Quantitative trends, 1 905-75 44 

Title 10, DOD-directed functions 49-50 

See also United States, Armed Forces. 


Present quantitative balance 6, 7. 45 

U.S. assets unparalleled 14. 21, 30 

Tactical airlift problems 30. 30N 

R. & D. programs 31 

Aircraft types identified 45N 

Related to forward deployment 52 

Quantitative trends, 1 905-75 45 


Quantitative trends, 1 905-75 44 

U.S. dependence on foreign-flag shipping 21, 32 

U.S., Soviet compared 

Related to total force concepts 21 

R. & D. trends 31 

Related to forward deployment ~^2 


8G 3 1262 09112 4916 

Sealift— Continued 

Civil defense: Page 

Low priority 28 

R. & D. programs 31 

I'SAF. See United States, Strategic offensive forces; Strategic defensive 

forces; Tactical air forces; Airlift. 
USAREUR. See United States, Army. 
I SMC. See United States, Marine Corps. 


Vortical/short takeoff and landing aircraft: expected use on Soviet carriers. 6 

Vietnam war: 

U.S. Army, Marine strengths during 5N 

Aircraft during 7 

U.S. combat experience during 10 

Influence on total force concepts 16 

Influence on All-Volunteer Force 16 

Sealift during 21N 

Role of helicopters 23 

VSTOL. See Vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft. 


Warheads : 

Quantitative trends, 1965-75 3, 4, 43 

U.S. superiority cited 3, 4, 23 

Soviet stock versus U.S. I CBM requirements 26 

U.S. lead linked to MIRV requirements 31 

Defined 68 

Warsaw Pact: 

Lacks tactical nuclear capabilities 5N 

Soviet forces predominate 7 

Personnel strengths 7, 8 

Tactical air forces 7, 8 

Quantitative balance with NATO 7, 8, 9, 22 

Divisions, tanks 7, 8, 22 

Naval forces 8, 9 

Qualities related to NATO 11 

Installations dispersed • 11 

See also Soviet Union.